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The current literature on the role of media in the public sphere in general, and 
particularly politics, is divided among two opposing trends. The liberal/pluralists argue 
that media is playing a democratic role consisting of either representing public opinion 
and/or informing it. The critical theorists argue that media is in fact controlled by and 
represents elite interests. But even critical theories of the role of media in politics are 
driven by the belief that media ought to play a democratic and liberal role in society. 
Both theories therefore share a common normative understanding of what the role of 
media ought to be and are therefore the product of a common normative ideological 
framework, the liberal paradigm. This prevents them from properly framing the question 
of what media actually do in societies which lie beyond the scope of the experience of 
liberal Europe.  
This dissertation seeks to transcend this debate, and the liberal paradigm along 
with it, by arguing that, given a different historical context than the European one, the 
practice and ethos of media develop differently, and cannot therefore be understood 
from the lens of the European experience and the liberal paradigm born from within it. 
To do that, I use Bourdieu's theory of fields to trace the birth and evolution of the private 
press in Beirut and Cairo from 1858 till 1916. 
I look at journalism as a practice, both in terms of production and consumption, 
within a social space in constant upheaval. The major metamorphosis of this social space, 
whether at the level of politics, the economy, society, and ideas, helped constantly shape 
and reshape this practice throughout this period. The journalist moved from being an 
educator, to being a spectator, and ultimately a politician. His role in society changed 
with the changes affecting the field of journalism which was born out of the struggles 
within the field of education, to become an autonomous field, ending up being absorbed 
into the field of politics, therefore losing its autonomy. The ultimate conclusion is that the 
question of the role of the media in the public sphere can only be answered with the 
more appropriate and precise question of what is the role of what media in what context. 
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"My people and I have come to an agreement that satisfies us both. They 
are to say what they please, and I am to do what I please." - Frederick the 
Great (Knowles, 1999: 324) 
 
Frederick the Great was an enlightened despot. He ruled with an iron grip, but 
allowed his people to "say what they please" in the bourgeoning Prussian press. But was 
the freedom of the press in eighteenth century Prussia the same as the one John Milton 
advocated for in his Areopagitica? Why was it important for people in Western Europe to 
speak freely, even when they could not impact politics in any meaningful way? What then 
was the role that the press and mass communication had to play in these societies? 
These questions led to the rise of a heated debate between two camps, pluralists and 
critical theory. Pluralists, following in the footsteps of Milton and Mill, argued that the 
media played a liberal democratizing role in society, spreading information on political 
developments to people, and thus keeping the executive and legislative branches of 
government in check. Critical theorists opposed this argument and claimed that media in 
fact acted as a tool of elite propaganda, creating a perspective of the world that served 
elite interests and cemented the dominant socio-political worldviews. Even today, no 
synthesis ever came out of this duality, and both sides remain entrenched in their camps. 
The few recent attempts at bridging this rift (Robinson, 2000; Lawrence, 2000) only 
managed to present models of media that allow actors to jump from one archetype to 
the other. 
This could be explained by a second-level reading of this debate, where both 
sides agree on a key assumption about the role of the press in society. Pluralists and 
critical theorists both seem to assume that theoretically, media should play a democratic, 
pluralist, and liberal role in society. They disagree only on whether or not media actually 
plays this role. This normative assumption about the function of media can be traced 
across disciplines and theories, a fact which escapes almost all of the scholars and 
academics interested in media. In fact, I have only managed to find one statement 
criticizing this uncritical assumption about the role of media. Dominique Marchetti 
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(2002b: 8) wrote that one of the major obstacles facing sociologists of media is their 
ethical investment in the rhetoric of media as a fourth estate, which makes all their work 
revolve around the assessment of whether or not journalists perform this supposed 
function, if they "did their job well" and thus served the public good. Marchetti never 
went beyond this point though. The liberal paradigm remains prevalent in the literature. 
The only form of dissent comes from a marginal approach that criticizes the 
current literature for being Eurocentric. Alternative and radical media studies recognize 
that media theories are always constructed around empirical evidence provided by 
Western case studies; these theories, as a result, are incompatible with the realities of 
non-Western media operating in non-Western societies. So far, the answer to this 
academic Eurocentrism has been restricted to the introduction of non-Western media as 
an object of study in the English language, producing enough evidence to show that 
Western media theories truly cannot explain non-Western media, their behavior, and 
their social function (see Downing, 2011; Curran and Park, 2000). 
At a time when the media are rapidly and radically changing, technology allowing 
global access for both producers and consumers of the news, and new mediums 
providing platforms for the individual to become a producer of news from the comfort of 
his home, social theories of media need to come to grips with the reality that they have 
been incapable of delivering satisfying answers, nor of constructing a framework that can 
be used to assess the role of media and the social and political function it performs 
beyond the sterile duality that currently characterizes the literature. This thesis addresses 
the shortcoming in the literature on the role of media in society, and more specifically 
politics, by challenging the basic assumption around which it is founded. It seeks to 
formulate an alternative framework, beyond the liberal paradigm, through which we can 
conceptualize and identify the role media play in a particular society. The research 
question that will guide such demonstration is: what was the social and political role of 
the private Arabic press in Beirut and Cairo from its inception in 1858 till the outbreak of 
World War I? 
This question will be answered using Bourdieu's theory of fields. A social field, 
like journalism, is a particular space within the broader social space, where a social 
activity is conducted by sets of agents and governed by a set of rules and capitals which 
are specific to it. Reconstructing such a field first requires identifying the actors who are 
situated in it, defining where lies their social positions, and understanding their stakes in 
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the field. And since Bourdieu (1971; 1998; 2000a) presented the workings of a field in the 
same way as a production cycle, one has to account for how the commodity, the 
mediated message, came to be produced and consumed. This entails investigating the 
sets of practices and norms that came to define the journalistic endeavor. How did 
journalists produce their articles? What did they expect as gain from their labor? How did 
they interact with one another? How was their product received by the different 
audiences and how did they react to it? The answer lies in the combination of 
biographical information on journalists and a discursive analysis of the newspapers. 
Also, a defining characteristic of the field is the dominant capital in it. Where is 
that capital generated and by whom? How is it invested in the field? How is it recognized 
as dominant, therefore becoming or constituting part of the symbolic capital within the 
field that can be reinvested elsewhere? The importance of this investigation into the 
forms of capital relevant to the field is primordial to defining its autonomy, as well as 
who the key dominant actors in it are, and how the struggles for dominance inside 
present themselves. For example, while the field of Arabic journalism was constructed 
around cultural capital, the struggle for dominance came in the form of attempts at 
introducing other types of capital into the field, capitals which were in the hands of the 
dominant political actors who wanted to control the press. 
Finally, the theory of fields regards a social field as one among many inside the 
social space. Individuals are not restricted to a position within one field, and can 
therefore have different interests in different fields, and invest capital from one field into 
the other if that capital is meaningful there as well. The way actors behave in different 
fields reflects the relations between these different fields, especially when these actors 
become dominant in them, as the autonomy of a field is dictated by the capital specific to 
it. If that capital is generated somewhere else, the field becomes a sub-field of that other 
field where the relevant capital comes from. This relational perception of the uses of 
different forms of capital and their different sources is necessary to understand the 
relation between journalism and politics, the ultimate goal of this thesis. When we want 
to examine the ways in which journalism affects politics and vice versa, it is necessary to 
understand how the relation between the two fields comes to be and what rules and 
power relations govern it. In this case, these will be explained by the transfers of 
different forms of capital from the one field to the other, a two-way transfer that created 
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an interesting mix of a non-binding work relationship between dominant political actors 
and journalists. 
The value of the theory of fields for this study is threefold. First, it allows for a 
multi-level analysis of media which accommodates philosophical and sociological 
concepts that have often been seen as contradictory. For example, the structure, 
understood as the social space, does not deny the actor's agency, nor does that agency 
mean that there is no social structure. Another key example is that the material and the 
ideational do not work in opposition or in a necessarily causal relationship. Second, 
reconstructing the social space as the sum of different social fields, journalism being one 
of them, allows us to examine the relationship between the different fields and how the 
developments in one could affect the others. Changes to any particular field are thus 
internal and external processes, therefore not restricting the work of media to a simple 
discursive analysis or a restricted practice that only answers to the logic of the field itself. 
Third, the concept of habitus, which academics often praise for its bridging of structure 
and agency, introduces an equally important aspect to the study of media and society 
more generally speaking, that of time. By virtue of it being the sum of past social and 
individual experiences which are embedded in the schemes of perception, thoughts, and 
actions of the individual, the habitus places the moment that we are studying within a 
historical motion (Bourdieu, 1980: 91-2). It tells us that an individual's perception of the 
world and his freedom of action are swayed, without being directed, by past experiences 
and therefore historical evolution. To properly understand a practice or an ethos, one 
would therefore have to study their historical development. The lack of historical depth is 
considered to be a major weakness in the theories of media (Conboy, 2004; Curran, 
2002), a point this thesis will show to be well justified. 
Apart from interest and expertise, the choice of case study was dictated by two 
facts. First, this thesis is grounded in the radical approach to media which criticizes the 
Eurocentric approach to the topic both in theoretical and empirical terms. Looking at the 
evolution of a non-Western media, the Arabic press, would therefore attest to the failure 
of the current media theories to explain its social role. Furthermore, and as this thesis 
promotes an alternative framework to the study of media's social function, an 
unconventional case study would be better suited as a blank slate on which to begin 
construction on such an approach. Second, the Arabic press remains understudied, 
especially in the English-speaking world, with only one English book dedicated to it. Even 
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then, Ami Ayalon's the Press in the Arab Middle East (1995) lacks a proper theoretical and 
methodological framework, leading the author into multiple anachronistic analyses and 
assessments. His account, however, remains valuable as a comprehensive survey of the 
Arabic press. Arabic sources also leave much to be desired. They are almost exclusively 
presented as chronicles of the Arabic press, simply compiling basic information without 
analysis nor reflection (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913; Adib Muruwwa, 1961; Mishal Ghurayyib, 
1978). The answer to the research question of this thesis will therefore address our lack 
of knowledge about the role that the Aabic press played prior to World War I. 
I must address at this point something which, from our present perspective, 
might sound like an oddity. Studying the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo as a single 
field reflects the contemporary social, cultural, and intellectual realities of nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century Middle East. Unlike now, these two cities used to be, 
at least nominally, part of a single state, the Ottoman Empire. That ceased to be the case 
in 1882 when the British invaded Egypt and established their dominion over the once 
Ottoman province. Rather than creating a problem for this study, this rift will be 
considered as a challenge to current uses of Bourdieu's theory which restrict its scope to 
the national level, in order to show that geographical boundaries, or at least the 
Westphalian definition of statehood, do not necessarily reflect on the shape of a field. 
Also, population movement between the two cities was common enough back then. In 
fact, private journalism was introduced to Cairo at the hands of Syrian immigrants who 
established newspapers there. Many journalists alternated their work between the two 
cities. The audiences were also the same, as Beiruti newspapers were read in Cairo and 
vice versa. This reflected in the continuous interest of the papers of each city with the 
affairs of the other, all the way up to World War I. Consequently, the experiences of 
journalists and audiences were the same in both cities, which was even promoted by a 
parallel political evolution of the Ottoman and Egyptian-British governments and the way 
they both dealt with the press. 
This thesis will therefore reconstruct our understanding of the social field of 
journalism in Beirut and Cairo, focusing on some key questions. What did certain 
individuals want from embarking on a career of journalist? What interested them? What 
were the conducive social factors and how did these journalists rationalize their choice? 
How was the newspaper received and by whom? How did these audiences react to it? 
What were the required capitals to become an actor in the field and what did journalists 
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gain from producing the mediated message? It is obvious at this point that the interest of 
this research lies both with the producer and consumer of the newspaper, which, for the 
better part of the period under study, happened to be one and the same. The point is to 
show through the reconstruction of practices and ethos within the field that the Arab 
press does not conform to the current theories about the social function of media on 
both sides of the pluralist-critical debate, nor to the liberal paradigm, as the development 
of the ethos of journalism had nothing to do with liberal values. 
The first step is to identify the actors that constituted the field. Who were they as 
individuals and as a social class? What did they bring with them into the field in terms of 
capitals when they decided to become journalists? This leads to the start of the 
reconstruction of the practice of journalism. How did they justify founding the first 
newspaper, or their shift to "political journalism"? What was their rationale and what 
were the reasons for their actions and thoughts which they could not consciously 
conceive of, i.e. how did their habitus come to be and evolve? Whom did they address 
and how was their product received and by whom? What were the mechanisms of 
recognition which journalists adopted; how did they come to acquire symbolic capital 
within the field of journalism? How did they invest their newfound capital and what did 
that mean for other fields, most notably the field of politics? 
It is important to note that, in my search for answers, I will give priority to the 
voices of the journalists and their contemporaries rather than to those of present 
historians who often and for different reasons misinterpret meaning and intent, a point 
that will be further developed in Chapter III. This means priority will be given for the 
primary sources over the interpretations of the secondary literature on the Arab press. 
For the purpose of this study, I have examined eleven newspapers published in Beirut or 
Cairo between 1858 and 1916. Some of them survived most of this period, while others 
appeared for some time and then died out. I have focused only on political newspapers 
and disregarded literary and scientific magazines which despite their importance were of 
little relevance to this project. A total of almost 1,200 issues, were collected mostly at 
random. The issues that were specifically targeted, though, were the ones that featured 
articles and editorials on journalism, the Arabic press, and the role of the journalist. 
These offered invaluable insight into the minds of these journalists, how they thought of 
the profession they were building, and how they reflected on their role in society and the 
system of values that should govern their field. I have also examined autobiographies by 
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individuals who were involved in one way or another with the press, most notably 
khedive 'Abbas Hilmi and sultan 'Abdul Hamid, two figures who had a great impact on 
journalism in the Arab world. Most secondary sources, especially the Arabic ones which I 
criticized earlier for being too uncritical and descriptive in their surveys of the Arabic 
press, also reproduced and quoted articles, autobiographies, and books written by 
journalists, and thus provided one extra access point which I would have otherwise been 
deprived of. 
The thesis is divided according to the following plan. Chapter II will examine the 
two-level pluralist-critical debate. The first level pits the two approaches as contradictory, 
each trying to negate the other. The second level highlights the common normative 
framework which both approaches share, the liberal paradigm. I argue in this chapter 
that this liberal paradigm is the major obstacle facing the literature in the attempt to find 
a proper universal theory that explains the role of media in society. Chapter III examines 
Bourdieu's theory of fields and establishes how it will be used as a framework to study 
the rise and development of the Arabic press.  
Chapter IV is an analysis of the birth of journalism in Beirut. I take a look at the 
social, economic, and ideological changes that hit the Ottoman Empire during the first 
half of the nineteenth century to explain the birth of a new social class, the educated 
professional, and the rise of a new ideology, modernism. The arguement in this chapter is 
that the promotion of modern education to fill out the needs of the state resulted in the 
birth of a class with very little prospects for social advancement. Within this class, some 
individuals chose to invest their newly acquired cultural capital in an innovative venture 
which held the promise of public recognition, journalism. 
Chapter V looks at the development of political newspapers. The chapter will 
argue that, although there was need for information about political developments, no 
one knew what the "political" truly meant, as politics had previously been the exclusive 
domain of the ruler. A definition of what constituted the "political" had to slowly find its 
formulation on the pages of newspapers. At the same time, the journalist continued in 
the tradition of social exclusion. He was rejected by the social elites as an unworthy 
newcomer and he rejected the common man as being unworthy of his knowledge. 
Chapter VI takes a look at some major changes that affected the field of politics 
between the years 1876 and 1882. During those short years, the status of the ruler as the 
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legitimate and absolute authority was shattered and a new major actor, the British 
military, came to control Egypt. Journalists had an important part to play in these events. 
I will argue that it was then, and especially during the 'Urabi Revolution, that they 
learned of the value of representation and, as a consequence, began talking to and in the 
name of "the people". It was also then that they acquired a sense of legitimacy to 
produce political opinions. 
Chapter VII examines how the governments in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt 
began to pay more attention to the press in order to be able to control it. They 
introduced a new dominant capital into the field of journalism, social capital revolving 
around the major political actors, which provided journalists with access to information, 
protection, and prestige. In turn, journalists resisted this encroachment, but were 
eventually pulled into the political field as they began to invest the symbolic capital they 
generated in journalism into political capital, allowing them to play a minor role in the 
political field. But while their own definition of the "political" created the image of 
politics as a realm of possibilities, journalists, unlike the dominant political actors, did not 
truly recognize the rules of the game in the field of politics; ownership of the means of 
physical violence remained the ultimate tool that determined who dominated the 
political realm in the context of an imperial state system. 
Chapter VIII is an analisis of the function that the press played at every junction 
of its development. The one constant that continually appeared was the desire of 
journalists to be publically recognized, first among peers, and then from the rest of 
society. Another important issue to be delineated is that journalism operated along 
socio-political conservative lines. The worht of the press as a platform of political 
communication and what it entailed for the politics of the Empire will also be examined. 
Then, the empirical findings will be put in contrast with the current theoretical 
explanations of both the pluralist and critical approaches to the role of media in politics 
to show that they had failed to explain this case study, unlike Bourdieu's theory of fields 
which has allowed a genuine reconstruction of the field of journalism its ethos, the 
practices within it, and the broader socio-political role it played. 
The aim of this thesis is to therefore contribute to the social theory of media by 
pointing out a key deficiency that obstructs it, the normative and value-laden 
assumptions that theorists start with. To solve this issue, I advance Bourdieu's theory of 
fields as a viable alternative to current theories. When applied to a historical reading of 
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media in a particular context, it allows for a proper reading of the socio-political role 
these media play and how this role evolves. Such reading should be guided by the 
development of that particular media as part of that evolving particular context, rather 
than by the anachronistic, foreign, and utopian assumptions that current theorists 
impose on it. I seek to change the question of what is the public role of media into what 
are the roles of what media in what public. Only such context-specific theory could break 








This chapter will be divided into two major parts, each dedicated to a different 
layer at which the pluralist-critical debate takes place. The first layer presents the debate 
as traditionally understood in the literature, pitting pluralist and critical theorists in an 
argument about whether or not media play a liberal and democratizing role in society. 
Pluralists argue that media promote socio-political diversity, act as a watchdog, a fourth 
estate, and represent peoples' opinions in the public sphere. Critical theorists argue that 
media acts as a tool of control in the hands of the elites. These elites could be the 
economic elites financing media outlets, or political elites who inculcate their opinions 
and ideologies onto the audiences. For the purposes of this study, I will restrict my 
examination to the broad lines of the arguments on both sides of the debate, and will not 
extensively examine each and every theory which appeared on either sides.1 
The second layer, I will argue, reveals a normative commonality between the 
pluralist and the critical theorists and scholars. They both fundamentally agree that 
media has an intrinsic innate role, that of promoting democratic practices. Analysis of this 
aspect of the literature will focus more on the critical literature; the pluralists are not too 
coy about proclaiming their liberal normative values. The critical literature, however, 
hides the prevailing notion that media ought to play a liberal role. Their only problem is 
that media is not fulfilling this function. This, I argue, is at the core of this thesis' 
problematique. What would it mean for the way we understand the role of media in 
society if media is not supposed to play this liberal role to begin with? 
 
I. The pluralist-critical dichotomy 
The pluralist tradition can be traced back as early as 1644 with John Milton's 
Areopagitica, in which he makes a case for the freedom of the press as a quintessential 
element of the freedom of speech and freedom tout court (Kendall, 1960). This tradition 
                                                          
1 A more comprehensive literature review on this debate would prove to be a colossal task. I refer 
the reader to James Curran's Media and Power, in which the literature review of the works that 
were produced only in Britain and covered British media alone spanned over fifty-two pages 
(Curran, 2002: 3-55). 
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was carried on by some of the great philosophical and political figures of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, most notably John Stuart Mill in his treatise On Liberty, in which 
he argued that the freedom of the press is intrinsic to the freedom of the individual 
which should, in no case, be trampled upon or else democracy would turn into a "tyranny 
of the majority" (Mill, 1859: 8). The pluralist literature developed out of these basic 
philosophical tenets on freedom. 
The critical literature on how media affected society can be traced back to Harold 
Lasswell's Propaganda Techniques in the World War (1927) in which he studied the 
techniques belligerents used to influence their constituents, "the management of 
collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols" (Lasswell, 1927: 627). This 
study set the epistemological and methodological foundations of the discipline which was 
to be later named "media studies". But even though media studies grew out of 
propaganda studies, the ideological and political prerogatives that drove its early 
existence were entirely opposite to those of its disciplinary predecessor, a point which 
will be addressed later. The critical theories of the role of the press had to wait till the 
1960s to pick up, though, mainly under the influence of the Frankfurt School which 
produced some of the most groundbreaking analysis on that front, especially with 
Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (1964). 
This division between the two model-archetypes of liberal and elite-driven media 
has been constantly used in the literature to analyze the different accounts on media 
behavior and the relationship between mass media and mass society (Curran, 2002; 
Bennett, 1982; Robinson, 2008; Corner et.al., 1997; Baudrillard and Maclean, 1985). 
These two categories have been labeled in multiple ways. Curran labeled them 
"affirmative narratives", which he divided into five separate trends, the liberal, populist, 
feminist, libertarian, and anthropological trends, which all point toward a progressive and 
inclusive role of the media, and the "radical narrative" which opposes them with the idea 
of elite control (Curran, 2002: 33). Baudrillard calls them the optimistic and the 
pessimistic accounts, stressing that he belonged to the latter (Baudrillard and Maclean, 
1985: 577). But no matter how they are referred to, these two categories remain the 
cornerstone of the division within the literature, the two opposing sides of the pluralist-
critical dichotomy which I will examine next. 
A. The pluralist approach 
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As stated before, media studies as a sociological discipline was the successor of 
propaganda studies. After the end of World War II, interest shifted toward studying 
voters behavior; research funding shifted accordingly. The most influential study that set 
the pace for the future of the discipline was Paul Lazarsfeld's the People's Choice: how the 
voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign (1944). Lazarsfeld interviewed 3000 
voters to determine how political messages altered their perceptions and choices. 
Repeated interviews allowed him to statistically compare these changes. His work was so 
influential that he became known as the "father of American sociology" (Jerabek, 2001: 
229). He cooperated with Elihu Katz to produce Personal Influence (1955), in which they 
argued that, through the "two-step flow" of information, a communication theory 
Lazarsfeld had first introduced in the People's Choice, audiences showed resistance to the 
messages in the media, therefore rejecting the idea that media controlled people. Katz 
further developed this argument in Medical Innovation: a Diffusion Study (Coleman et.al., 
1966) in which he argued that medical doctors would respond to a particular media 
message based on their own experiences, personal connections, and professional 
networks. 
The core argument of these academics, who represented the "Columbia 
tradition" of communication studies (Peters, 2001: 19), was that media could not control 
people, but rather people were informed through the media of the social and political 
developments around them. This presented a sociological and positivist backing for the 
traditional claim that media acted as a watchdog, a fourth estate that keeps the 
government in check by informing the public which, in turn, holds politicians responsible 
for their actions. The watchdog argument remains a strong component of the pluralist 
approach, with the positivist methodology as one of its constant features. Recently 
Shyamal Chowdhury (2004) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) have argued that increased 
press freedom led to higher accountability and therefore reduced corruption. Economist 
Amartya Sen (1999a; 1999b) argues that a free press is essential to the economic 
development and welfare of nations since it allows the people to recognize wide-scale 
poverty and pressure governments to handle it. Sen (1999a: 7-8) makes a remarkable 
claim, even though he conflates correlation and causation in it: "in the terrible history of 
famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and 
democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no 
matter where we look". McNair (2000) has argued that the expanding size and quantity 
of different media outlets has given the public even more access to information. 
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Criticisms as to the professionalism and quality of news media, he argued, hid the fact 
that journalists are becoming more rigorous in their coverage of political news. Other 
efforts, such as John Keane's (1992) attempt at reverting back to some philosophical 
grounding of the watchdog argument, are also worth mentioning. He considered that 
freedom of the media is essential not only to make the public aware of political 
developments, but to also make social life not boring; for him, " a society [...] which 
contains no controversies over freedom of expression and representation, is a society 
that is surely dying, or dead" (Keane, 1992: 129). 
The other major argument in the pluralist approach is that of representativeness. 
Uses and gratifications theory is the most important theoretical formulation of how 
media represents public opinion; it is the consumer who chooses what medium to follow 
and what message to digest, which means that the particular message therefore 
represents the opinion of this consumer. In their 1969 book, Television in Politics, Blumler 
and McQuail examined how British voters reacted to the elections of 1964, and more 
precisely how they chose to watch particular media messages at a time when short and 
competing programs were broadcasted simultaneously. Along with Brown, they followed 
up on their findings to categorize audiences based on the types of gratification they got 
from watching a particular media production, concluding that there were four major 
categories: diversion, personal relationships, personal identity, and surveillance (McQuail 
et.al., 1972: 155). These different categories underlined the differences between 
audience members, and how each of them identified with a particular program based on 
their social, cultural, and psychological context (McQuail et.al., 1972: 163). A more 
complete theory was formulated by Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973), who examine in 
their article the different aspects of the uses and gratifications theory, the assumptions 
behind it, how different medias offer different gratifications, how audience needs have to 
be socially grounded, and finally, what the effects of the different types of gratifications 
are. It must be noted that there has been a recent resurgence of the uses and 
gratifications theory, especially with the increased interest in new media and how people 
react to the new technology which supposedly brings forth more of the individual into 
the realm of mass communications (Gilder, 1994; Leung and Wei, 2000; Papacharissi and 
Rubin, 2000). 
It is clear therefore that the pluralist approach favors the informational aspect 
that media provides for its consumers. Whether from the perspective of a watchdog or 
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that of the users and gratifications theory, pluralists argue that media brings forth the 
audience  into the public sphere. As a watchdog, it informs this audience for it to take 
political action. As gratification, it gives its audience a choice, and therefore represents 
that choice and the consumer of the media product along with it. The major shortcoming 
of the pluralist approach, however, is that its main focus is on the consumption process, 
on how audiences interact with the media message, and what the effects of that message 
are. There is an almost complete disregard for the production aspect of the news. Media 
messages are presented as if they existed as a bubble, hanging in the air, and waiting to 
be picked up by a wandering audience. Livingstone (1997: 26-7), writing about Katz in 
particular, rightfully argues that his functionalist approach, along with the underlying 
assumptions of his work, hide a normative and undeclared drive to promoting a 
democratic model of society, a model where the individual is preserved and protected as 
a self-determining socio-political agent. The same applies to all other pluralist 
theoreticians, which is the main point that critical theorists seek to address. 
B. The critical approach 
The basic premise of the critical approach is that the flow of information from the 
media to the audience only goes one way, which makes the audience a recipient of the 
produced message which then serves to shape that recipient's worldviews and opinions. 
This premise took many shapes and developed into multiple theories and approaches to 
the study of media. The most enduring and influential remains the one launched by the 
scholars of the Frankfurt School. The first of their publications to come to mind is Herbert 
Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man (1964), an analysis of how mass culture in advanced 
industrial society helped promote false consciousness by creating unnecessary needs for 
society, needs that are achieved through consumerism. His views on the role of media in 
this process are scathing: 
Our insistence on the depth and efficacy of these controls is open to the 
objection that we overrate greatly the indoctrinating power of the 
"media," and that by themselves the people would feel and satisfy the 
needs which are now imposed upon them. The objection misses the 
point. The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of 
radio and television and with the centralization of their control. The 
people enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long standing. 
[...] Indeed, in the most highly developed areas of contemporary society, 
the transplantation of social into individual needs is so effective that the 
difference between them seems to be purely theoretical. Can one really 
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distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and 
entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination? 
(Marcuse, 1964: 10-11). 
In this short paragraph, Marcuse created a paradigm shift from simply looking at media 
as a consumption activity, to examining the production of media and the social, cultural, 
and ideological processes that shape and structure this production. He had taken Adorno 
and Horkheimer's concept of "culture industry", which they had advance in their 1944 
book, Dialectic of Enlightenment, and transformed it into a mature view of media 
production, breaking past its status of quasi-Nietzschian rant against popular culture. 
 The Frankfurt School's take on the production of culture, mainly through mass 
communications, coincided with an increased interest by European thinkers, scholars, 
and academics in critical assessments of the role of media in social life. This was a 
symptom of the rise of the European critical approach, an overarching category which 
combined different Western Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, as well as the theories 
which splintered off from them. There seems to have been enough of a disciplinary and 
theoretical division at this level for the study of media to have been seen as of the 1960s 
as being divided between a North American "administrative" approach and a European 
"critical" one (Corner et.al., 1997: 2-4). This "critical" approach was shaped by the work 
of French structuralists, such as Althusser and Lévi-Strauss, and the British New School 
and its notable scholars, Stuart Hall and E.P. Thompson., two of the founders of the 
discipline of cultural studies (Curran et.al., 1982: 18). However, the critical approach to 
media was less homogeneous than this categorization presents it to be with its internal 
theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary divisions that accompanied the rise of 
contending scholarly trends: political economy of the media, cultural studies, post-
modernism, post-structuralism, social history, as well as a deviation toward the positivist 
North American tradition of media studies, albeit with a critical view on the role of 
media. 
The political economy approach strongly relied on a Marxian analysis of the role 
of media. They argue that mass media is primarily a commercial enterprise and that, as a 
result, the prime motivator of media production must be catering to the needs of 
advertisers, sponsors, and investors. Aside from the commercial imperatives which some 
academics stress (see Murdock and Golding, 1997; Curran, 1977; Herman, 1997), the bulk 
of the political economy argument revolves around the ideological hegemony that such 
imperatives lead to. Media is thus seen as structured by social controls, and 
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simultaneously exerting control over the audience through the mediated message. The 
ideology of the dominant class which owns the media therefore comes to create social 
consciousness, or more precisely false-consciousness, through mediated mass 
communication (Bennett, 1982: 45-6; Murdock, 1982: 114). It must be noted that the 
theory of the political economy of media grew as a reaction against both the traditional 
Orthodox Marxist literature on the topic and the American domination of the field. It was 
an attempt at introducing Marxism into media studies without being stuck at the 
dogmatic discourse. Marxism, or at least the economic lens it provided, had been 
completely absent from Western European media studies tradition (Curran, 2002: 108). 
The efforts of academics such as Curran, Bennett, and Murdock, to introduce the 
economy as a key component of media studies was met with much resistance, especially 
from fellow critical theorists. One of the most famous opponent to their "economism" 
was none other than Stuart Hall, one of the key thinkers of the New Left, and a founding 
father of cultural studies and the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. His approach 
was influenced by the writings of Louis Althusser, especially on the relationship between 
media, ideology, and the state (1969), in which the French structuralist accepts that the 
reproduction of the dominant ideology is not a direct linear process, and that the 
medium through which this ideology spreads has a relative degree of autonomy of 
practice, and Gramsci's theory of "hegemony", especially in relation to the "crises of 
hegemony" in the different spheres of the superstructure (Woollacott, 1982: 105-6). In 
his edited book, Policing the Crisis (1978), Hall criticizes the political economy argument, 
which he compares to "simple conspiracy theories", and offers an alternative view where 
the news producer has a relative room to maneuver free from structural constraints. This 
freedom, however, comes as a "secondary definer" to the systemic reproduction of the 
interests of the powerful as "last instance", to quote Althusser (Hall et.al., 1978: 57). Hall 
later advanced the notion that a more complex approach to media ought to be adopted, 
one which transcended the study of the simple transmission-reception linearity. He 
presented his Encoding/decoding model, in which he argued that each step between the 
formation of the news and the consumption of the news is governed by its own practice 
and rationale, which he studies at the discursive level, where the process of 
communication takes place. The encoding of the message contains a "preferred reading" 
which the producer seeks to transmit. This preferred reading is embedded with the 
dominant ideology. This, however, does not mean that this is the reading that the 
consumer of news will absorb. The social position and context of the consumer will 
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determine one of three possible decodings. If he accepts the preferred reading, he would 
then abide by the "dominant-hegemonic code". If he accepts the grand significance of 
the code, i.e. the legitimacy of hegemony, but opposes its situational message, then he 
would read a "negotiated version" of the message. If through decoding, the consumer 
rejects the hegemony of the dominant ideology, then he would have adopted the 
"oppositional code" (Hall, 1980: 125-7). Hall's theory has come under a lot of criticism for 
not being developed or sophisticated enough, which is to be expected since his only 
contribution to this topic has been his ten-page paper "Encoding/Decoding" (for a 
detailed enumeration of the different critiques, see Pillai, 2006). His contribution, 
however, needs not be restricted to this specific theory. Within the critical tradition, he 
shifted attention from the acts of social and political participatory resistance to 
hegemony which characterized other critical theories to the act of individual resistance at 
the level of consumption. He was also among the first in Britain to focus on the 
importance of discourse in understanding power relations and their distribution and 
reproduction, a hallmark of cultural studies. 
A similar philosophical and sociological shift was also taking place in France 
during the same time. The postmodernist post-structuralist approach to media found its 
philosophical formulation in the works of Michel Foucault, most notably l'Archéologie du 
Savoir (1969) and Surveiller et Punir (1975). Foucault set the stage for a discursive 
analysis of power in which language represents a system where power relations 
manifest, are reproduced, and resisted. Jean Baudrillard was also a major figure in this 
respect, especially with regards to his article, "the Masses: the Implosion of the Social in 
the Media" (1985), a follow-up on his book, à l'Ombre des Majorités Silencieuses (1982). 
Baudrillard viewed the role of media with from a pessimistic perspective, claiming that 
what he sees is a tool of "noncommunication", since media is not a space for exchange 
and dialogue, "a reciprocal space of speech and response" (Baudrillard, 1985: 577). Still, 
he claims that the audience has managed to resist this one-way flow of information by 
simply being disinterested, not only by the message, but by the political process 
altogether. He concludes on a somehow nihilistic note that this resistance is childlike 
behavior at best, since the system only offers no real escape (Baudrillard, 1985: 588). His 
is the propaganda argument taken to the extreme, as he is the only scholar to claim that 




The effect of postmodernism and post-structuralism on the theories and studies 
of media cannot be underestimated. They brought forth a very important aspect to the 
study of discourse, which is the historical dimension of meaning. Meanings and words 
now had an "archaeology", they evolved. Social constructionism had a major impact on 
media studies, especially that it brought forward the question of how we came to 
understand certain aspects of social life as we do today. While this was not a new 
invention in absolute terms, especially with the rise of social intellectual history in the 
1950s with its two famous schools, the French School and the Cambridge School, Curran 
rightly argued that media studies had undeservingly completely forgotten about the 
history of media, and I might add history tout court (Curran, 2002: 3). The result of this 
theoretical shift was a renewed interest in some of the core assumptions guiding 
journalism, most notably the ethos of journalists and news creators. David Mindich 
(1998) discussed how the concept of objectivity evolved across time in the United States, 
and how it slowly came to dominate the ethos of journalism. Stephen Ward (2004) did 
the same with his analysis of the evolving construction of the ethics of the journalist. He 
concluded that objectivity in news presentation is more of a pragmatic rather than an 
absolute approach to objectivity. The scope of this approach, however, no matter how 
valuable for someone looking at the broad picture of the role of media in the public 
sphere, and more precisely politics, retains a certain aspects of depoliticizing of media, in 
the sense that they are presented as studies of the evolution of meaning s and concepts 
within the closed circle of the media, disregarding the broader power relations that 
shape not the defining of the meaning, but of society's relationship with those operating 
under said definition as a result of its formulation and reformulation (Thornham et.al., 
2009: 13). 
One must also mention at this point that the American tradition of media studies 
witnessed a critical shift as a response to the challenge posed by the European 
approaches. While American scholars and academics retained their positivist and 
behavioralist methodologies, they began to question some of the liberal premises around 
the role of media. One of the first and most influential study in this regard remains 
Shanto Iyengar, Mark Peters, and Donal Kinder's  "Experimental Demonstrations of the 
"Not-So-Minimal" Consequences of Television News Programs" (1982), in which they 
introduced the concept of "news priming". Grounded in cognitive psychology, they 
argued that since the viewer does not have ready access to knowledge and information, 
he will make political decisions based on what is readily available, that is what is being 
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offered in the news. This includes how to form normative judgments and values, as well 
as how to assess certain issues. Media was therefore not only setting the agenda for the 
viewer, but also shaping how issues are perceived to be important (Iyengar et.al., 1982: 
852-5). In another study, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) experimented with different factors 
that might shield the viewer from the effects of media, arguing that political activism 
would minimize the effects of agenda-setting, but that, contrary to popular beliefs, 
education did not. Priming, on the other hand, proved to be much more pervasive 
despite the different mitigating factors. The conclusion of their work is quite remarkable: 
"in commanding attention and shaping opinion, television is now an authority virtually 
without peer. Near the close of the twentieth century, in the shadow of Orwell's 1984, it 
would be both naive and irresponsible to pretend that such an authority could ever be 
neutral" (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 133). Back in 1972, Dallas Smythe (1972: 25) wrote: 
"one might hope that the results of rigorous logic and observation pursued outside the 
laboratory might in this area acquire status as intellectually valid 'evidence'". It had taken 
American media studies forty years to reach a conclusion which had been a given for 
their European counterparts ever since they started discussing the role of media in 
society in the 1940s; but now they had the numbers to support this argument. 
This divergence from the traditional tenets of American media studies continued 
and intensified. The early 1990s saw the introduction of news framing theory. It was a 
theory that was based on the realization that space is one of the major constrictions 
facing the production of a news piece. All opinions and points of view could not possibly 
fit inside a single news story, which means that gatekeepers must make a choice 
concerning what to include, a choice which reflects their values and norms that 
necessarily find their way into the news piece they are in the process of constructing 
(Kuypers, 2010: 299). According to Robert Entman, "frames typically perform four 
functions: problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion" 
(Entman, 2010: 336). Framing studies further revealed that the individual's political 
decisions are heavily influenced by how media frames the political issue at hand, 
confirming "the inherently circumstantial nature of human judgment" (Iyengar, 1991: 
130). What is most important in this shift in perception of American scholars is that they 
were no longer looking at media in simple terms of effects on an audience. The 
production of news had become a key variable in their studies, as news producers insert 
a clear political agenda into the news frame, deliberately shaping and affecting the 
political consciousness of their viewers (Denton and Kuypers, 2008: 117; Entman, 2007). 
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Entman rightly noticed that framing theory has allowed academics to highlight the notion 
of power, one which was completely absent from American media studies (Entman, 
2010: 333). 
Peters (2001: 26) identifies one further critical approach to the study of media, 
the radical approach, mostly represented by Noam Chomsky. In one of the most 
influential books on the role of media in politics, Manufacturing Consent (1988), Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky present their "propaganda model" through which they 
explain the hold media moguls and states and governments have over the media, with 
special emphasis on the United States. They conduct an extensive content analysis of 
different cases to show the dichotomy in the produced news between a worthy story and 
an unworthy one, a legitimate political procedure and an illegitimate one. Their 
conclusions are straightforward. Basically, big businesses have better access to news 
production and tend to reproduce the official storyline that perpetuates the socio-
political order. Manufacturing Consent actually provides the conceptual tools to assess 
the systematic bias in news production, and this is what mainly separates Chomsky and 
Herman from the rest of the political economy of media theorists. Their other 
publications consolidate this approach to the examination of bias, and how such bias 
creates the illusion of truth, especially in democratic societies (Chomsky, 1989; 2002; 
Herman, 1993). The most important contribution of Chomsky and Herman, though, was 
that they opened the mind of the American audience to the fact that media are 
structured in a way that forces propaganda not only on the audience, but on the 
producers themselves; and they did so in a language that was broadly accessible, unlike 
their fellow social scientists who still clung to positivism and the absolute truth of 
correlating numbers. Others followed and tried to fill the major gap that Manufacturing 
Consent left, which was the link between the practice of producing a news piece and the 
content in that piece. Accounts of the practices of producing the news under the 
structural restraints of politics and business such as Sparrow's Uncertain Guardians 
(1999) began to appear and be received with more legitimacy at the American front of 
media studies. 
C. Dialogue of the deaf? 
It seems that the pluralist-critical debate revolves around two clear and opposite 
presuppositions. The pluralists argue that media helps promote democracy, as it informs 
the citizens of political developments they have no other access to, and it represents 
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their opinions at times when the traditional mechanisms of checks on the government, 
like elections, are pending. Proponents of the critical approach view media as a tool of 
propaganda and population control working for the benefit of elites and the structure of 
power which benefits them. But after the review of the major theories and approaches 
which drive both arguments, one cannot hope but wonder if this debate does not mask a 
false dichotomy. 
Proponents of each of the two arguments look at different aspects of the cycle of 
media, here meant to include both the production and consumption of news, and all of 
the ramifications that grow out of each of these actions-practices. They also use different 
tools, methodologies, and epistemologies to explain the specific part of the cycle they are 
looking at. Liberals usually follow a behavioralist approach to look at audience effects. 
What matters for them is how and to what extent people resist the message of the 
media. Alternatively, they are interested in showing that, when the message is not 
resisted, it is because of the willingness of the audience member to accept it and, 
therefore, becomes represented by it. Critical theorists, on the other hand, are more 
interested in the process of producing the news, and most importantly the ideological 
constraints that come up with this production. Prior to the adoption of a critical view in 
media studies in North America, there has rarely been any critical theorist to approach 
the subject from a positivist lens. In fact, all of the European media theorists and 
sociologists interested in media have approached the topic from an anti-positivist 
interpretive perspective. Whether or not this means that we need to rethink if there is 
truly a debate between the two sides is an issue that will be touched upon later, based 
on the findings of this research. It is something that must be kept in mind when 
questioning some of the underlying assumptions of the theories that try to explain the 
role of media in politics. 
 
II. The debate's second tier, where they all just get along 
The notion that the two contradictory arguments might not be so contradictory 
after all is a thought that has been out there for some time now. In fact, there has been 
recent attempts at both sides of the ocean to try and come up with a unifying theory, or 
at least a theory that would present the two sides of the argument not in mutually 
exclusive terms. In this section, I will start by examining these attempts, first because 
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they are in and by themselves important and influential theories that have been gaining 
much ground recently, but also because they are a prelude to the core and contribution 
of this literature review, in that they indicate, by the mere fact of their existence, that 
there is a certain unifying factor that underlines all of the current approaches to the 
study of the role of media in society. I will then argue that this unification takes place not 
at the methodological or epistemological levels, but at the ontological level where 
dormant liberal normative values pervade the analysis of even the most radical of leftist 
thinkers and academics. 
A. Alternatives and middle-grounds 
Two recent theories have come to recently challenge the pluralist-critical 
dichotomy: Piers Robinson's "policy-media interaction model" and Regina Lawrence's 
"event driven news". They both share some very similar features, in that they both agree 
that media is usually elite-driven, but, occasionally, it can perform a critical role which 
forces policymakers to respond to a sort of popular pressure. For Robinson (2000; 2002), 
this takes place when policymakers and elites are not too certain about what their 
position is from a particular issue. Then, media can play a critical role and influence the 
policymaking process. For Lawrence (2000), it is when unexpected events occur and elites 
do not have sufficient time to process them and come up with an "official line", that 
journalists manage to escape the boundaries of controlled media and promote a critical 
attitude toward the particular event. Robinson and Lawrence therefore recognize the 
dichotomy as valid and that the two archetypes exist, except that they claim that media 
behavior might jump from one side to the other depending on circumstance. 
Habermas, in his now classic the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1989), also offers an alternative view of the role of mass communication in society. 
During the eighteenth century, Habermas argues, the major European cities' public 
sphere, as represented by their reading houses and cafes for example, were a vibrant 
realm where rational ideas and communication devoid of the influence of interests 
roamed freely. This model of a free, successful, and rational public sphere should have 
become universal. It was a sort of "golden age" for mass communication. Instead, 
Habermas claims, the rise of commercial mass media, the destruction of the boundary 
between the private and the public spheres, and the "refeudalization" of society, all 
combined to crush the bourgeois public sphere. The ultimate goal of mass 
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communication, however, remains to convey free and rational thought that is unimpeded 
by statist or social forces. 
Habermas' theory of the public sphere received much attention in the realm of 
media studies, mostly in the form of negative comments, which reflected the general 
attitude to Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in the different disciplines of 
social sciences. His account was mostly deemed ahistorical, as it relied on a fictional 
utopian view of the bourgeois public sphere in modern age Europe. His theory was self-
contradictory. It claimed that the bourgeois public sphere represented the height of 
liberal democrtic ideals, but consciously rejects the participation of other elements of 
modern society in public debates. Also, it completely disregards the fact that the public 
sphere by then had become so diverse in form and in content that it was impossible to 
assess it from such reductionist perspective, especially when looked at as a "dialogical" 
entity while disregarding mass media as a factoring innovation born out of the modern 
age (Thompson, 1993). John Thomspon, one of Habermas' most quoted critics, presents 
his own argument on the function and development of mass communication in Europe 
from the age of modernity onward. In the Media and Modernity (1995), Thompson 
chooses an approach which had been previously somehow disregarded for being too 
technologically deterministic, Marshall McLuhan's media-centric approach (1964). 
Thompson's account focuses on what Habermas misses, the rising role of the media and 
their becoming the dominant form of human interaction and communication. The core 
argument in his account is that the development of commercial mass media has generally 
pointed toward a clear identification of the relations of power in favor of the owners and 
producers of media, but that the technological progress of media could contribute to the 
development of a "'deliberative democracy' - not so much as an alternative to 
representative institutions but as a way of developing and enriching them" (Thomspon, 
1995: 255). Media has therefore the potential to be liberal, if people were willing to see it 
develop in that direction. 
The final model of a middle-ground position I will examine here is the one 
advanced by Cees Hamelink. Hamelink looked at the behavior of certain media, like the 
Nazi propaganda machine and the radios in Rwanda, and realized that media could serve 
to promote violence and conflict rather than being a tool for enlightenment and 
progress. In what he calls the "escalation spiral", Hamelink (2011) identifies a trail of 
rhetorical development that media use to promote social violence and incite to war. 
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While this might seem like a banal statement, Hamelink (2008) argues that the literature 
had not previously portrayed the behavior of media as such, nor did it expect it to work 
this way. All previous studies on the link between media and violence generally focused 
on the impact of violent messages on the behavior of individuals, but never on how they 
incite social violence (Hamelink, 2011: 36-8). His claims should come as no surprise, 
seeing how his article "Media between Warmongers and Peacekeepers" (2008) featured 
in the opening issue of the journal Media, War & Conflict, the first journal dedicated to 
studying the effect of media on mass violence. It was only then that the academic world 
first began to imagine that media could actually play a role in war. Still, for Hamelink, this 
behavior is deviant and atypical of regular media behavior, which, for the purpose of our 
examination, means that he perceived that media could play any of the two roles. What 
is even more interesting, but remains a point that he barely reflects on, is that he 
accepted that the abhorrent role media play is not restricted to the non-Western world. 
From the scholars advancing models and theories that lie in-between the two 
archetypes, and therefore remain entrenched in a pluralist-elite spectrum, I will move to 
examine some theories that present an alternative framework to the role of media. Here, 
I must start with Bourdieu's small treatise, sur la Télévision (1996), in which he gave one 
of his very few commentaries on journalism and television, first because his theory of 
fields is the theory I chose to guide my own research, and second, and more importantly, 
because neither he nor his students and colleagues fully used this theory to answer the 
question of what role media play in society, even though it is a question Bourdieu set out 
to answer. He approached the topic from the examination of the practice of journalistic 
production and most notably from the structural restrictions that are imposed on the 
journalist while producing his message. These structural limitations, as Bourdieu 
presented them, had more to do with the practical aspect of journalistic production, i.e. 
the choice of a story, how to make it interesting for the viewer, the speed of thinking and 
reporting, competition among journalists, and competition for a share of the market. 
Bourdieu's account therefore dismissed any larger implications for the journalistic 
practice and how it related different fields and actors in the social space to one another. 
Journalism was reduced from a medium of mass communication, a platform for broad 
social interaction, into a practice within a field, which at best reduces the public's 
interaction with other fields to one governed by the simple modalities of a consumer 
society. He called that the "audimat", the illusion of a free-to-choose audience which is 
governed by the law of media marketing (Bourdieu, 1996: 78). While this may seem like 
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Bourdieu's account might fit into the critical approach, his economic model of a 
production-consumption nexus, even though it lexically borrows from a traditional 
economic analysis, is centered around the trade in the symbolic good of the information 
flow. It is the message that is the commodity, and not the audience numbers, like the 
political economy of media theorists argue. Still, the brevity in which he addressed the 
topic leaves much to be desired from his analysis; he forced on himself some of the same 
restrictions that he claimed were facing journalists, since he presented his treatise in the 
form of a televised lecture and was therefore forced to limit his message, both in form 
and in content, to account for a broad lay audience as well as a different medium than 
the one he usually used, the printing press. 
His approach, though, has gained a lot of attention in the academic world, not 
only because of sur la Télévision, but also because his theory of fields had attracted 
academics who were looking for an alternative framework from which to look at media. 
The merits of his theory will be more fully examined in Chapter III, but it suffices to say 
here that his framework allowed for an examination of the media as an autonomous 
social field and, at the same time, as a field that interacts with other fields around it. It 
permits looking at the specificities of the act, media production, as a set of practices, 
rituals, and relations, and understand this activity and how it relates to other social acts. 
French academics had been using the theory for years. Eric Neveu wants to bring 
everyday's journalist to the center of the political communication process, focusing on his 
"ordinary functioning" and the "ordinary moments" (Neveu and Kuhn, 2002: 5). 
Everyday's practice and the habitus of the journalist, guided by field theory, represent, 
according to Neveu, a promise of a social theory that is more complex than the 
traditional public sphere theory and better suited for empirical investigation (Benson and 
Neveu, 2005: 1-2). Dominique Marchetti did a little more than translate Bourdieu's ideas. 
He implemented them to study particular phenomena that developed in the French 
media, like the rise of scandal as a characteristic of successful journalism, linking this 
phenomenon to changes within the judiciary and political fields (Marchetti, 2000), or the 
development of sub-fields within the field of journalism (Marchetti, 2002a). Even outside 
of France, the theory of fields proved to be a strong attraction to scholars who needed an 
alternative framework to study media. Nick Couldry (2003b; 2006) relies heavily on 
Bourdieu's theory to map out a new road for media studies; it addresses "two crucial 
landmarks (knowledge and agency) that imply a third (ethics)", claiming that this map 
eventually leads to answering the question of the role of media in the social order 
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(Couldry, 2006: 25). Still, the only impediment in the face of reaching an answer to this 
question has been that researchers have applied this theory only to narrow case studies, 
like the ones mentioned above, usually shying away from answering the major question 
that Couldry wants to address. 
The final alternative current that needs to be addressed here is that which 
Couldry and Curran (2003: 6) labeled "alternative media: the forgotten land". The label 
here might be misleading, as the major scholars who represent this trend use different 
headings to categorize it. John Downing (2011) refers to it as "radical media" or "social 
movement media". Clemencia Rodriguez et.al. (2014) call it "alternative, radical, and 
citizens' media". No matter what we call it, though, the objective of the study of 
alternative media is the same: to examine the experiences from the global south, 
women, different communication formats, non-English media and studies, and both 
repressive and progressive media (Downing, 2011: xxv); more simply, it is to look at the 
fringes of mass communication and its studies, to look at what has been largely neglected 
for not being part of the mainstream media, both in form and in content. The stress in 
this theory is put on the local and the locale, even though recent transformation in the 
uses of the internet has brought a new perspective to the study of alternative media. 
Still, one of the core foundations of this approach is its consciousness of the pervasion of 
Eurocentrism across the literature, both in terms of theoretical and conceptual 
formulations, as well as in terms of interest in empirical studies. It must be of some 
indication that, until this point in this literature review, the claim that no theory and 
approach was interested in looking at media outside of Western Europe and North 
America was made. Outside of this fairly recent development from the peripheries of the 
discipline, there is not even a confession, let alone a reflection, on the exclusiveness of 
the field in terms of social, political, or cultural diversity. The European experience is so 
engrained in the minds of scholars and academics of media that they do not even 
question this point; but that will be addressed in the next section. What matters most for 
this research here, is that alternative media studies bring to the fore the question of 
difference with the mainstream versions of media and, even more interestingly, the 
commonplace understandings of what role media play in society. It is an academic 
discipline which recognizes that media is a different tool in different contexts and it is 
therefore within this prism that this current research is located. 
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In this regard, I must mention two works that can be situated under this loose 
umbrella called "alternative media research", and which target the Eurocentrism in the 
literature. First, Curran and Park (2000) try to de-Westernize media studies. To do so, 
they dedicate eleven of their twenty-two chapter book to non-Western case studies, that 
is if we consider Russia to be non-Western, and most of these chapters are ironically 
written by Westerners who still try to forage how media promotes democracy in areas 
like the Middle East and how it is introducing a modernity that challenges the backward 
ways of the locals (Sreberny, 2000). Such Orientalist view, however, does not diminish 
from the fact that Curran and Park sought to address a problem which they thought 
hindered the discipline. The opening paragraph of their volume read: "this book is part of 
a growing reaction against the self-absor[p]tion and parochialism of much Western 
media theory. It has become routine for universalistic observations about the media to 
be advanced in English language books on the basis of evidence derived from a tiny 
handful of countries" (Curran and Park, 2000: 2). It is therefore important to point out 
that there was a certain level of consciousness as to the limitations of the literature in its 
understanding of anything "foreign". This skepticism toward Eurocentric approaches and 
the Eurocentric socio-historical experience is at the core of this current research project. 
The other book that I want to mention here is Noha Mellor's Modern Arab 
Journalism (2007) in which she uses Bourdieu's theory of fields to assess the field of Arab 
journalism in recent years. Of great interest to this thesis is how Mellor understood the 
role of media, in parallel to that of education, in the attempted cementing of a 
modernization project, and the obstacles it faced. She situated journalistic practice within 
its social context, linking it to the pertinent fields with which it interacts and to which it 
contributes. But, what is more relevant than her findings is the questions she asks and 
which this research project seeks partly to answer. Three points must be addressed here. 
First, she acknowledges that the lack in current knowledge about Arab media is caused 
not by the unanswered questions, but by those that remain unasked. Second, Western-
developed theories, even Bourdieu's theory of fields, cannot be uncritically adopted in 
other contexts. Third, she pays attention to the issue of the Arabic language and the 
different forms its takes, and the development and evolution of these forms across time 
and communication platforms (Mellor, 2007: 1-5). Her subsequent analysis is a very 
interesting mapping of the state of Arab journalism in recent years, a snapshot of what 
the field looks like. This dissertation should be read as further development of the 
foundations that Mellor set, focusing on two key points. First, like most sociological 
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accounts, Modern Arab Journalism offers a momentary glimpse, an analysis of the 
"present moment" that describes the field of journalism, even though the author 
examines the prior decade as historical background. This thesis will adopt a more 
extended view of the historical process, to show a very important point that a snapshot 
of the field misses: practices evolve and develop, so does the ethos of the field, and 
consequently, its social function. Second, I will take Mellor's argument which firmly 
belongs to the alternative approach to media studies and a criticism of Eurocentrism 
within the broader literature as a starting point for more engagement with the social 
theory of media. 
B. The liberal paradigm, the theory's cul-de-sac 
The importance of the alternative and middle-ground theories is that they point 
us in the direction of the argument I will present in this section, albeit each from a 
different perspective. The in-betweeners suffer from exposed symptoms of the liberal 
paradigm, as their whole aim is to desperately try and find the liberal behavior among all 
the structural and elite-driven propaganda that they discern. The alternative approach, 
on the other hand, tries to put its finger on the real problem. They recognize that it 
comes from the exclusive focus on European media as a basis for empirical studies and 
theoretical formulations. Still, their efforts remain largely peripheral and rarely touch on 
the theories of media. What they often offer is an indigenous look at fringe media, and I 
include in that peripheral media within Europe and North America, or at areas that have 
yet to be academically explored, especially in the English language. In fact, I would not be 
surprised if there is a non-English tradition of media studies which has yet to find its way 
into Western academia. What I can tell for certain is that it is not the case in the Arab 
world.2 In this section, I will take the alternative approach a step forward, specifically 
pointing at the root of the problem facing the theories of media. It is, I argue, the 
imposition of a liberal normative understanding of the role of media which truly restricts 
a proper understanding of this role. I will trace the pervading liberal norms in the 
literature, especially among critical theorists, to show how they try to impose their values 
on the role of media, and more precisely on how media should function and behave 
                                                          
2 I have managed to locate three books written in Arabic on the topic of the role of media in 
society. Two of them are preoccupied with how media should play a liberal role of promoting 
freedoms in Arab societies (Ramzi Mikha'il Jayd, 1987; Muhammad Husam ad-Din, 2003). Only the 
third book offers an alternative which, sadly, is too dogmatic in its approach to nationalism and to 
political developments to make it of any serious value. Still, it is noticeable that Sabah Yasin (2006) 
argued that the ethos, an-nasaq al-qiyami, of journalism should revolve mainly around national 
liberation and the renaissance of Arab civilization. 
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socially and politically. It therefore becomes meaningless to separate them from the 
pluralists, as they both agree on a supposed ultimate function of media and society, one 
which falls squarely under the liberal paradigm. The liberal paradigm therefore refers to 
both the pluralist and critical theories when examined at the second tier, that of the 
liberal norms they both share. 
Habermas is a prime example of this trend. He literally invented an imaginary 
"public sphere" to justify a superior and utopian liberal reality to which media ought to 
aspire. What is even more surprising than his close to fiction work is that his audience 
considers him of the Left, even after he laments the death of the laissez-faire's public 
sphere of civil society at the hands of the political public sphere of the social-welfare 
state (Habermas, 1989: 232). In his book, the liberal ideology is not quite hidden. 
Thompson (1995: 253) wants to see in the media the agora of modern democratic 
societies, the "bridge [...] between electors and representatives". Media is thus 
categorized as a platform where political deliberation takes place, where the people 
trade in information about political issues and learn about the opinions of others. It 
seems for both scholars that the conclusion dictated the rest of their works. The goal was 
to reach a point where media promotes liberal democracy. For others, this conclusion is 
less striking, but nevertheless equally dominant. Piers Robinson's (2002) work, as well as 
Regina Lawrence's (2000), seem to focus on glimpses of liberal behavior on the part of 
media. It is the stated aim of their books to look for instances when media behave as 
liberal institutions. Again, the question is not how media act, but when are they 
conducive to democracy. This conclusion thus leads much of their research. Again, the 
question of why exactly should media operate this way is never even asked. 
For others, liberal norms present themselves in the form of a political plan, a 
desire that they seek to achieve through their work. Hamelink's (2011: x) goal from 
studying the "escalation spiral" is to be able to turn it around, "bringing people together 
peacefully (and keeping them together democratically)". The very notion that media is a 
magical tool that can promote or halt social violence is quite ludicrous to begin with. Still, 
Hamelink makes no attempt at situating the role of belligerent media in a socio-political 
context that would make it possible to understand the role of violence, rather than the 
message of violence, thus deflecting responsibility from the message, and therefore the 
message producer, onto the medium. Again, this is explained by the fact that he was 
driven by the assumption that there is a particular role that media play in society. It is the 
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ultimate source of information for regular people of their political realities, and it is 
therefore to be blamed for making such realities violent. It is as if conflicts like the 
Rwandan war could have been prevented had media played a democratic, 
understanding, and accepting role. 
For Couldry, the whole aim of finding a new path to study media is to achieve a 
post-culturalist defragmentation of the political, so as to go back to Hanna Arendt's 
"publicity". "Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact 
that everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public 
life" (as quoted by Couldry, 2006: 79). Again, the underlying drive to find this elusive 
democracy flattens all the social space, even in a book whose author claims to want to 
examine the social surrounding of media. The context does not matter as long as the aim 
is set on the Holy Grail and the scholar faithful to the task. What makes my claim even 
more relevant is the fact that Couldry is not unaware that his ultimate vision is, at the 
very least, contested. He writes: "a virtue of producers outside mainstream media 
channels [...] is that they refuse to take for granted either the question of what social 
ends media serve or the connection between those ends and the hard-pressed ideal we 
call "democracy"" (couldry, 2003a: 51). How come, then, he could not get past his own 
assumptions about society and media's role in it, assumptions that he was aware were 
socially, politically, and ideologically situated? 
Bourdieu adopts a similar attitude in sur la Télévision. In his opening words, he 
claims that it would be easy to argue that the behavior of journalists represented a 
danger to political life and democracy, citing several case studies which he could have 
used. Instead, he wanted to focus on the discursive aspect of the ordinary practice of 
journalism (Bourdieu, 1996: 5-7). This means that he recognized the difference between 
the two positions and it was not only that they were two separate objects of study. Being 
a danger to democracy is a characterization of the function of media, whereas looking at 
the practice of journalism is a value-less description of what journalists do; it is a 
snapshot of the field. Still, Bourdieu's (1996: 8) hopes were that his analysis would serve 
those who are fighting for what could have been an extraordinary tool of direct 
democracy, but which could also become a tool of symbolic oppression. It could be seen 
as surprising that Bourdieu, who is generally very critical of the liberal paradigm, seems 
to be so taken by its values to the point that they overshadow his account.  
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From this perspective, Chomsky is the most honest scholar to have written on 
this issue. Along with Herman, they confess that freedom of expression should not be 
defended in instrumental terms, but should be upheld as a value in itself. If anything, 
they argue, the instrumental argument favors media operating as a defender of 
economic, social, and political privilege, which is the societal function it performs 
according to their "propaganda model" (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 298). The ultimate 
goal for them is for peripheral, radical, and progressive social forces to recognize how 
they are excluded from media production so as to find ways to penetrate the realm of 
participating in the public discourse. While this means that, for Herman and Chomsky 
too, the goal is democracy, their own type of democracy. It was to achieve this goal that 
their "propaganda model" was designed. The difference with other scholars, however, is 
that Herman and Chomsky are clear about their normative grounds, as well as to the 
difference between seeing the social world through the lens of their values, and through 
an "objective" lens. 
But why would this common theme among theoreticians and scholars be 
detrimental to our understanding of the role of media in politics? Why am I claiming that 
it creates a cul-de-sac, a dead end for the theories of media? The answer lies in two 
sections and each, alone, could explain why studying media with such normative 
assumption would not allow us to escape the restrictive, and possibly ill-constructed, 
pluralist-critical debate. First, this fascination with liberal values and the promises of 
democracy is socially, culturally, and ideologically situated firmly within the European 
experience of the age of enlightenment and onward. The liberal ideology as both an 
intellectual promise and a political program, irrespective of its merits and limitations, was 
born out of a particular context that culturally and politically favored both its rise and its 
adoption. Imposing this ideology, along with the norms and values which it represents, 
on societies that lay outside of the social, cultural, and geographical boundaries of 
Western Europe and North America has been greatly criticized (Amin, 1988; Hobson, 
2012). Eurocentrism has more specifically been addressed in this case by the radical and 
alternative approaches to media. From Mellor and Rodriguez to Curran and Park, 
attempts at introducing a radical theory of media have first tackled the Eurocentric 
anchor of the mainstream academic literature. They realized a simple fact that current 
media theory does very little to explain the role of media in a non-Western context. At 
the very least, it cannot properly situate it within its indigenous social and cultural 
context, and cannot therefore present an image of media as a social and political actor. 
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This stressed the importance of properly contextualizing the media under study, a 
contextualization that must account for the different social fields that operate around it. 
In the second section of my answer, I take this criticism of the liberal paradigm a 
step forward and argue that the normative assumptions about the preferred role of 
media in society are what make the pluralist-critical debate exist. As the liberal normative 
assumptions serve as the foundational basis of both pluralists and critical theorists, they 
frame the debate inside a set and rigid binary framework. Such prescriptive judgment can 
only be addressed and assessed in either positive or negative terms. If the general 
agreement is that media ought to be a democratic force, the only available and 
conceivable debate becomes whether or not it performs this function, which is what 
characterizes the great majority of the literature. The problem here is not with the initial 
assumption per se, but with the overwhelming agreement over it. Once this agreement is 
broken, then the debate can take many more forms. If we simply address the assumption 
rather than the debate, which is but a symptom, we can then open up the discussion to a 
wide spectrum of positions, and the binary archetype simply disappears. When we ask 
what role does media play without a particular teleological goal in mind, we can then 
assess different possibilities that lie outside of the field of vision of the current literature. 
The main goal of this research project is to therefore examine whether or not the 
normative foundations of the pluralist-critical debate apply in a case were culture, 
society, and politics were foreign to the historical experience that led to the rise of the 
liberal paradigm in Europe; by showing that the Arab experience with the press was 
different in practice and in the social values which drove it and which it promoted, I 







Theory and method 
 
In very many ways, the methodology and the theoretical framework guiding this 
research project are one and the same. This chapter will show how Bourdieu's theory of 
"fields" (champs) will serve as the guideline to try and answer the question pertaining to 
the function of the Arab press across time, i.e. the purpose it served at the time of the 
genesis of the field, and how this purpose evolved with time. The guiding principle is that, 
to understand this function of the journalistic field in Beirut and Cairo, we must 
understand the field itself, i.e. how it functions and how this function fits in relation to 
other fields within the broader social sphere. The aim is to therefore reconstruct this 
field, along with the different elements structuring, constituting, and operating within it. 
Bourdieu's theory not only offers us a road map to construct this field and the social 
space it operates in, but also addresses many issues that would have otherwise impeded 
this research, most notably some of the dichotomies which generally plague most 
sociological theories, like structure/agency, objectivism/subjectivism, 
base/superstructure, etc., a fundamental aspect of his anti-dualistic thought (Wacquant, 
2008: 264). 
This chapter will also dwell on how to add a historical perspective to the theory 
of fields from a methodological perspective. Since this thesis is an examination of the 
production of past thought, the discourse in the newspapers and the intellectual 
framework within which they were produced will be assessed using Skinner's method for 
the study of intellectual history. It focuses on an understanding of meaning and intent 
that are genuine to the actor that is being studied, rather than imposing an anachronistic 
assessment and understanding to words and thoughts produced in a context foreign to 
that of the researcher. 
 
I. The theory of fields 
Society, or the social space, is divided into social fields, each of them 
representing a particular social activity or domain, like the field of politics or the field of 
journalism. Each field is governed by a particular form of capital, whether economic, 
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cultural, or social, and functions according to a particular set of rules that govern the 
interaction of the individuals positioned within this field. These individuals are in a 
constant state of struggle to ameliorate their position in the field, either by accumulating 
more of the dominant capital, or by trying to change the rules of the game within the 
field by either changing the stakes or the dominant form of capital so as to have a 
relatively better position than their competitors. This section will examine these concepts 
in detail, showing how they will be used to reconstruct the field of journalism in Beirut 
and Cairo. 
A. The social space as conditions of possibilities 
In the same way as building a car first requires a frame, a chassis, constructing 
the field first needs a space, a structure, inside which to exist and function. The social 
space, or social structure, represents the context within which a particular field operates. 
It is the space where the different social fields coexist and where actors and the different 
forms of capital they possess are positioned in relation to one another. So, unlike his 
contemporary French structuralists, Bourdieu's perception of the "structure" of the social 
space is not a deterministic one; it can only run in a dialectical fashion with the subjective 
moment of the manifestation of the habitus to lead to practice (pratique), concepts I will 
deal with later in this chapter (Bourdieu, 2000a: 235; 1977b). The main point here is that, 
in many ways, Bourdieu only defined the "social space" in opposition to the structuralist 
"structure". It was not merely the structuring schema which restricted agency and 
presented human behavior as a fait accompli, but rather a generating principle of the 
multiple possibilities of human behavior in a particular context, the social space itself 
(Bourdieu, 2000a). 
The role of the social space, as a historically evolving structure of social 
conditions, has many repercussions on a field that exists within it. This social structure 
represents the conditions within which the habitus comes to exist during a particular 
period, as well as the context within which it operates at a particular point in time 
(Bourdieu, 1980: 94). This role of the social structure reveals some of the reasons why 
Bourdieu's theory fits this study best. First, it takes into account historical evolution at 
the different levels of the social space. Structures evolve due to their continuous 
restructuring by an evolving habitus, the unconscious accumulation of historical 
experience; and the field itself, as a space of production and reproduction, circulation 
and consumption of the commodities which are specific to it, in this case, the symbolic 
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good that is the message in the press (Bourdieu, 1980: 94; 2000a: 312). Second, it takes 
into account the evolution of the field itself, allowing for a more contemporary and 
context-specific reading rather than a static one. 
In this case, viewing the social structure as evolving dialectically with the habitus 
it generates and, which in turn, reshapes and reproduces this structure, helps us examine 
the field of the press in the Arab world from its birth onward as part of a broader 
historical evolution of society, the economy, the state, the intellectual arena, etc., all of 
which witnessed major changes in the Arab world during the period under study. I will 
thus be able to demonstrate that the function of the press was also altered to answer 
these contextual changes. 
An equally important impact the social structure has on the field is that it 
"structures" it both internally and externally. The "external structuration" allows us to 
see the similarities in the properties of particular social groups, permitting classification 
of predispositions, a perception of closeness within the social space. The "internal 
structuration", on the other hand, revolves around the particular agent's position within 
the social space, and how it affects his perception of other elements within it; it is a 
perception of symbolic power relations within the field (Bourdieu, 1985: 727). This 
double structuration Bourdieu presented is one element of his theory which transcends 
the structure/agency dichotomy. It advances a model of a structure which defines the 
different possibilities for the agent to freely maneuver, taking into consideration the 
dynamics of power relations (symbolic, social, cultural, etc.) which link this agent to 
others within the field. 
To construct this social structure, the social conditions leading to the rise of 
particular social classes and the genesis of certain activities, behaviors, and dynamics 
specific to these classes within a field, I will rely on historical materialism to understand 
the major changes the Arab region witnessed during the period under study. Historical 
materialism here does not refer to a particularly teleological philosophy of history, in that 
I reject the sheer economism and reductionism which pervades most of the classical 
Marxist theory and literature. It rather refers to the focus on the economic structure and, 
more importantly, and as Paul Hirst (1985) has aptly pointed out, on the relations of 
production as the main constructing factor of the social structure more broadly 
envisaged. It therefore becomes a method rather than a theory, a method of historical 
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writing rather than an essentialist rationalization of history, and, from this perspective, 
could be more easily reconciled with Bourdieu's own views on the matter.  
On this point, Bourdieu (1985: 723) clearly opposed the economism of classical 
historical materialists, their tendency to reduce everything to the role of a resultant of 
the economic base. He favored an approach which focused more on the relationships 
between agents in order to construct a social space. However, in view of the many works 
of historical analysis dealing with the social, political, and intellectual developments in 
the Middle East, Bourdieu's criticisms of historical materialism can be safely disregarded 
in favor of an approach which has proven to be very convincing in the way it described 
developments there, especially in Beirut and Cairo. This is so especially because the fields 
which affected the birth of the press, the fields of education and the economy, have been 
extensively studied and analyzed in a way that would allow us to recreate the social and 
intellectual context which led to the rise of an educated class who embarked on their 
journey to establish a field of journalism. 
It is therefore for the sake of simplicity that when I will be setting up the broad 
context that led to the founding of journalism, I will rely on established and 
comprehensive analyses of the economic, social, and intellectual changes that affected 
the region. In his seminal work the Middle East in the World Economy (1993), for 
example, Roger Owen studied the economic history of the Middle East since the 
incorporation of the region into the global capitalist economy. He demonstrated how this 
inclusion altered the local economy, society, and politics at their core. This historical 
materialist reading of Arab society, especially in Beirut and Cairo, the two centers linking 
the region to Europe, will shed light on the social metamorphosis experienced in the 
region in general and the effects it had on the field of the press in particular. On this 
point, we must also consider Albert Hourani's classic work Arabic Thought in the Liberal 
Age (1983), in which he stressed the role of the new social structure, as well as the 
"encounter" with Europe in shaping the intellectual, cultural, and political scenes in the 
Arab world. 
B. A field of production and consumption 
Inside the social structure of the Arab world, exists the field of the Arab press. In 
the simplest form of presentation of this analytical tool, the field is a particular space 
within the broader social space which is concerned with a particular social activity or 
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concern, and which is governed with a set of rules, authority, and capital particular to it. 
Understood as such, Bourdieu (1971: 52) presented a way in which to develop a model 
for a given field, specifically targeting in his writings the field of journalistic production, 
among others. Simply put, he saw journalism as a production process in which producers, 
journalists, create a commodity, the message, that caters to the need of a consumer 
market, the audience, in order to generate a desired surplus, an accumulation of the 
capital specific to this field. 
But before explaining how to empirically address the field as a production 
process, it is imperative to lay down an important conceptualization of the field in which 
Bourdieu seems to borrow from mechanical physics to separate the field as one of forces 
and one of struggles (champ de forces and champ de luttes). Similar to statics, the field of 
forces represents a snapshot of the field, an image of the field in a state of equilibrium. 
The forces are the regulations, codes, and particular capital operating in the field at a 
particular moment. The field of struggles, on the other hand, is similar to dynamics. It 
incorporates the competing tendencies and forces within the field - weights, 
counterweights, and friction if we were to completely adopt the analogy with dynamics. 
It represents the competition among different agents for primacy in the field, a primacy 
which can take many forms, depending on the stake within the field, whether it is one of 
consolidation, preservation, and accumulation of an already dominating form of capital, 
or one of transformation and shift in power among competing agents through a shift in 
the possession of the already dominating capital, and even shifting the very form of 
capital dominating the field, and therefore changing the rules of the game altogether 
(Bourdieu, 1977b: 410; 1981: 8; 1994: 55; Wacquant, 2008: 268). This conceptualization 
of the different forms of forces operating within the field is important because it helps 
first explain consolidation and changes within the field, but also because it incorporates 
the issue of the evolution of the field across time; it is therefore a theory which is not 
transfixed in time, but rather understands the importance of the impact of historical 
evolution and of time as a major variable of change, another major contribution of 
Bourdieu's thought which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
This approach allows us to separately study the different elements constituting 
the field, whether they are the actors (producers and consumers), the message in the 
press, the relations among these different elements, the division of labor in the field, 
production, reproduction, and diffusion of the message, etc. (Bourdieu, 1971: 54). Also, 
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one of Bourdieu's major contributions in this regard was that he saw the need to look at 
the internal dynamic of each different element, to see the distinction which governed the 
different actors playing in the field, most importantly among the producers whose 
distinction and different social positioning are in fact the main reason behind dynamism 
inside the field. 
For example, at the level of the production of symbolic goods, and most notably 
political messages, the very target of this research, Bourdieu (1985: 738) wrote about the 
"structural duplicity" of the political discourse. Indeed, as any act of production in a 
particular market seeks to occupy the largest share of consumption within this market, 
the usual target of this production becomes the consumer whose opinion is not only 
shaped by the message, or even comes to exist because of it, but also shapes the 
message itself, mainly through a process of self-censorship and targeting which the 
producer, willingly or not, imposes on himself in order to attract the largest audience 
possible by allowing it to identify with his message. But similarly, the producer needs to 
promote his own distinction within the field, his own self-perception of his role, identity, 
and opinion which separate him from his contenders and competitors, and therefore 
through promoting his own interests as defined by his position within the social 
structure, undergoes a process of communicative distinction with his peers and 
competitors in the field (Bourdieu, 1985). 
This duplicity finds itself in Bourdieu's theory as a dual-dynamic of the production 
of symbolic goods which needs to be addressed. First, this production, and especially that 
of intellectual products as is the case with the journalistic message, operates as a 
"restricted production" (champ de production restreinte) in that it addresses the public of 
producers themselves (Bourdieu, 1971: 54-55). This aspect of production is what leads to 
formulation of norms and values guiding the field, what is generally called the 
"journalistic code" being one such sets of values, its evaluation criteria, and general 
recognition among peers. 
Second, this production operates at the level of the broad public of non-producer 
consumers as "broad symbolic production" (champ de grande production symbolique). 
This aspect of production is important on two accounts. Since it targets an outside 
audience, it must obey to the simple rules of the market in that it answers to the laws of 
supply and demand. Supply is therefore guided by a conscious need to acquire a broader 
section of the consumer market, and, in view of competition, requires of the producer to 
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adjust his product to the needs of his targeted audience (Bourdieu, 1971: 81). Also, 
because of the political outlook of the field of journalism and the press, it is imperative to 
recognize that broad symbolic production is primordial to restricted production if only 
because competition over power, the stake in the political field, translates into a 
competition over the ownership of the right to speak for and represent the lay public, or 
parts of it (Bourdieu, 1981: 13). Indeed, if journalistic production reverts onto itself in a 
process of restricted production, it would negate the very basis of the external outlook of 
the field, resulting in the loss of support from and representative claim over a certain 
public (Bourdieu, 1981: 15). The case of the rise of the Arabic press, however, constitutes 
a very interesting test to this theory since journalists, even though expressing a desire for 
attracting larger audiences, did not manage for a long time to address anyone but their 
own peers. They managed to combine both broad symbolic production and restricted 
production, a process which played an important role in the shaping of the ethos within 
the field. 
It is interesting to note at this point, that this particular theoretical contribution 
of Bourdieu might help us elucidate some of the key contradictions and explain some of 
the biggest frictions between the normative and practical drives within the field. Indeed, 
it is this very separation between restricted and broad productions which might even 
explain the internal dichotomy found in the critical approaches to the study of media, the 
one which I referred to as the second-level rhetoric in the literature review chapter. 
Indeed, these critical approaches recognize that media operates in practice in a different 
fashion than it is normatively supposed to operate. This normative assessment, as 
previously discussed, hides the dichotomy between restricted and broad productions 
within a field, as it understands media production as broad production, yet evaluates it as 
restricted production. It is important to note that Bourdieu himself fails to make this 
distinction when studying journalism, a point I will address later in this chapter. 
C. Classes and positions in the field 
Bourdieu (1985) provided a very elaborate analysis of what he understood as a 
social "class" which he specifically defined as: "sets of agents who occupy similar 
positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar 
conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and 
therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances" (Bourdieu, 1985: 
725). Classification for Bourdieu therefore takes place at the level of the predispositions, 
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closeness in the social space which generates similar tendencies among its different 
individuals. Class is therefore the set of individuals sharing similar habitus, a system of 
common dispositions and common conditioning, and is therefore simply a group of 
individuals who most closely resemble each other in this regard, and, from this same 
perspective, differ from others who are part of other classes (Bourdieu, 1980: 100; 
Bourdieu, 1994: 25). 
The developments within any field can be therefore understood as a resultant of 
the social positioning of actors, not only as individuals, but also as groups or classes. And 
explaining their predispositions based on their positioning also leads to understanding 
their stances, actions, and behaviors in specific actual contexts. This is because of the 
subjective impact of structuration previously discussed as part of the "double 
structuration" of social groups. Positions, as a result, shapes the "schemes of perception 
and appreciation available for use at the moment in question" for agents (Bourdieu, 
1985: 727). The particular position of the agents offers them a paticular perception of the 
world. It gives them a particular spectrum from which to recognize their options and 
even act the way they do. 
This, in turn, results in distinction, the differences in choices between different 
agents of different social positioning. The importance of this concept lies in the fact that 
it ties production and consumption very closely together, not because of the simple laws 
of the market which posit that production seeks a particular niche, a targeted market 
demand, and shapes itself to supply this demand, but rather because it ties producers 
and consumers of symbolic goods at the social level through their positioning. The 
production process itself therefore becomes a communication tool among producers of 
symbolic goods and their consumers.  
Distinction in this sense becomes a social expression of the interest of the group 
which combines both producers and consumers sharing proximity in the social space 
(Bourdieu, 1985: 738; Bourdieu and Christin, 1990: 68). It manifests, for example, in the 
choices and opinions of the educated class to which journalists belonged, and how, 
through their newspapers, they rejected the "common man" as socially and intellectually 
inferior. Through their newspapers, they expressed their own social and cultural tastes 
for modern sciences and literature, and showed an interest in a newly formulated vision 
of politics which other social classes still had not assimilated.  This interest is itself a result 
of the position of the groups and individual agents, which expresses both the interests of 
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the body of the group (an objective structural interest), as well as a perceptual interest (a 
subjective, individual, and conscious definition of what is the interest of this group) which 
finds direct expression in the communicative act that is the political message in the press. 
The producer of the political message therefore becomes a representative of the social 
group which identifies with his message, partly because of the shared social position 
which parallels the opinions, viewpoints, and interests shared by both producer and 
consumer of this particular symbolic good, and partly because the producer assumes the 
role of this representative, an individual substitute of the group, who not only expresses 
himself in its name, but also grants it the power to exist because of his recognition of it, a 
mutual recognition of roles between them which Bourdieu labeled the "mystery of 
ministry" (Bourdieu, 1985: 740). Bourdieu made this point in reference to politicians in 
positions of power, giving examples like Louis XIV's famous quote: "l'état c'est moi". But, 
facing an altogether different socio-political system, his theory of distinction within the 
field and the expression of interest of body and positions of groups will prove to be very 
revealing of the behavior of the Arab press, especially during its foundational stage (the 
first phase this dissertation examines), when journalists began crafting and acquiring this 
"mystery of ministry" Bourdieu wrote about. The case of the Arabic press will show the 
true meaning of "mystery", as the assumption that speaking in the name of the group 
created the group was consciouly adopted by the journalists, but never by the group they 
supposedly created. 
D. Habitus and sens du jeu 
But what is this habitus that I have mentioned earlier? A core concept which 
Bourdieu developed as an answer to the problems posed by the deterministic nature of 
structuralism, habitus helps us explain how agency still exists within the overarching 
structure, as well as the power this agency has in reshaping the structure. Bourdieu 
(1980: 88; 2000a: 25) defined it as a: 
system of durable and transposable dispositions, structured structures 
that are predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as 
principles generating and organizing practices and representations that 
can be objectively adapted to their goals without assuming the conscious 
aim toward ends and the explicit mastery of the necessary operations to 
attaining them, objectively "ruled" and "regular" without the least being 
the product of an obedience to rules, and, in addition to all that, be 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing 
action of an orchestra conductor. 
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In simpler terms, the habitus is the sum of past collective social experience imbedded in 
the agent's unconscious, a forgotten history lingering in the form of a second nature 
allowing this agent to recognize the different possibilities of action within a particular 
field (Bourdieu, 1980: 94; 2000a: 263). Reminiscent of Jung's "collective unconscious", 
the habitus is a resulting development of the particular social space within which it exists. 
It is born out of a particular social context, evolves in it through the incorporation and 
accumulation of social experiences, and, in turn eventually reshapes the social structure 
itself because of the accumulation of new experiences, whether through consolidation or 
transformation. 
Aside from providing us with the conceptual link between the social structure 
and the freedom of movement of the agent within it, understanding the predispositions 
of agents within a field also allows us to understand their behavior as a symbiotic product 
of a historical process and a quasi-momentary choice of action during a particular event. 
This encounter between the process and the moment allows for the dialectical 
materialization of the structure and the habitus into a "practice", a behavior which 
implies a choice among many other choices available to the agent, i.e. a choice from 
within the already available predispositions, which does not entail a necessary 
reproduction of past choices, but rather one which is unconsciously informed by them. 
Bourdieu (1980: ff.89) claimed that it might even be more conceptually useful to 
understand habitus not only as a principle allowing agents to perceive possible moves at 
a particular moment, but also as a system of acquired dispositions which first and 
foremost allows them to eliminate false problems and false solutions, and therefore 
identify more suitable solutions and behaviors to better address the particular moment. 
The encounter between the habitus imbedded in a particular individual and class, 
and the field within which this individual and class are invested gives rise to a sens du jeu, 
or "feel for the game", the game being the field itself. This feel for the game is, according 
to Bourdieu (1980: 111; 1994: 45), the quasi-miraculous encounter between the 
incorporated history, habitus, and the objectivated (objectivée) history of the moment in 
the field, which allows for possible anticipation of possible futures, of the foreseeable 
outcomes of the set of choices available to an agent in the field. It is somehow the logic 
of the habitus, internalized in the field to create a sense of intelligibility for invested 




Bourdieu (1981) advanced the example of the politician whose success relies on 
the mastery of the rules of the game of politics and the skill required to play it. It is 
through this knowledge of the field that the politician can calculate the possible results of 
his actions, foreseeing most importantly how contenders or opponents would or could 
react to his play; the sens du jeu is what informs his position-taking within the field 
(Bourdieu, 1981: 6). This notion of the "feel for the game" is quite important for studying 
the journalistic field. Whether during its foundational period, or later when it became 
more incorporated into the field of politics, the field of journalism was one of constant 
competition among its different agents, if only because of its very nature which forces 
competition for larger audience shares, and consequently for more representative claims. 
It is therefore essential when looking at the behavior of journalists to understand their 
choices as being motivated and driven by a particular sens du jeu proper to the field of 
journalism in Beirut and Cairo. The logic of their action is therefore understood as a chain 
of plays, actions and reactions, which follow a strategy internalized in the field, i.e. one 
which is only dictated by the logic of this particular field. This internalization entails that 
the sens du jeu, while specific to the field, does not lead to the necessary rise of 
conscious intent of the agents, but could do so if the agent is more skilled in and adapted 
to the game (Bourdieu, 2000a: 257). 
E. Economic, social, and cultural capitals 
Another one of Bourdieu's contributions stems from his critique of the economic 
determinism of Marxism, which he addressed by introducing a new conceptualization of 
capital, one which is not restricted to the economy. He defined capital as "power over 
the field (at a given moment) and, more precisely, over the accumulated product of past 
labor (in particular over the set of instruments of production) and thereby over the 
mechanisms tending to ensure the production of a particular category of goods and so 
over a set of incomes and profits" (Bourdieu, 1985: 724). This definition, although 
seemingly very Marxian, hides the major alteration Bourdieu introduced, namely that 
capitals vary in nature. 
 Indeed, he identified four major types of capitals: the economic capital, cultural 
capital, social capital, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1985: 724; 1989: 17). Economic 
capital is the form of capital traditionally defined in the Marxist literature as the one 
operating in the economic sphere (financial, operational capital, equipment, etc.). Social 
capital is the capital generated from belonging to a particular social group, whether class, 
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family, clan, school, political party, etc... It is the accumulation of actual or potential 
resources generated by the belonging to a form of institutionalized network of 
recognized relationships, a closeness within the social space where the individual is 
located (Bourdieu, 1986). In regards to social capital, Bourdieu had a special affinity to 
the belonging to a particular educational institution and how that belonging was 
primordial in positioning individuals in the social space and also impact their position-
taking (see for example Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage (1994) on the role of education 
in reshaping the bureaucracy of the French state; Bourdieu (1981) on its impact on 
politics; Bourdieu (1984) on the impact of belonging to a particular school on the 
positions and position-takings of academics). 
The concept of social capital is very important for this research on the account 
that belonging to particular networks was a precondition for many to enter into the 
journalistic field, and to flourish within it. During the foundational phase of the Arab 
press for example, this belonging was to a particular sect (most journalists belonged to 
the Christian minorities), a specific social class (they were all part of a nascent educated 
class of professionals tightly linked to European interests in the region), and the network 
of intellectuals who themselves ended up constituting the producers in the field of 
journalism. The educational institutions within which journalists studied also played an 
important role in creating networks of ideologically and socially coherent camps in the 
journalistic field during the different eras this research focuses on. 
Defining cultural capital can best be accomplished by listing the three forms in 
which it manifests itself. In its "incorporated state" (état incorporé), cultural capital is 
durable knowledge, expertise, and experience which the individual accumulates 
throughout his life through the processes of socialization and education. It is a form of 
capital which, once possessed, remains with the individual throughout his life, but also 
dies with him as he cannot transfer it through inheritance or any other form of capital 
transfer. In its "objectivated state" (état objectivé), cultural capital becomes palpable in 
the form of books, paintings, instruments, and machines which endow their owner with a 
transferable form of cultural capital that he can sell, inherit, purchase, and endow. 
Finally, in its "institutionalized state" (état insitutionnalisé), cultural capital takes the form 
of official acknowledgment of certain forms of cultural capital in its objectivated state, 
most notably in the form of academic titles and certificates (Bourdieu, 1979: 3). Cultural 
capital cannot be overlooked when studying the Arab press, as it was the dominant 
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capital which shaped the journalistic field. It was the capital that journalists sought to 
exhibit in order to gain recognition and the capital audiences needed to be able to 
process the mediated message. 
F. Symbolic capital 
The issue of recognition of cultural capital takes us to the final form of capital 
which Bourdieu focused extensively on in his writings, symbolic capital. Bourdieu (1989: 
17; 1994: 116) defined symbolic capital as being any form of capital (physical, cultural, 
social) when it becomes perceived and recognized as legitimate by social actors who have 
the ability and capability to notice and recognize it as valuable within a given field. The 
importance of this form of capital, and the reason why it is presented here separately 
from the previous capitals, is that symbolic capital is located at a crossroad between the 
dynamics of a field (forces and struggles, as well as production and consumption), the 
social positioning of actors, the habitus, and other forms of capital as well. 
First and foremost, symbolic capital helps us establish the forces and struggles 
within a field. A group of individuals who are in a position of power within any field are in 
fact those who possess a large amount of symbolic capital, that is any form of capital 
which is recognized by other actors in the field as being the dominant capital, i.e. the 
capital that matters. The struggles within the field can take one of two forms. They are 
either struggles for the acquiring and accumulation of this symbolic capital, or struggles 
with the aim of changing the stakes of the game, the nature of the dominant capital 
within the field. It is interesting in this regard to mention Bourdieu's treatment of 
Baudelaire and Flaubert in les Règles de l'Art (1998). It is according to him the differences 
in the type of struggles within the literary field which allowed Flaubert to prosper while 
Baudelaire was rejected both socially and literarily. Flaubert tried to navigate the field of 
power, while Baudelaire refused to play by its rules and tried to impose his own rules of 
the game, an attempt at which he failed because he simply lacked symbolic capital, a 
contemporary recognition of his legitimacy as a literary figure. 
In this sense, symbolic capital as a concept becomes primordial in our assessment 
of the Arab press. In the first foundational stage, one of the main characteristics of the 
development of the journalistic field is the accompanying formulation of a symbolic 
capital proper to the field. Indeed some of the most important questions that will arise 
later on in this project is why do certain newspapers and journalists gain credence and 
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legitimacy while others are ridiculed and fail. Who accumulates symbolic capital in this 
field? How is it generated or acquired? How is it invested within and outside the field? At 
later stages, the question of symbolic capital will reappear, especially with the 
transformations of the field itself (the boundaries of the journalistic field being as 
dynamic as the social space which surrounds it). Are the struggles within the field over 
the same type of dominant capital, or do some groups and camps try to change it and 
impose a new form of dominant capital and therefore a different source of recognition 
and legitimacy? 
One answer lies in the theory itself. One of the most important functions of 
symbolic capital, according to Bourdieu, is that it grants its possessor enough symbolic 
power to affirm his own worldview (and here we must remind the reader that this 
worldview is tightly linked to his position in the social sphere), his own classification of 
the world, or at least of the field within which he possesses enough symbolic capital. This 
symbolic power becomes the ultimate force behind the creation of social groups, in the 
sense that these groups become recognized as such through the representation of the 
symbolic capital holder. Symbolic capital, as a generator of symbolic power, is therefore a 
two-way street. It is a social recognition of the authority of a certain individual who, in 
turn, recognizes and identifies the social group as such (Bourdieu, 1977b: 410; 1989: 23). 
 This has been discussed earlier in the chapter when I dealt with Bourdieu's 
"mystery of ministry", or the ability of the recognized individual to shape groups and 
represent them through an act of mutual recognition (Bourdieu, 1985: 740). I only come 
back to this issue and how Bourdieu described it as being a direct resultant of distinction 
or, more precisely, how distinction and homology are required for this ministry to be 
attained, because, at one point, Bourdieu (1985: 731) claimed that distinction and 
symbolic capital are one and the same. Based on Bourdieu's own writings (1971; 1998), 
however, one can safely argue that marginal cultural production can exhibit distinction, 
but, if it does not generate symbolic capital, it remains obscure and marginalized. The 
issue is of importance because in the case of the Arab press, there are many cases of 
marginal papers appearing and disappearing regularly, not being able to find a place in 
the field for one reason or another. Examining their failures is equally as important as 
examining the successes of others, and how these successes impacted the social space, 
or what might be called the "public sphere" to better fit with the current literature and 




II. A historical perspective 
One of the big questions facing this research project is why find refuge in the past 
in order to seek answers to the current question the project raises. There are theoretical 
implications to the use of the theory of fields which necessitate a historical outlook. If we 
were to go back to each concept introduced by Bourdieu in order to form his sociological 
theory, we notice the importance of the element of evolution in both the form, 
consolidation, or change to the field (Steinmetz, 2011). None of these concepts discussed 
earlier are static; they cannot be read as simple snapshots, even when they are such 
snapshots (like the field of forces for example) because, even then, the instantaneous 
view which they offer us is but a fragment of a broader evolution of social behavior. 
This chapter has already touched on this point when dealing with the concept of 
habitus. The very definition of this concept reveals the intimacy between Bourdieu's 
theory and the historical depth required in any case study. Indeed, the habitus is the 
product of history, past individual and social experiences which find themselves 
incorporated into schemes of perception and action. Habitus is therefore the durable 
persistence of past experiences in the contemporary spectrum of choices available to a 
social actor and his class (Bourdieu, 1980: 91). 
Similarly, Bourdieu sees the concept of "practice" as being an introduction of 
time into the equation. "Practice unfolds itself in time" (Bourdieu, 2000a: 347), he wrote, 
and this factor is what changes the relationship between the structure and agency. 
Through time, social actors make choices, different choices, which are not always in 
compliance with their position in the social structure, one of the main points that 
positivism and objectivism find difficulties explaining because of their binding of society 
to the rules of the structure. Bourdieu substituted these rules by strategies, the 
possibility of choice within the larger parameters within the structure. 
Needless to say, the issue of social positioning is equally affected by time, 
especially since Bourdieu's theory allows for the accumulation, loss, and transfer of 
different forms of capital which might change the positioning of particular actors. This 
brings us to the forms of capitals operating in a social space which, because of the 
constant struggles within each field, change in nature, form, and value. In one of his 
essays reproduced in Raisons Pratiques, for example, Bourdieu (1994: 44) showed how a 
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change of dominant capital accompanied the social transfer of power from the hands of 
the nobility to that of the state bureaucrats. 
Finally, the very field we are studying is not static in its shape, size, autonomy, 
constituents (Steinmetz, 2011: 54). This project, for example, focuses on the field of the 
Arab press, as it is found in Cairo and Beirut, which I argue is a single field during the 
period under study. Journalists in the two cities all belong to the same social group, 
predominantly Lebanese Christians, educated in European schools, and belonging to the 
new class of professionals that saw the light with the inclusion of the region into the 
global capitalist economy. They equally wrote to a similar crowd in both cities which were 
still nominally (at least before 1882) part of the same state, the Ottoman Empire, and 
which shared social and cultural closeness that rendered them, for all practical purposes 
one and a single social space. In fact, Lebanon was the preferred summer resort and 
touristic attraction of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, while Cairo had become the major center 
of intellectual and cultural life in the Middle East since the rise of Muhammad Ali in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, which attracted all Lebanese intellectuals and men of 
letter who, as previously states, founded the biggest and most influential Egyptian 
newspapers like al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. But after from the 1890s onward, the field 
of journalism lost its autonomy to the field of politics and became a sub-field within it. 
The field of politics, on the other hand, was split after the British invaded and established 
their authority over Egypt. 
The goal of this quick historical survey was to show the reader that the concept 
of field cannot be understood as a static one, a particular space within the broader social 
space which does not change in time. In fact, the structures, rules of the game, capitals, 
and habitus are all products of a historical development and we therefore need a 
theoretical framework where history can be accounted for, where we take into account 
the changes to the context itself, the social space within which the press operates. The 
different forms of changes that affected the Arab world since the start of the nineteenth 
century make this case study extremely interesting, as they show how a field is affected 
by, but also affects, a changing social, economic, cultural, and political context. 
But the focus of this research project, the press in the Beirut and Cairo, coupled 
with a historical approach to the topic, raises the issue of the method used in reading 
primary sources, whether newspaper articles and editorials, or autobiographies and 
essays written by notable journalists and editors, texts which were produced in the past 
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and therefore must be contextualized as such. Bourdieu, in many of his writings, dealt 
with the issue of past ideas, their contextualization, and how to relate them to each 
other in terms of perceived influence, and to other contemporary competing ideas and 
ideologies (Bourdieu, 1971: 120-121; 2002). He also focused on the issue of the 
consciousness of the full meaning of ideas, whether to the contemporary, or to the social 
scientist going back to examine such ideas (Bourdieu, 1976: 52). His notes have a lot in 
common with the Cambridge School of intellectual history which featured names like 
Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and John Pocock. In many ways, we can read their works as 
an expansion of Bourdieu's notes on the topic, or his as a summary of theirs since their 
publications predated his. 
Bourdieu's remarks are essential in helping this project avoid the pitfalls of 
reading past texts, especially the autobiographies of particular journalists, editors-in-
chief, and newspapers owners. In "le Sens Pratique" (1976), he claimed that the 
sociologist (a term which also denotes the social historian) had the advantage that he 
could examine the totality of the evidence available to him to form an idea which the 
original informant, the original producer of this evidence, could not. The original 
informant can in no way understand himself and the changes he is bringing to his own 
context and practice in the same way, at least not at the moment when this practice and 
these changes are taking place. The role of the sociologist is therefore to find the 
patterns, the logic of the system which escapes the consciousness of the contemporary 
witness or actor (Bourdieu, 1976: 52). 
This entails that, when reading autobiographies, one must not simply take their 
content at face value, both for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, and as 
argued by Bourdieu, it is more difficult for a social actor than for a sociologist to see the 
larger patterns characterizing a particular social context, if only because he does not have 
at his disposal the amount and breadth of evidence available to the sociologist, and most 
notably the advantage of hindsight. Practically, autobiographies are always the product 
of this hindsight which I have mentioned, meaning that they offer a different vantage 
point from which the social actor sees his own experience, thus, consciously or not, 
altering his memories and opinions of past events. This is not to reject the 
meaningfulness of autobiographies, especially since they offer us unique insight on 
important actors in the field of the Arab press whose conscious minds we could not 
access otherwise. It is, however, an invitation to a critical reading of their accounts and 
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analyses, their autobiographies and reflections on their lives' works. It is therefore not a 
question of the evidence being right or wrong, but rather of asking the evidence the right 
questions, most notably what did the author mean by his statement, how we can 
understand his statement within its historical context (Collingwood, 1946: 275; Skinner, 
1969; 1978). 
The reading of such texts, alongside the examination of the texts appearing in the 
Arab press, must therefore follow a particular logic of history, a historical method which 
seeks to contextualize them both socially and intellectually (let us not forget that much of 
what appears in the press, especially in terms of editorials and analyses, is in fact an 
intellectual product). In "les Conditions Sociales de la Circulation Internationale des 
Idées" (2002), Bourdieu briefly explained the need to contextualize ideas in order to 
understand their true meaning, i.e. their function when they were born. It is by doing 
that, that we can delineate the field of ideological struggles at a particular point in time. 
Situating an idea in the broader realm of ideas, thoughts, themes, and problems arising at 
a certain epoch allows a true understanding of the position-taking of the social actor 
professing this idea (Bourdieu, 1971: 121; Skinner, 1969). 
Doing so entails reconstructing in parallel with the social sphere where the field 
of the press existed the intellectual realm in which political messages were produced. 
During the foundational period, editorials calling for social, political, and economic 
modernity and modernism were appearing as part of the broader intellectual realization 
of the need for modernization in the face of a superior Europe. It is under this broad 
intellectual question that we must situate the messages in the press. This will allow us to 
situate their producers as position-takers, people navigating these issues, with their own 
stakes and goals, and behaviors and possibilities of behavior. 
 
III. Collecting and analyzing primary material 
The main archive which I have examined to acquire my sources was the library of 
the American University of Beirut, which contains one of the largest and most complete 
collections of historical Arabic newspapers. But even in such an exhaustive collection, I 
encountered the problem of availability and readability of the newspapers. Many papers 
are not available in their entirety, and even more feature issues that are simply too worn 
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out to be able to read or even decipher. I estimate that around half of the contents of the 
newspapers examined were unavailable. 
Still, I managed to go through a total of thirteen newspapers that were published 
in Beirut and Cairo between 1858 and 1916.3 I collected more than a thousand issues 
totaling 2,617 newspaper pages to analyze. This was after I had gone through all available 
material in the library’s collection. Data collection followed two major criteria. First, I 
specifically looked for issues where there was mention and treatment of journalism as a 
profession, of the work of journalists, details on the day-to-day operation of a 
newspaper, and the ethics of the profession. These provide insight into the mind of 
journalists at the time, as they represent their conscious attempts at explaining and 
justifying their work, positions, and role. Second, I applied a process of exclusion, not 
saving issues that were for all practical purpose a repetition of previous issues. I still 
collected representative sample issues at regular intervals, ranging from one every two 
weeks to one per month, depending on the readability and availability of the publication 
in full. If newspapers were missing many issues, I would try and collect them at a more 
frequent rate because of the more inherent possibility of missing major changes. The goal 
of this approach to collecting data was to account for the different trends appearing on 
the pages of these papers. Layout, design, topics covered, front page subjects, and any 
changes that affected them in form and content were taken into account. The aim was to 
assess short, medium, and long term changes in interests, and also in the general way in 
which the profession evolves, as attested by the product of the field of journalism. This 
also meant that I excluded pages which featured irrelevant information, like 
advertisements (even though I would take a couple of examples of advertisement from 
each journal to track possible sources of financial income) and pieces of literature, like 
plays and poems. In the latter case, I kept in mind the possibility that such literary pieces 
might have held hidden political meaning and messages; from my initial examination, 
none did. In total, this meant that I had examined the totality of the available newspaper, 
and collected almost a fourth of all available material, thus guaranteeing 
representativeness of my sample. 
It can therefore be said that the material collected is representative of the overall 
production of media during the period under study. It covers all the main political 
newspapers, as well as a good sample of less influential ones. Furthermore, I have 
                                                          
3 These were Hadiqat al-Akhbar, al-Janna, Lisan al-Hal, Thamarat al-Funun, al-Haqiqa, al-Ahram, 
al-Muqattam, al-Mu’ayyad, al-Liwa’, al-Jarida, al-Manar, at-Taqaddum, and al-Misbah. 
52 
 
focused in my collecting on representing all trends, changes, interests, opinions, formats, 
and topics that different newspapers featured. 
A final form of primary material that I used is autobiographies by contemporary 
figures who were involved in one way or another in the field of journalism. These 
included the autobiographies of the two rulers who interacted and used the press the 
most during the period under study, sultan Abdul Hamid II and khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II, as 
well as that of Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, an Egyptian lawyer and intellectual who ventured 
into journalism and politics for a short while. I am also well aware that there are other 
relevant published autobiographies of journalists like Jurji Zaydan which I could not 
access directly, but still managed to find excerpts of in secondary sources. I am equally 
aware of the methodological problems facing the use of autobiographies, and therefore 
only critically employ them as anecdotal evidence (see Collingwood, 1946). 
There were multiple factors that guided the choice of the birth and development 
of the press in the Arab world as this thesis’ case study. First and foremost, I am very well 
informed about the topic and am vastly knowledgeable about the literature, both 
primary and secondary, that has been written about it. Indeed, the rise of the press in 
Beirut and Cairo was at the center of my studies in history while I was pursuing past 
degrees. This familiarity allowed me in great part to discern how this specific case had the 
potential to address my research question. 
Second, since my critique of the current literature is strongly based on the radical 
approach of media studies, which places great emphasis on the Eurocentric roots of 
media theories, the option of a medium operating in a non-Western context seemed 
appropriate. In this regard, my choices were somehow restricted because of the language 
barrier and my lack of knowledge about alternative cases like China, India, Latin America, 
or Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Third, the Arabic press remains a largely understudied phenomenon, especially in 
the English language, where Ami Ayalon’s the Press in the Arab Middle East (1995) 
remains till today the only published book on the topic. Empirically, this is a chance to 
revisit the history of the development of the Arab newspaper from a fresh perspective, 
especially that Ayalon’s account suffers from many shortcomings. Theoretically, this 
means that this case can be seen as a blank slate, a new venue to explore, and therefore 
offers great potential to construct a framework and an approach around. 
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Having said that, I must stress that this case study has been equally chosen 
because it proves as much a test to the current literature as well as to Bourdieu’s theory 
of fields. Indeed, one of the main issues I seek to contest is the national framework which 
has been traditionally applied to the theory of fields, since all the uses of the theory have 
restricted the social space to the level of the state, if only because it has mainly been 
applied to cases within Western Europe, i.e. cases where it could be argued the 
Westphalian model of the state exists. The case of the press in Beirut and Cairo will 
definitely create a challenge to assess from this perspective, but they also offer an 
opportunity to assess the elasticity of the theory and the extent to which it can account 
for non-traditional cases. Indeed, Beirut and Cairo were for the better part of the period 
under study officially part of the same state. Still, they were in effect governed by two 
contending rulers and even became two separate states when Britain decided to invade 
and occupy Egypt in 1882. This shows a rift between the fields of politics in the two 
capital cities, while socially, both Beirut and Cairo remained to a large extent united by 
common culture and history, especially for the educated and well-to-do middle class that 
traditionally moved back and forth between the two cities either for work or for leisure. 
Furthermore, this case study offers the possibility for historical analysis, a point 
which I argue is necessary for the construction of an appropriate framework for the study 
of the roles the media play in different societies. Indeed, the field of the Arabic press in 
Beirut and Cairo presents us with a clear starting point, the year 1858 when the first 
private Arabic newspaper appeared in Beirut, and a clear closure with the complete 
obliteration of the field in 1916. But aside from historiographic feasibility, this case is a 
chance to examine both the birth and the development of the field of journalism in a 
dynamic and constantly changing context. Conceptually, this is necessary because it 
reveals the different possible factors which might affect the development of the field, 
whether the forms of capital, social classes, changing positions, and developing ethos. A 
socio-historical lens provides dynamic insight rather than a static picture of the state of a 
field. 
This last point can be easily identified in Bourdieu’s theory of fields and theory of 
practice, as previously explained in this chapter. Indeed, Bourdieu defines the major 
components of his theory as temporally mobile. Focus is generally placed on the 
dynamism of the relational aspect of his theory, at the expense of the dynamism of 
historical motion. Still, the way he defines habitus holds a major historical component. It 
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is, after all, habitus is a “system of durable and transposable dispositions” (emphasis in 
the original text), “structured structures that are predisposed to function as structuring 
structures” (emphasis added) (Bourdieu, 1980: 88; 2000a: 25). Dispositions, structured, 
and predisposed, are all connotations of processes occurring in the past rather than the 
moment, even though their practical manifestation takes place in the immediate 
moment under examination. Bourdieu (1980: 94; 2000a: 263) even makes this exact 
point when he elaborates that habitus is a sum of past collective social experience, a 
forgotten history that is incorporated into the social agent’s unconscious mind, a sort of 
instinct within a field. The manifestation of this habitus is but one of the many 
possibilities that the agent has available and, therefore, a non-historical approach would 
fail to grasp all the other possibilities that remain obscure at a particular moment in time. 
Historical motion is therefore inherent to the theory of fields. 
Using a theory of practice means that the whole lives of the journalists I study 
can be considered to be the primary data that founds this research. Their social positions, 
education, and social networks are as relevant as the documents that would traditionally 
be understood as primary sources. And in this regard, much work has already been done 
in terms of biographies and histories of the lives of the individuals and groups that 
constituted the class of journalists, or more broadly the then nascent modern and 
educated middle class. Understanding this is primordial to situating the role of the 
“primary documents” and how they are analyzed in this thesis. Indeed, this chapter 
began with the assertion that the theory is in very many ways the methodology when 
trying to reconstruct the field of journalism. 
Still, the use of the journalistic product, newspaper articles and editorials, 
remains equally important in order to demonstrate how the practices and ethos of the 
journalist materialized. The challenge was to find a method of analysis that could 
incorporate the broad breadth of this research, i.e. a research method that can look at 
broad trends stretching over decades of journalistic production, while at the same time 
allowing for the extrapolation of specific details and short-term trends and 
transformations. The problematique of this thesis, a critique of theories that 
inadequately reflect social contexts and realities, also implied that I had to start from the 
evidence, and therefore required an inferential approach. As a result of this research 




Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three trends of qualitative content analysis, 
two of which I use in this research. Directed content analysis uses an existing body of 
literature and theory to identify key variables as initial coding categories (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005: 1281). Because of the heuristic and inferential aspect of my approach, I 
fall short of coding the data, which Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1282) argue increases the 
trustworthiness and lack of bias of the research. Indeed, I allow the data to guide my 
findings, since it is this data that reveals the different forms of practice. Directed content 
analysis is therefore the first step I use toward answering the traditional questions that 
content analysis pose.  
The second trend I rely on is summative content analysis, a step further in the 
comprehension of a particular text. Summative, or latent, content analysis seeks not only 
to perceive trends in the text, but to further understand the meaning inherent to this text 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1283-4). It is this specific aspect of content analysis that I 
emphasize, and where I use Quentin Skinner’s method for studying intellectual history, a 
method that can be used for the study of any idea. Skinner argues that the most 
important factor in understanding an idea is to contextualize it, not only as a social 
product, but also as the product of a particular thought process within a particular 
society. This implies that meaning is not ephemeral, but rather contextualized, and that it 
is at the same time specific in the sense that it should be as the original author of the 
particular idea intended it to be (Skinner, 1969; 1978). Skinner’s approach, which I have 
previously addressed in this chapter, distances us from the possibility of anachronistic 
and decontextualized assessments of thought, which, in this case, will prove a powerful 
hermeneutic tool in differentiating between actual practice and imposed versions of 
practice, which is the central aim of this thesis. 
The main focus is therefore on the meaning of the text, rather than simply on the 
trends and their evolution, but also on the meaning of these trends and the changes they 
witness. This is why coding in a more traditionally rigid sense was not used in this 
research, especially because of the informed strategy adopted. When concepts and 
keywords evolve in meaning, using them as a category becomes entirely inappropriate. 
“Politics”, “people”, “subscription”, “journalism”, etc., are constantly evolving concepts 
during the period under study, and it is the evolution of the meanings they held which is 
more telling. This might seem at odds with the traditional positivist tendencies of content 
analysis which promote a belief in the “scientific”, “objective”, and “statistically relevant” 
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(see for example Shapiro and Markoff, 1997: 12-14). Recently, however, there has been 
acknowledgment of the shortcomings of this positivism, especially in what relates to 
meaning, communication as a two-way process, and social systems (Krippendorff, 2004: 
xviii-xix). 
This is where I add the layer of discourse analysis, an examination of the text as a 
representation of particular realities, but also as an active construction of reality, 
especially in evolving socio-political contexts when novelty often transcends immediate 
understanding and requires its contemporaries to search for definition. When looking at 
the journalistic product, I therefore see two processes, one where the social context 
influences the text, and the other where the text creates a particular vision of social 
reality and therefore participates in its construction. Bourdieu’s theory of fields takes into 
account this act of dual-construction, especially when we consider the relational nature 
of his theory, as well as the spatial division he promotes to visualize the social space and 
the fields existing within it. 
It might therefore be sufficient to claim here that my approach seeks to 
extrapolate from the message information about three elements constituting the chain 
of production and consumption of the newspaper, the product itself, the producer and 
production process, and the audience and consumption of news. Content, style, and 
meaning imbedded in the message, which I extrapolate using the previously mentioned 
methods, will illustrate how and why the producer of news, the journalist, constructed 
his message, and how and why the audience consumed it. But, again, these methods only 
serve to illustrate particular practices which can only be observed and fully understood 








The journalist educator: the social space, new cultural capital, and the birth of 
journalism 
 
The first privately owned newspaper appeared in Beirut in 1858. Before that 
year, there were only a couple of Arabic newspapers which saw the light in the Ottoman 
Empire, but, with the exception of one obscure and very short-lived newspaper in 
Istanbul, all of them were government owned and run. Apart from the symbolic 
importance of their emergence, they had very little impact on journalism in the region, 
both in terms of production and consumption. In fact, it was not until the 1950s that 
public media acquired an audience in Egypt and the region, only to wither after the 
defeat of 1967. This chapter seeks to examine the appearance of private journalism in 
Beirut and Cairo, which set the stage up for the formation of a field of journalism in the 
two cities. I will argue that the birth of journalism was in fact a byproduct of the struggles 
within the field of education, where new cultural and social capitals were being 
introduced by new actors, and that, from 1858 till the early 1870s, it operated as a 
component of that field. It was a period when the journalist was an educator. 
This chapter starts out with a description of the social space and, for our 
purposes, restricts the scope of this examination to the political and economic 
components of this space. The two fields of politics and economy were in a state of 
upheaval during the period under study and this directly and indirectly affected the 
formation of the field of journalism. The theme of the encounter with Europe will 
overshadow all other factors impacting the construction of the field of journalism, and 
the social space more generally, simply because this encounter left a major impact 
socially, economically, politically, and inevitably, intellectually, in Arab society. Europe 
during this period became the "Other" that local politicians and intellectuals obsessed 
with. It was this superior entity which they suddenly had to compare themselves to. From 
the moment Europe integrated the region into the global economy, a feat which it could 
only have done after it demonstrated to the Ottomans that it had become militarily 




This encounter with Europe also altered the field of education, a very important 
section of the social space because it was in its bosom that journalism was born. Indeed, 
primordial to this research are the transformations to the educational system across the 
Ottoman Empire which led to the rise of a new educated group of people with very little 
employment prospective. This exclusion was one major component of their choice to 
integrate into the new field of journalism, and it will remain a salient feature describing 
journalists for decades, as will be seen in the following chapters. But the struggles within 
the education field did not only affect journalism by creating the new educated class of 
professionals which was to inhabit the field of journalism from then on. It was also the 
channel through which a new idea spread across this new class, an idea which reflected 
both the political changes as well as the economic colonization of the region. 
"Modernity", a concept which was both structurally imposed on the region, as well as 
consciously adopted by the different local elites to try and make sense of the world 
around them, became the most pervasive idea which shaped the way this new class 
thought, and reflected the dichotomy between the new forms of education and the more 
traditional ones (Sharabi, 1970; Hourani, 1983). 
Having established the context in which journalism was born, this chapter will 
further trace the practice of early journalism to try and understand what the first 
journalists tried to do with this new endeavor that represented their newfound social 
position, the social dichotomies of traditional versus modern, and the ideas that they 
professed. Inspecting this period of formation of the field of journalism will allow us to 
follow the birth of the practices of the new profession, the formation of its ethos, and the 
forms of capital which came to determine the field. These components will help us 
reconstruct the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo in its foundational stage and help 
us visualize how journalistic production and consumption came to be there, thus 
understanding what the broader role of journalism was in this particular social space 
before it became a field. Reconstructing the social space will also contextualize the 
remainder of this study; it is the broad setting in which journalism and politics as fields 
and activities evolved all the way until World War I.  
 
I. The modern Middle East, a social space in a state of upheaval 
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Historians generally agree that the beginning of what can be coined as the 
"modern" Middle East coincides with the last couple of years of the eighteenth century. 
This modern Middle East came about as a result of pressure from two directions. By then, 
the eastern shores of the Mediterranean had to come to terms that, for the first time 
since the Roman invasion, Europe had become the superior power. But reaching the 
modern age was not simply a result of this external process; it also one of internal 
decline, as the Ottoman administration had been experiencing deterioration throughout 
the previous  century and a half. The tax-farmers who had constituted the backbone of 
the Ottoman local administration and tax collection system had become too powerful 
and wealthy to be controlled by the central government. The janissaries who were once 
an elite army corps unparalleled in the world had degenerated into a band of thugs 
quarreling for power and doing very little in terms of providing security for the people of 
the Empire and for the Empire itself and its borders (Cleveland, 2004; Palmer, 2011; 
Shaw, 1976). 
It was in this context that Europe demonstrated without a doubt that it has also 
become militarily superior to the Ottoman Empire which, not long before, had caused the 
continent to shake in its boots. Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 and, facing relatively 
little resistance, moved north through Palestine in a bid to take over the eastern shores 
of the Mediterranean. It was only though the combination of an unexpected staunch 
local resistance in Akka, a major Ottoman counter expedition, and British naval support 
for the Ottomans that the French general and his adventurous expedition were defeated 
and Egypt returned to the bosom of the Ottoman Empire (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 60; 
Cleveland, 2004: 65; Cole, 2007). The Ottoman Empire thus safeguarded its territorial 
integrity in the Arab East for another three quarters of a century. 
A. Modern armies, modern education 
The most direct result of Napoleon's campaign in Egypt was that a young 
Albanian officer who took part in the campaign to retake Egypt for the sultan managed to 
climb up the ranks of the army, getting close to the Egyptian notables and subsequently 
getting appointed as governor of Egypt in 1805. His name was Muhammad Ali, the 
founder of modern Egypt and the first of a dynasty of rulers who later became Khedives 
and then kings of Egypt, heading the country for almost a century and a half. After 
consolidating his power internally, Muhammad Ali embarked on a comprehensive reform 
program, focusing most on the modernization of his army and the consolidation of his 
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own power. All the reforms that he ushered during his reign went solely to serve this 
purpose (Fahmy, 1997: 19, 30; 1998: 139). 
One of the things he understood early in his endeavor was that a reform of the 
army had to be accompanied by a more wide-ranging overhaul of both state and society. 
Not long before he acceded to power, he had seen a sultan fail in his attempt to 
modernize the Ottoman army because he did not have full control over society. Indeed, 
Selim III (r. 1789-1807) tried to reform the Ottoman army by creating a new infantry 
corps, the Nizam-i Cedit, to replace the old inefficient corps of janissaries and sipahis. Not 
realizing that the old military system had become ingrained in a particular socio-political 
structure, the lack of social and economic reforms accompanying his shuffling of the 
military led to a revolt against him and his eventual deposition and assassination (Shaw, 
1976: 264-5). Muhammad Ali was not going to have any of that. 
His reforms were to target the political realm, society, bureaucracy, and the 
economy. Each of these reforms affected down the line in one form or another the 
creation and development of the journalistic field. The political and economic reforms 
went hand in hand. Simply put, Muhammad Ali needed to get rid of the competition, the 
remnants of the old Mameluk elite which ruled Egypt before him, as well as the 'ulama, 
the religious leaders of the Egyptian community. These two groups were also holding the 
main source of revenue in Egypt, the land. He approached the problem with a simple 
solution: he killed all the leaders of the Mameluks and confiscated agrarian lands from 
tax-farmers and clergy alike, imposing new taxes which would help him raise his new 
army (Owen, 1993: 57, 67). He also chose to gear his economy toward Europe, focusing 
the efforts of the agricultural sector on the production of cotton which guaranteed him 
the highest income he could generate from the land (Fahmy, 1997: 11). In 1816, he also 
adopted an import substitution policy, establishing textile factories, importing machines 
and skills from Europe to do so. This went hand in hand with the establishment of other 
factories aiming to reduce Egyptian reliance on Europe, especially in terms of armaments 
and military equipment (Owen, 1993: 69-71). 
All these reforms required a new breed of state employees. Indeed, a new army 
needs medical doctors, engineers, officers who knew mathematics and physics; new 
taxes need bureaucrats trained in the arts of accounting; new factories required skilled 
workers and even more skilled administrators. Muhammad Ali's initial impulse was to 
send missions to Europe, to learn skills in European  schools, absorb European 
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techniques, and acquire European languages and know-how (Owen, 1993: 57; Heyworth-
Dunne, 1938: 104-5; Silvera, 1980: 1-2). In parallel, he began a process of establishing a 
new form of local schools. Unlike the traditional Egyptian school, the kuttab school that 
taught students to memorize the Quran and offered the most skilled and financially able 
among them the chance to receive further religious education at the famous al-Azhar, 
Muhammad Ali's new school system was more in line with secular European schools. 
Before the end of the 1830s, he had already established cavalry, artillery, infantry, naval, 
medicine, pharmaceutics, veterinary, war munitions, mineralogy, engineering, applied 
chemistry, signaling, and arts and crafts schools; in addition to the military schools, he 
also established maternity schools, schools of irrigation, translation, agriculture, and 
languages (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: viii; Gesink, 2006: 328-9). 
Evidently, people receiving education either in Europe or in European-like schools 
formed the core of a new group in Egyptian society, one that received a secular 
education, an education imbued with the positivist spirit of Europe, if not explicitly, then 
at least implicitly due to the nature of the subjects learned there. They formed the scion 
of a new class, an educated elite whose sole purpose was to serve the different machines 
of the state revolving around the person of the ruler, Muhammad Ali Pasha. However, in 
a bid to further consolidate his already absolute power over Egypt, Muhammad Ali never 
allowed for this new class to effectively manage the new sectors of Egyptian economy 
and education. In fact, the management of most of the new factories resided in the 
hands of what Owen describes as the "still fundamentally Turkish/Mamluk military elite", 
the pasha's men, rather than in the hands of the young men who were sent to Europe for 
education (Owen, 1993: 72-3). This was the beginning of the process of alienation that 
this group of people was to experience; they were a nascent group of young men who 
learned the European ways, most notably the way politics and public administration were 
understood in Europe during its "liberal age", but whose access to the real positions of 
political, administrative, and bureaucratic power was almost completely restricted. 
Nothing illustrates this claim better than Muhammad Ali's response to one of the young 
men whom he had sent to Europe, and who tried to give him advice based on the 
knowledge he had acquired there. The pasha simply answered him: "it is I who govern. 
Go to Cairo and translate military works" (as quoted by Hourani, 1983: 52). 
B. Integrating Europe and spreading modernization 
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At the start of this chapter, I have mentioned that Europe played a major role in 
the birth of Arab journalism. But to this point, it might seem to the reader that the efforts 
of Muhammad Ali took the region in the opposite direction. In fact, all his efforts were 
geared toward advancing and modernizing independently from Europe. Two of his 
actions, however, created a backlash, opening wide the doors of the Middle East to 
European integration, economically, politically, socially, and culturally. First, his reliance 
on a single cash-crop, cotton, that found an almost exclusive market in Europe, made 
Egypt into a center of focus for European capitalist penetration, especially later on in the 
1860s when, due to the American civil war, Egypt became the main source of cotton for 
Europe.  Second, his failed military expedition to Syria in the 1830s permitted the 
imposition of European rules on the economy of the region. His monopoly over cotton 
production and sale was terminated when the pasha's forces were defeated by Ottoman 
and British forces combined. The British coerced the Ottomans into a treaty, the Anglo-
Turkish Treaty of 1838, which resulted in an opening of the Middle Eastern markets to 
European exploitation, banning monopolies over the production of local goods, and 
placing tariffs on imports of processed goods at a low five percent, making imported 
products cheaper than locally produced goods (Owen, 1993: 75-6). The introduction of 
the Middle East into the capitalist world-system and the accompanying European 
encroachment had officially begun. 
This European integration was far reaching for the establishment of the class of 
intellectuals who later on founded the field of journalism. But first, it must be mentioned 
here that the successes of the pasha's reforms led the sultan at the time, Mahmud II, to 
usher reforms of his own. The weakness of the central government in its control of the 
imperial peripheries and the lesson the sultan had learned from his predecessor, Selim III, 
led him to undertake a slower transformative process, one which first sought to remove 
the threat of the janissary corps, the old order. By taking his time to empower a counter-
weight to the janissaries in the form of the local religious leaders, Mahmud II made sure 
that social reforms that gave power to these 'ulama was enough to guarantee their 
support in the transition, one which was as bloody as the one undertaken by Muhammad 
Ali. The janissaries were slaughtered in their garrisons, and their barracks were burnt 
with them inside. The road of reforms was opened for Mahmud II who ushered the era of 
tanzimat, or reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 20-21). His reforms of the central 
government, as important as they are in themselves, are not as useful to us here. 
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The era of Ottoman reforms, however, permitted social changes that altered the 
imperial peripheries, especially with the introduction of the imperial decree of 1856 
which guaranteed equality between subjects of the Empire irrespective of their sects and 
creeds (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 118; Hourani, 1983: 47). The importance of this reform 
was not that it brought about a secular code of laws, but rather that it served the 
purpose of European integration in the region in that it empowered indigenous 
minorities who were in direct contact with Europe both commercially and culturally. 
Indeed, since the beginning of the era of integration into the global economy, European 
merchants had to rely on a local group of people to conduct their trade with, a group 
which mainly understood both European languages as well as local culture of commerce 
to be able to link the local peasant with the European trading houses (Owen, 1993: 99; 
Firro, 1990: 160; Issawi, 1977: 98). The family names of some of the Beiruti merchants 
dealing with European trading houses are worth noting here: Khuri, Thabit, Bayhum, al-
'Aris (Issawi, 1977: 198); some of the most prominent journalists during this period came 
from these families, including the founder of the first newspaper in Beirut, Khalil al-Khuri. 
C. An age of reforms and changes 
In this section, I have shown through the historical account of the first half of the 
nineteenth century that the social space of Beirut and Cairo during that period was one 
of transition and change. The changes were brought about by the reform attempts of the 
local governments, that of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Mahmud II in the rest of the 
Empire, as well as by European encroachment on the economy, an encroachment which 
ushered a series of social and cultural changes that will be explored in the next section in 
this chapter. The reason why Beirut seemed absent so far was that reforms and changes 
there started to become apparent a little later than in Cairo, which might be a bit peculiar 
seeing how Beirut was the place where Arab journalism was really born. Indeed, it was 
not until the end of the Lebanese civil strife of 1860 that major changes were introduced 
to the Mountain, and consequently to Beirut, the link of Mount-Lebanon to the rest of 
the world, a link which exponentially grew in importance with the rise of silk prices, 
Mount-Lebanon's single cash-crop, leading it along with Beirut, to be of major 
importance to Europe, and mainly France, the largest market for Lebanese silk in the 
1860s and 1870s. 
But changes in Beirut began earlier than in 1860, even though on a small scale. 
Indeed, the trade of silk with Europe became more important starting in the 1830s and 
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accelerated during the 1840s with the establishment of French silk reeling factories in 
Mount-Lebanon (Firro, 1990: 151). Beirut and Cairo were simultaneously being absorbed 
into the European sphere of influence and the global economy. Culturally, Beirut had also 
been connected to Europe, and specifically France, for a longer period. Ever since the 
capitulations of the sixteenth century, France had acquired the right to protect Catholics 
in the Ottoman Empire. The Maronites of the Mountain having reestablished contact 
with the Vatican became the target of such protection and French influence grew among 
this community. Similarly, Russia protected the Greek Orthodox after the 1774 Treaty of 
Kutchuk Kinardji (Hourani, 1983: 39-40). Hourani (1983: 44) argued that "by the 1820s 
and 1830s therefore there existed Ottomans who, without being torn from their roots, 
had become members of the European community and were conversant with its ideas". 
Changes were therefore taking place across the entirety of the social space. 
Politics, society, the economy, culture, and even identities were changing. The remainder 
of the period under study, all the way until the division of the region by the French and 
the British in the Sykes-Picot agreement and the San Remo Conference, was one of 
constant metamorphosis, especially at the political level. The political field in Beirut and 
Cairo constantly changed, with major milestones like the Lebanese civil strife of 1860 and 
the accession of Ismail pasha in Egypt in 1863, both events leading to the administrative 
autonomy of Mount-Lebanon and Egypt respectively, the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 
and the tanzimat of sultan Abdul Hamid II starting almost simultaneously, the removal of 
the almighty Lord Cromer in 1907 and the Young Turks revolution in 1908. By some weird 
twist of historical coincidence, these changes took place in Beirut and Cairo at the same 
time, maintaining a momentum of cultural and social attachments between the two 
centers. As a result, these changes, although apparently dividing Beirut and Cairo, never 
created a socio-cultural wedge between them. Many fields, not just the field of 
journalism, remained common between the two cities. This was not in spite of the 
changes, but rather because of them. One example of importance which will further be 
developed in the next chapter would be the immigration of many educated Lebanese 
men from Beirut to Cairo in the 1870s and 1880s, where they founded a private Arabic 
press, a continuation of their efforts in Beirut. 
 
II. New educations and the birth of new cultural and social capitals 
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Prior to the nineteenth century, education tended to be disregarded in the 
provinces of the Empire, including in Egypt and Syria. Young children learned for a short 
while in the local religious schools which taught them the basics needed to fulfill their 
religious obligations, while part of a minority which was a bit more lucky to come from a 
relatively more privileged background, i.e. some of the sons of notables and local 
community leaders, would be sent to Istanbul for higher education and the enrollment in 
the service of the Ottoman government (Bashshur , 1966: 452). In Egypt, there was one 
(and the only) institution of higher learning, al-Azhar, founded in the year 972 and solely 
providing Islamic teaching (Gesink, 2006: 326). 
For the purpose of this study, the changes to the education system, and more 
precisely the introduction of new types of education in the Arab East will be stressed as 
the major factor which allowed for the birth of private journalism. This new education, 
whether the missionary education of the Protestants in Beirut, or the government 
schools established later during the nineteenth century in Egypt, did not simply imbue 
individuals with a set of liberal values and a sense of radical criticism which was 
unfamiliar to the local people as much of the literature suggests (Bashshur, 1966: 453; 
Dodge, 1972; Faksh, 1976: 236). It also offered these individuals new forms of cultural 
and social capitals which had previously been unavailable. Cultural capital is obviously the 
main outcome of education. In this case, the particular cultural capital offered by the new 
European or European-styled education systems was the key component of the creation 
of a social class which, as seen in Chapter III, represents "sets of agents who occupy  
similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar 
conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and 
therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances" (Bourdieu, 1985: 
725). Furthermore, belonging to this new educated class imbued the individual with 
social capital generated from the adherence to networks of individuals with similar 
predispositions - indeed most of the journalists during this period belonged to such 
networks - and, more importantly, because of their knowledge of European languages, 
were also linked in one way or another, usually through employment and prospective 
employment, to European missions and consulates. These social links were fundamental 
in the establishment and survival of the Arabic press both in Beirut and Cairo. 
A. Traditional education and the power of the status quo 
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Traditional religious education is mostly disregarded in the literature which 
stresses the role of education in the rise of the Arabic press simply because it did not 
impact during this period the field of journalism much and only produced three major 
journalists: 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani, Rashid Rida, and Yusuf 'Ali. Qabbani received his 
early education at a local madrasa, but later joined the ranks of Butrus al-Bustani's newly 
founded secular National School on the outskirts of Beirut (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 
100). Rida received his early education at a traditional Islamic school in Tripoli and his 
theological and religious development came as a result of his reading al-'Urwa al-
Wuthqa, the polemic revolutionary Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's famous publication (Ryad, 
2009: 33). 'Ali's venturing into the field of journalism was actually a reaction to his Islamic 
education at al-Azhar which he found to be boring and wanting (Goldschmidt, 2000: 230). 
All three journalists were therefore the product of an escape from the traditional 
religious education institutions. 
There were a few other shaykhs who later on became journalists, like shaykh 
Yusuf al-Asir but were of little impact in the founding and evolution of the field of 
journalism. In his account of the first one hundred years of journalism in Egypt, Hamza 
mentioned one other al-Azhar graduate to have gone into journalism. Shaykh Hamza 
Fathullah published al-Burhan in Alexandria in 1881. The paper quickly failed because, 
according to the author, it was but a caricature of its editor, a man who lived outside his 
age ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-61]: 76-7). Some have attributed this discrepancy 
to the "outdated" curriculum of the traditional religious schools, a curriculum which only 
taught grammar, religious history, jurisprudence, philosophy, theology, mysticism, and 
commentary (Gesink, 2006: 327; Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 112; Faksh, 1980: 43). 
Some also have argued that the rift between traditional education and the press 
was in fact an extension of the problem traditional education, and the 'ulama' it created, 
had with the printing press. The main example of this rift is usually found in the story of 
the first Arab encounter with the printed word which can be found in the account of the 
historian and al-Azhar graduate 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Jabarti. The printing press that 
Napoleon brought with him to Egypt in 1798 created a sense of revulsion in al-Jabarti 
when he read the printed declaration of intent of peace Napoleon addressed to the 
Egyptians. Al-Jabarti went and denounced the grammatical, lexical, and literary 
shortcomings of the general's first declaration, an act which for him was tantamount to 
destroying the French attempt at communicating with the locals since it revealed that the 
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French and their invention, the printed word, failed to produce a satisfying level of Arabic 
language and were therefore inferior to the local learned men (Ayalon, 1995: 168). 
Many, including Ayalon (1995), have ascribed this opposition to printing as a 
revolt against the competition it might have brought to the realm of the written word 
that the clerics had once monopolized. The assumption is that the written word in the 
Arabic world was mainly used to preserve religious ideas and sacred texts, and the act of 
writing was therefore equal to the possession of this knowledge which rested with the 
'ulama'. But even if we assume that they were afraid they had lost control over the 
production of the written word, and therefore their monopoly over the sacred, they were 
still at that time in firm control of teaching, and therefore reading. It would therefore 
seem hardly a problem for them to control access to the written word because they were 
in control of both its production and consumption. This whole argument also disregards 
that a lot of writing in Arabic was in fact dedicated to history and literature, and not only 
religious studies; it equally ranged between the most sacred holy scriptures of Islam to 
the most blasphemous poems of one of the greatest Arab poets of all times, Abu 
Nuwwas.  
But when the field of education changed and more people learned to read and 
write, the press became more accessible to the public. Only then we can understand why 
al-Jabarti's position became a matter of more urgency, as the challenge to the 'ulama's 
possession of knowledge and its dissemination tools became more serious, as a new 
group of people would become an alternative that they could not control. The printing 
press, in this case, threatened and undermined their position of dominance by creating a 
complete chain of production and consumption of independent knowledge; but this 
might only have been possible after education was widespread enough to create a class 
of learned men from outside of the circle of 'ulama'. This means that the reason for this 
opposition between traditional views and print must be found elsewhere during this 
early stage, which will be examined later. 
B. Missionary education, the womb of Arab journalism 
Talking about missionary education in the Middle East in general might be 
misleading and not entirely accurate from a historical point of view. It was in fact around 
American Protestant missions in specific, that the individuals who founded Arab 
journalism and populated most of its field during its inception congregated. And it was 
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specifically because they were Protestant missions that their imprint was felt more 
strongly in the field of education, as well as in society in general. Indeed, unlike other 
missions, the most notable during this period being the French Catholic missions and the 
Russian Orthodox missions, the Protestant missionaries sought to educate the locals 
differently as well as convert them spiritually. Bashshur (1996: 453) stressed this 
difference, claiming that the Protestants sought to instill an independent and radical 
spirit of self-initiative, while the Catholics were neither radical nor motivating; they 
represented the spirit and qualities of much of the local population, or at least the 
Christians of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon, the majority of which were Catholics 
themselves. 
If we were to just compare the mission statements of Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries who established and managed institutes of higher education in Beirut, we 
could very easily understand how Bashshur reached his conclusion and why missions 
other than the Protestant mission in Beirut failed to mold individuals who were 
interested in new endeavors such as journalism. Daniel Bliss, one of the founders of the 
Syrian Protestant College from which most of the early generation4 journalists emerged, 
said on one occasion: 
Tyrant, Despot, Pope and Priest are ever the enemies of agitation, and 
when in their domains a master spirit arises and disseminates freedom 
and truth, the rack and inquisition claim another victim. There can be no 
quiet when antagonistic principles meet. The great model Agitator 
brought not peace to human society but a sword (As quoted by Kedourie, 
1966: 77). 
Traditionally, the literature paints a very rosy picture of the impact of this mission on the 
local society, usually stressing how it instilled the liberal values of the West on the locals, 
giving them an understanding of Western civilization, a point which will be rectified in the 
course of this dissertation (Dodge, 1972; Kedourie, 1966). 
The French, on the other hand, had a completely different approach. By 
establishing one of the most prominent schools at their Beirut university, the Oriental 
school at the Université Saint Joseph, the French hoped to "guarantee [their] prestige 
and establish [their] intellectual supremacy in Syria" (as quoted by Herzstein, 2006: 317). 
                                                          
4 The use of the term "generation" in this thesis refers to groups of journalists who appeared in 
the field at roughly the same time, viewed their role in the same way, shared similar journalistic 
interests, and had a similar attitude toward their social surroundings. It builds, to some extent, on 
Bourdieu's notion of social class, except that it takes into account time.   
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Their effort was therefore not aimed at the local population, but rather at the 
Protestants who were challenging the Catholic dominance in Mount-Lebanon and, by 
extension, Beirut. This challenge was to become a salient feature of the relationship 
between the Protestant and Catholic missions. Any further effort by the missionaries was 
directed not at educating the locals, but rather at teaching themselves about the locals. 
In the words of a contemporary professor referring to the oriental school: "what better 
occasion and under what better guidance could have we learned about the Orient here?" 
(as quoted by Herzstein, 2006: 320). The aims and goals of the Catholic missionaries were 
exclusive of the local population and not as driven as the Protestant ones. It is therefore 
not surprising that they left so little impact on the changing social scene, enough to make 
it very difficult to find any piece of primary or secondary literature dedicated to their 
efforts in this regard. 
Going back to the Protestant mission and its flagship educational institution in 
the Middle East, the Syrian Protestant College, later renamed the American University of 
Beirut, I first examine what they offered their students. The curriculum of the medical 
school and the school of arts and sciences included subjects ranging from chemistry, 
anatomy, pharmacy, and zoology, to Latin, Arabic, French, English, geometry, physics, 
history, and philosophy (from Shahin Makarius' study of education in Syria in 1882/3, 
translated by Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 116). The novelty lied not in the subjects 
themselves, but rather in the teaching methods and material. Indeed, the locals had their 
own brand of medicine and pharmacy still known till today as Arab medicine. They could 
also learn European languages at traditional Christian schools which, even after the 
establishment of modern schooling in Syria still graduated pupils who then went to 
European institutions of higher education. The schools of Suqah and Bqarqasha, one of 
them founded in 1584, and the famous school of 'Ayn Waraqa, which was founded in 
1793 and graduated many of the founders of the Arabic press, are but few of the more 
prominent examples (as quoted by Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 125). 
What was therefore the meaning of these new scientific subjects that were being 
introduced to the pupils of the Syrian Protestant College? It was simply new forms of 
cultural capital that they were accumulating. The positivist approach to European 
sciences came imbued with a set of philosophical underpinnings characteristic of the age 
of enlightenment that the West experienced during the previous two centuries. These 
new sciences were accompanied by new methodologies and new goals. What the 
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Protestant missionaries offered was therefore the positivist spirit prevalent during the 
nineteenth century. The form of the incorporated cultural capital had therefore changed 
and modern education offered them a new type of knowledge that was different from 
the forms of knowledge previously known to the region. They also introduced cultural 
capital in an objectivated state, a set of material goods that contained knowledge. 
Students acquired books and instruments which became necessary to the accumulation 
of cultural capital in its incorporated state. Finally, the missionary institutions offered 
their students cultural capital in an institutionalized state. They gave them degrees and 
certificates, pieces of paper which guaranteed their status as possessors of a particular 
cultural capital. Still, generally speaking, cultural capital, especially in its institutionalized 
state, was not yet a prerequisite to enter the job market; it did not always translate into a 
capital useful in other fields. For a while, the only real prospects for graduates was to 
either teach or be employed as translators for the missionaries themselves or European 
embassies and consulates (Dodge, 1972: 20). Such demand on the job market was bound 
to dry up quickly, especially that modern education began to graduate exponentially 
more students. But going back to the new type of cultural capital that modern education 
introduced, its importance lies in that it presented a new type of knowledge, driven by 
different methodologies and transmission tools than traditional education. Students 
learned to think differently about a different type of knowledge, a transformation which 
must not be disregarded when trying to understand why they embarked on an innovative 
project such as journalism. 
A factor which might partially explain the birth of journalism as a possible outlet 
for these graduates was the new social capital that missionary schools generated among 
their students. Indeed, many networks were created in and around these new 
institutions of learning. Literary and scientific societies emerged with the help of 
American missionaries and they slowly grew to become the intellectual hotbeds of the 
formulation of modern Arab nationalism. But even before that, the first journals and 
newspapers saw the light from their midst (Bashshur, 1966: 453). Hafez (2000: 17-18) 
argued that it was specifically the activity of these networks which led to the rise of 
journalism. With the adoption of new methods of thinking and new approaches to 
reality, people gathered in groups to discuss their newfound ideas and communicate 
them among each other. The only tool that could spread these ideas beyond the 
immediate group was journals and publications. Without such dissemination, this 
accumulation of cultural and social capitals would have been useless. Therefore, if we 
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transpose Hafez' argument onto Bourdieu's theory of fields, we see that the new class 
which saw the light as a result of the new education system, and acquired new social 
capital because of it, was now investing both cultural and social capitals outside of the 
confined circles of individuals within the field of education. It was therefore addressing a 
broader public and seeking to spread education to more people. Although there is no 
evidence to this point, the only logical deduction for such an approach was that the 
nature of modern liberal education had the spread of knowledge among people, rather 
than an accumulation of this knowledge in a close circle of individuals, embedded in its 
message. There seems to be no ulterior plan or purpose for the creation of the first 
newspapers and journals beyond this spread of knowledge, a point I will return to later in 
this chapter. 
The most important of these societies was the Syrian Scientific Society, al-
jam'iyya al-'ilmyya as-suriyya, which featured among its members Butrus al-Bustani and 
his son Salim, Nasif al-Yaziji, Muhammad Arslan, and Husayn Bayhum, as well as Eli Smith, 
Cornelius Van Dyck, and William Thompson, the founders of the Syrian Protestant College 
(Antonius, 1938: 53; Ayalon, 1995: 31; Diab and Wahlin, 1983: 105). Many of the local 
members became very prominent journalists. Another society in Beirut was jam'iyyat al-
funun, the Arts Society, which was the Muslim counterpart of the secular Syrian Scientific 
Society and whose members decided in 1875 to publish the first Muslim newspaper, 
Thamarat al-Funun (the Fruits of the Arts),  to counter the successes of the papers 
established by Christians (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.1: 25; Ayalon, 1995: 36). It becomes 
apparent that the role of the new social capital forming around the missionary education 
in Beirut was primordial in shaping the birth of the journalistic field. 
C. Government schools, an alternative modern secular education 
As was previously mentioned in this chapter, the reform of education first started 
with Muhammad Ali who established schools to train employees needed to fuel his 
armies and bureaucracy. These schools were mostly technical and their graduates did not 
need to go and look for jobs; the state already had a place for them (Faksh, 1976: 235; 
Gesink, 2006: 328-9). But a decade and a half after his death, education in Egypt had 
relatively stagnated under the reign of his two successor 'Abbas I and Sa'id, and it was 
not until the reign of the pasha's grandson, Isma'il (r. 1863-79), that educational reforms 
were picked up. having been educated in Paris, he exhibited a very strong passion for the 
spirit of modernity which he tried to impose on Egypt through a series of major 
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modernization projects that reflected his attachment to the European ideal. During his 
visit to Paris in 1867, he said: "over the past thirty years Europe's influence has 
transformed Cairo. Now... we are civilized" (as quoted by Raymond, 2000: 312). After his 
abdication in 1879, he was even reported saying: "My country is no longer in Africa; we 
are now part of Europe. It is therefore natural for us to abandon our former ways and to 
adopt a new system adapted to our social conditions" (as quoted by Scham, 2013: 318). 
Educational reforms during his reign were part of his grand vision of 
modernization; and it is important to stress this fact because, like many of his other 
reforms, their effects on Egyptian society were unpredictable. New preparatory schools 
were founded as early as 1863 to educate the sons of government officials and other 
wealthy subjects, some of whom became prominent public figures (Reid, 1983: 377). 
Military schools also received a facelift and civil schools based on European models were 
established to educate the youth (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938: 348-355). By the late 1860s, 
the educational reforms reached most of Egypt, and the state provided a primary school 
for every village of two thousand inhabitants (Gesink, 2006: 330). One of the most visible 
results of these reforms was that the reign of Isma'il saw the real creation of an Egyptian 
middle class of educated professionals, a new elite (Yousef, 2008: 109). 
The educational system kept expanding from the time Isma'il was deposed in 
1879 till World War I, even though the literature seems to be in agreement that the 
British administration of Egypt did not pay much attention to education. Evelyn Baring, 
known as Lord Cromer, and the governor of Egypt from 1883 till 1907, had a conscious 
policy of restricting the expansion of education for he believed that it would be better for 
Egyptians to stick to the social position in which they were born, where they would be far 
happier than if they received an education (Reid, 1977: 357). His declarations hid a fear 
that a new educated class would create more problems to the British administration of 
Egypt than a more docile uneducated rural society (Tignor, 1963: 148). Still, as will be 
shown in later chapters, demand for education grew despite of the lack of development 
in the sector of education, as more people wanted to acquire higher levels of education. 
The impact of these new schools was to create a larger pool of educated people in Egypt, 
an obvious pre-requisite for the establishment of a successful field of journalism simply 
because it provided it with the required readership. But what is interesting to mention at 
this point is that not many graduates of the government educational system ended up 
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being journalists during this period, even though they played a central role in the field in 
the years after World War I. 
The final point concerning government education revolves around the most 
important and unintended result of Isma'il and his successors' reforms. Efforts to 
modernize focused on creating a new Egypt, a new society, and new institutions. Writing 
about the transformation that the city of Cairo endured, Andre Raymond (2000: 318) 
argued that the new Egypt did not replace the old one, but rather came to exist right next 
to it, not symbolically or metaphorically, but physically through the new urban planning 
of the city. This was the case with all other modernizing efforts. A rift was created 
between the old and the new, the "traditional" and the "modern". This rift became quite 
noticeable at the social level, especially with the introduction of modern government 
education in Egypt. The new system did not quite compete with the old traditional 
education, as each served a particular class of people. The traditional religious education 
served the masses and provided them with basic learning, while the new schools catered 
for people who were maneuvering the social space (Faksh, 1976: 236; Reid, 1977: 350). 
The real issue here was not that the rift was simply irreconcilable, as Raymond (2000: 
318) noted that "Cairo is like a cracked vase whose two halves can never be put back 
together". It was that, in fact, it divided society along lines where communications would 
become much more difficult to achieve. It was during this particular time when 
journalism was introduced to Cairo. As a result, in this chapter, government education 
has no real place except that it was an additional producer of consumers of journalism, 
educated people who could read and who learned that skill outside of the religious 
establishments of learning. But the significance of the impact of this type of education 
will be felt later, when the social rift between the educated and non-educated, the 
modern and traditional segments of society, will divide the local communities and equally 
separate their modes of public communication. 
D. Modernity and the field of education: social context for the birth of the press 
I must begin the conclusion of this section by pointing out that, unlike the case 
for Arab journalism during its foundational period, education in Cairo and Beirut followed 
different paths of development and constituted two separate fields of education in which 
two different processes were taking place. This was because the actors and their 
challenge to the status quo of the educational field that was common to the whole of the 
Ottoman Empire were different in Beirut and Cairo. In Beirut, the missionary education 
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sought to replace traditional education not simply as a learning institution, but equally, if 
not more importantly for the missionaries themselves, at the level of society broadly 
speaking (Hanssen, 2005: 164). It was a mission of spiritual and social conversion and, 
needless to say, it opposed the status quo which the encroachment of Europe on the 
local economy had already perturbed. In Egypt, on the other hand, the creation of a 
secular government-led education system did not really challenge the traditional Islamic 
educational institutions, but rather operated beside it, the two targeting different 
classes, offering their students different capitals and opportunities to invest these 
capitals elsewhere in the social space. The fact that I do not stress this difference much is 
that its impact on the field of journalism is negligible. The fields of education in Beirut 
and Cairo produced the same class, sets of agents who enjoyed the same type of 
education, acquired the same knowledge, and came to constitute the same producers 
and consumers of journalism. The two fields of education fed into a single field of 
journalism. 
To understand the role of the field of education in the birth of the Arabic press, I 
must return to the process of political modernization which created the context that 
allowed for European-styled education to challenge traditional religious education, 
creating in along the way new processes of producing and consuming knowledge, and a 
new class that could operate this new chain. This began as a result of the project of 
modernity which swept the region starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
and intensifying in its final third under Abdul-Hamid II in the Ottoman Empire and 
Khedive Isma'il. The results of the attempted introduction of modernity varied in each 
case. In some aspects, like with the economy and society, it led to the creation of what 
Issawi (1961) labeled a "lop-sided development", or the development of a two-speed and 
two-direction economy, one which was geared toward trade with the center, Europe, and 
one which remained entrenched in the old ways of the periphery. Socially, it created the 
divide previously mentioned between a large majority of the population which remained 
within the traditional sphere, while a small segment of society adhered to the new class 
of educated professionals. This social division, which the struggle within the field of 
education was but a symptom, also came to define the formation and evolution of the 
field of journalism. 
Politically, the results of the attempt to modernize can be located somewhere 
between the surreal and the ridiculous. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was completely 
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devoid of institutions which could efficiently support the reforms. And not only were 
there no alternatives for the modernizing governments except to copy in form Western 
ideas and concepts, but there was not even the socio-cultural prerequisites for such an 
emulation. Heyworth-Dunne (1938: 343) argued that public life was not just incompatible 
with such political innovations, but was rather completely non-existent as people in 
general were politically ignorant, a state of affairs which had been actively promoted by 
the absolute despots of the age of reforms in the nineteenth century. One example 
illustrates perfectly this claim. When Isma'il called for the formation of a parliament in 
1866, he directed the deputies to sit to the right if they supported the government, to 
the left if they opposed it, and in the middle if they were neutral; they all went to the 
right, wondering how they could possibly oppose the government (Heyworth-Dunne, 
1938: ff343). 
The literature has traditionally framed this dichotomy between traditional and 
modern, or local and Western, in civilizational terms, where modernity was incompatible 
with a backwards society strongly clinging to the ways of the past. This rhetoric also 
applied to analyses of educational developments during this time (Yousef, 2008: 111). 
There are, however, few accounts that tried to sociologically understand the 
phenomenon of the opposition between traditional and modern educations. Faksh 
(1976: 236), for example, noted that different types of education served different 
clientele. Western education was meant for a new elite, the new middle class, while 
traditional education served the poor and the masses. The result was that the position of 
the clergy as an intellectual and social elite was threatened, especially that the new rising 
educated class was replacing them in many government positions due to the creation of 
the new modernized bureaucracy (Faksh, 1976: 235). This necessarily created a strong 
backlash against modernization both socially and in the sector of education (Gesink, 
2006: 339-342). 
Such analysis can be more solidly conceptualized in Bourdieu's own terms. This 
social division and the opposition between traditional and modern, especially within the 
field of education,  was a symptom of a struggle within the field which was seeing new 
players challenge the status quo. Indeed, education in the nineteenth century had 
become a champ de luttes between the traditional religious education system, the 
European missionary education, and the secular European-styled government schools. 
These new education systems were threatening traditional education by providing new 
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types of cultural capital in the form of natural and administrative sciences (Hanssen, 
2005: 164). Previously, the field was monopolized by clerics who produced and 
reproduced cultural capital, only allowing specific individuals of their own choosing to 
own and distribute such capital through a process of recognition from the producers of 
knowledge themselves that such individual was worthy of such a position. But with the 
advent of modern education, whether missionary education or government schools, the 
rules of the game had changed. New actors could invest, produce, reproduce, and, most 
importantly, propagate new cultural capital through a process of production and 
consumption that lied totally outside of the control of the 'ulama'. Individuals populating 
the traditional sector of education were on the defensive trying to preserve the old rules 
which privileged their own position as holders of knowledge and the cultural capital it 
represented. It was therefore natural for them to reject the tools introduced by agents of 
the modern sectors of education since these were the tools that challenged their own 
position of dominance. Journalism was one such tool.  
As a result of this Bourdieusian reading of the traditional/modern divide, we can 
thus understand why traditional education could not either produce or consume 
journalistic production, but also why the people who possessed the old form of cultural 
capital, represented by the traditional types of knowledge taught in traditional schools, 
could not easily accumulate or invest cultural capital produced in modern schooling or 
the press, which, as I argue in this chapter, was a product of this modern schooling and 
the particular cultural capital it generated. This was because the individuals possessing 
these two different types of cultural capital had different social positions and professed 
different dispositions. This was best described by the famous author Taha Husayn who, 
even though he was writing in 1938, seemed to adhere to Bourdieu's theory of fields to 
the letter when describing the duality in the way of thinking between the graduates of al-
Azhar and modern schools: 
the graduate of the Azhar conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of 
the modern schools conceives it in another sense. Thus the two different 
graduates agree in neither their thinking nor in their evaluation; nor do 
they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action (as 
quoted by Faksh, 1980: 42-3). 
Even Husayn's terminology reveals the effects of the struggle in the field of 
education on other fields where graduates pursued their careers, and most notably in 
journalism. It is easy to explain from this perspective the aversion traditional schools, 
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scholars, and graduates expressed against the novelty of the press. It was part of the 
attack they were sustaining from the project of modernity. This rejection was therefore a 
sign of a social struggle rather than a mere ideological one. Traditional scholars needed 
to preserve their privileged position as owners of the means of producing and consuming 
knowledge and modern education threatened this position by creating an alternative and 
even alien cycle of knowledge production and consumption. The most appropriate 
supporting evidence of this claim might simply be that the key intellectuals who 
promoted modernity and the renaissance of Arab thought, an-Nahda, during this period 
were usually Muslim clerics like at-Tahtawi, al-Afghani, and 'Abduh, educated in the 
traditional schooling system. Secondary sources do not even question the rigidity of their 
representation of this dichotomy between traditional and modern, even based on 
historical facts. Throughout most of the Arab and Islamic history, we know of many 
scientists and pioneers who emerged from the same traditional Islamic education system. 
It is enough to mention Ibn Sina, al-Khawarizmi, al-Kindi, and al-Farabi to make the simple 
point that traditional Islamic education was not in essence intrinsically opposed to 
scientific enquiry and progress. This reinforces the argument that the difference was in 
the social positioning and predispositions of the actors in the field, rather than a mere 
ideological deference conservatives had in the face of modernists. 
 
III. The birth of journalism in Beirut, an educational endeavor and a modernizing project 
In 1857, notables in and around Beirut received letters from Khalil al-Khuri (1836-
1907), asking them to subscribe to an endeavor on which he was to embark soon. The 
letter read: 
A collection of news will be printed in the Arabic language in a private 
printing house in Beirut. It will contain news of these lands and foreign 
news translated from the best and greatest European journals. It will also 
feature general scientific benefits and experiences that would prove 
beneficial to the other classes of people. This endeavor will be charged to 
a group of the smartest and most alert writers, translators, and editors in 
the country, some of whom will later become famous, especially people 
like Umar effendi al-Unsi al-Husayni and shaykh Nasif al-Yaziji. [...] We 
pray every civilized person who wants to benefit these lands to honor us 
and place his name on this list of subscribers (as quoted by Filib di 
Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57). 
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In January 1858, this endeavor appeared under the name Hadiqat al-Akhbar, the Garden 
of News, the first Arabic newspaper in Beirut, and the only such private enterprise until 
1870. The question that I seek to address here is why al-Khuri chose to embark on such 
an adventure. Not only was the public unaware of the invention that was the newspaper, 
but al-Khuri himself had no benchmark on which to measure his chances of success and 
expectations. The possible knowledge he could have had on journalism would have even 
discouraged him. The only periodical during that time was the official government 
newspaper in Cairo, al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya. It informed state officials of the decisions of 
the government. The other Arabic newspaper to have appeared before 1858 was Mir'at 
al-Ahwal (the mirror of the state of affairs), founded by Rizqallah Hassun in Istanbul. He 
published it for more than a year in Istanbul, criticizing the sultan and siding with the 
Russians in the Crimean War. He was sentenced to death and barely escaped with his life. 
The fact that his publication persisted for a year probably meant that it received very 
little attention, even if its owner was reported to have jubilantly written in response to 
his death sentence: "I am the son of Hassun Rizqallah, more famous than fire on a 
banner; everyone knows about me" (as quoted in Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 55). 
The first relatively lengthy Arabic commentary on the press appeared in 1830 in a 
book written by one of the students Muhammad Ali sent to Paris. The student was the 
shaykh Rifa'a Rafi' at-Tahtawi whom many consider to be the first figure in the 
intellectual renaissance of the Arab world during the nineteenth century, the Nahda. In a 
commentary on his stay in France, entitled Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz (extracting the 
gold from a summary of Paris), Tahtawi devoted sections to the leafs of paper the French 
called "journaux" which contain the opinions of anyone who had anything they wanted 
to say, as long as it does no harm to others. These papers contained various news from 
inside and outside the kingdom and, even though they were filled with lies, they still 
contained some bit of useful advice. Tahtawi even encouraged this practice: "do not 
despise a worthy opinion, even if uttered by a lowlife" (Rifa'a Rafi' at-Tahtawi, 2011: 115). 
These papers also publicized great deeds as well as mischief, thus earning praise or 
shame to their doers. He moved on to describe the mechanics of journalism. It allowed 
the French to say their mind and criticize the administration of the state, and the press 
enjoyed full freedom to do so. This freedom is only restricted by the sensibility to the 
wellbeing of others whom it might hurt because it would then make it legally 
accountable. But in practice, Tahtawi (2011: 192) argued, newspapers are the rallying 
point of political groups which promote their views in them, making these papers a 
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collection of lies, and everyone knows what liars the French are! On the same page, he 
went on to socially classify journalists. They were less significant than public speakers, 
even though they fulfilled a somewhat similar role. But they were definitely of a higher 
class than poets. Khalil al-Khuri began his career as a poet, so maybe he read Tahtawi and 
thought he was making an upgrade. 
A. The first journalists, a social class 
So why exactly did al-Khuri choose to invest in an activity which promoted lies, 
was so insignificant that no one would care about it, and, if they did, might end up with 
him being executed? The answer probably lies in the combination of all the elements 
previously discussed in this chapter, in the character of al-Khuri and his associates in this 
endeavor, their social position as a group and a class. He came from a well respected 
Greek Orthodox family in Mount-Lebanon, worked for a commercial firm for awhile, and 
wrote poems in Turkish and French (Ayalon, 1995: 31). Even though there is no evidence 
pointing toward his education, his knowledge of these languages and his relationship to 
Butrus al-Bustani tends to indicate that he learned at one of the newly established 
schools in Mount-Lebanon or Beirut.  The person who funded his paper, Mikha'il bin 
Yusuf Mudawwar, was a notable from Beirut who worked as a merchant and a translator 
for the French embassy there, indicating that he also received modern education (Filib di 
Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57; Zachs, 2012: 163). Nasif al-Yaziji, who was supposed to contribute 
to the paper, also came from an old family of Catholic notables. He received his 
education in a traditional school, but became quickly affiliated with the Protestant 
mission in Beirut which used his vast knowledge of the Arabic language to translate some 
works. In the course of his work there, he became acquainted with Butrus al-Bustani and 
taught Arabic at the school the latter had established (Antonius, 1938: 45-47). 
Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) himself received his education at 'Ayn al-Waraqa. 
In 1840, he converted to Protestantism and was employed by the Protestant missionaries 
for a few years, teaching at their preparatory school in 'Abay, translating some of the 
textbooks they used and parts of the Old Testament, and finally establishing his own 
secular school, al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya, or the National School. He wrote one of the 
most famous Arabic dictionaries, Muhit al-Muhit, and also compiled the first Arabic 
encyclopedia, Da'irat al-Ma'arif. In between, he founded with his son three periodicals, 
the newspapers al-Janna (Paradise) and al-Junayna (the Garden), and the magazine al-
Jinan (the Gardens) (Hourani, 1983: 99; Houtsma, 2012). His immense knowledge 
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coupled with his life mission to spread this knowledge among his compatriots earned him 
the title of mu'allim, or master. The first generation of journalists was almost entirely 
affiliated with him. 
What these men had in common was more than the personal relationship that 
bound them together. They all came from families of notables, a class which was not part 
of the old feudal system but which served various functions around it, like providing 
secretaries and administrators to assist the local feudal lords, or muqata'ji. They all 
received a modern education which put them in contact with representatives of Europe, 
whether the Protestant missionaries or the French embassy. They all received training in 
languages and presented a tendency toward the literary world. As their biographies 
attest, they exhibited a sense of enterprise which cannot be disregarded when 
considering that they embarked on an adventurous mission to establish a newspaper. All 
this helps us place these individuals in a very close location in the social space. They 
constituted a class from a Bourdieusian perspective. They shared similar predispositions 
which materialized both in the messages they spread in the early days of the rise of the 
press, as well as in their lives more generally speaking. 
B. Positions and dispositions, or Modernism as a worldview 
The ideology of Modernism came to represent the mindset of this class. But this 
ideology never managed to transcend the boundaries of the local social conditions and 
experiences. As Zachs (2012: 159-163) pointed out, Mudawwar was part of a group of 
merchants who also happened to be men of letters, or at least interested in literature 
and thought. Historical evidence shows that they apparently adopted a stance of 
modernization without Westernization, wanting to adopt technologies and techniques 
without having to immerse in Western culture which they were very ambivalent about. 
The word tamaddun, literally meaning becoming urbanized but used more broadly to 
refer to the combination of civilization and modernity, became a cornerstone of their 
rhetoric. It "was essentially an economic and cultural social ideal, indicative of an ongoing 
process of revival and progress" (Zachs, 2012: 160). Europe, at this point in time, was still 
a promise. The problem was only how to properly discover the formula which could 
reconcile this promise with the local culture (Hourani, 1983: 67-8, 103). 
As mentioned earlier, they focused extensively throughout their careers on the 
development of the Arabic language. They translated European works into Arabic, wrote 
81 
 
textbooks for sciences in Arabic, and established the first newspaper also in the same 
language. In fact, the close circle that formed around al-Bustani is credited with the 
articulation of the modern style of writing which characterized the Arabic novel since. 
This was part of their answer to the question of what to take, or more precisely what not 
to take from Europe. 
Another part was to promote among the public what they thought to be the 
necessary elements which local society needed to pick up from Europe. In the first issue 
of Hadiqat al-Akhbar (January 1, 1858), Khalil al-Khuri introduced his readers to the 
function of his newspaper. It was to  
promote sciences and arts, as a form of love of progress and as a step 
toward modernity and civility (at-tamaddun wat-tahdhib) in these lands, 
especially with the spread of the printing press, the biggest factor in the 
proliferation and success of newspapers that were beacons of civility in 
civilized countries [...]. This Ottoman journal will not print anything which 
would harm public morality and will shy away from all religious issues. It 
will only promote sciences and morality and will feature the news of 
these lands and foreign countries [...], shedding light on the conditions of 
this wondrous world. [...] We will print this publication in a way that, by 
the end of the year, subscribers could bind the papers of this journal and 
make a book out of it. 
In one of the seminal historical accounts of the rise of the press in Beirut, 
Ghassan Bustrus (1977: 8) described al-Khuri and Bustani as intellectuals and men of 
principle. Hadiqat al-Akhbar tends to corroborate this claim. Furthermore, it reveals that 
the aim of the individuals involved in its appearance remained educational for a long 
time. The "news" that it presented its readers with was mostly social commentary and 
advice, focusing on the way Europeans behaved, the way they taught their children and 
the books they read (Hadiqat al-Akhbar, 22 April, 1858), and what fell under the title of 
"political summary" was mainly concerned with events happening in Europe (Hadiqat al-
Akhbar, January 19, 1859; February 19, 1859). The only debates in which the paper took 
part for a while were with al-Jawa'ib. Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, the owner and editor-in-
chief of the Istanbul based paper would quarrel with other newspapers over the lexical 
innovations introduced into the Arabic language as a result of the translation of modern 
scientific terminology from European languages. 
Ayalon (1995: 32) argued that al-Khuri showed caution by shying away from 
political issues, following the lead of official bulletins, and adopting factual reporting "so 
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as not to irritate the authorities". This view, however, seems to be imposed on the 
evidence. It presents al-Khuri to have wanted to do something he never admitted to. His 
approach to journalism as being an educational endeavor never changed throughout his 
whole life, nor did he ever aspire to play a role in politics or had any publically professed 
political opinions. All that Khalil al-Khuri seems to have wanted to do was to spread 
education and the message of modernity to the broadest possible audience. Even in 
1883, twenty-five years after he had established his paper and well after other political 
newspapers had seen the light in Beirut, his idea of the "political" was still to simply and 
quickly report on the activities of state officials without any commentary, and then move 
on to write on issues of science and technology, like recent findings about the stars and 
the invention of a steam engine cart that looks like a horse (Hadiqat al-Akhbar, May 28, 
1883). 
What is more important about pointing out Ayalon's mistaken explanation is that 
it hides a very important component of the early rise of journalism. Indeed, al-Khuri's 
behavior can be understood not just in terms of interests, but also as a foundation of 
what might be called at a later point the ethos of the field of journalism. Being the first 
and only major newspaper to have appeared for more than a decade in Beirut, the values 
advanced on the pages of Hadiqat al-Akhbar, and professed through the behavior of its 
founder and editor-in-chief, became the standard of proper behavior of journalists. This 
will be shown more clearly in the next chapter, but it is necessary to point out how Khalil 
al-Khuri came to strongly define the basis of the ethos of the field. We need not go 
beyond the above quoted paragraph to discern the lines of such beliefs. He stressed the 
issues of civility, public morality, and morality tout court. A journalist was supposed to 
behave like a "gentleman" and preserve public morality while promoting proper 
behavior, civility. Being the only major newspaper at this point gave a particular 
monopoly for these beliefs and they remained unchallenged for a long while. As will be 
seen in later chapters, journalists would accuse each other of breaking these particular 
rules to deprive each other of recognition. 
Also, the formation of this particular ethos helps us better perceive an alternative 
explanation to that of Ayalon as to why Khalil al-Khuri never bothered with  politics. His 
particular understanding of what was supposed to be the role of a journalist was more in 
line with a conservative view of society. Civility and morality had a very strong conformist 
component to them. Proper behavior, or conformism, was not solely restricted to social 
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conduct, but also to political practice. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, politics during 
this period was not the realm of all men, but that of the ruler alone. It was inconceivable 
for someone like al-Khuri to think that he had a role to play in politics, if only because it 
was not his place, nor was it the "proper" thing to do. In fact, the statement that his 
paper "will shy away from all religious issues" is but a confession that he will not ponder 
on political matters, for this was the extent to which a dweller of Beirut and Mount-
Lebanon during this period thought to be the political realm. 
C. Journalism as a social prospect 
What becomes apparent in Hadiqat al-Akhbar, as well as with the other 
publications of this small group of intellectuals, is that their claimed mission was, broadly 
put, to educate the public and promote civility and progress. For them, this meant the 
propagation of rationality and secularism, which would result in the love of the watan, 
the nation, rather than the love of the sect and the confession. More than anything, this 
was the result of their experience with the sectarian civil strife which hit Mount-Lebanon 
in the late 1850s, culminating in the massacres of Christians in the Mountain and even in 
Damascus.5 Many secondary sources have heavily taken this sectarian divide as a core 
component of their analysis of the rise of particular intellectual trends and ideologies, 
arguing that this intellectual rebellion was "for the typical Christian [...] a total existential 
experience" (Sharabi, 1970: 89). Christians were supposedly completely excluded from 
public life and therefore found themselves to be socially and politically excluded in the 
context of the Ottoman Empire. But these same accounts cannot escape the fact that, 
even if that were true, these Christians found their way into the civil service, not because 
of their belonging to  a minority per se, but because of their new education (Sharabi, 
1970: 4). This new education offered them new opportunities, as proven by the 
biographies of some personalities who went into the business of translation and the 
printing of translated works, like Mikha'il bin Yusuf Mudawwar, the man who funded the 
first Arabic newspaper in Beirut and who worked as a translator for the French embassy 
                                                          
5 It must be pointed out that there existed no contradiction between the local political identity 
and the broader identity of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, as one of many Islamic empires across 
history, the Ottoman Empire was a supra-national political entity that acknowledged and 
permitted its different constituents to profess their own ethnic and racial differences as long as 
they recognized their belonging to the larger umma, or nation. It would therefore be erroneous to 
consider that the identity and ethnic particularity of these Syrian intellectuals promoted a 
particular political program as understood from a Eurocentric understanding of nationalism. Their 
self-identification along geographical, ethnic, or religious lines did not, in this case, constitute 
something different than their Ottoman identity, as it was an integral part of it. 
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(Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57), and Faris ash-Shidyaq, the founder of one of the most 
famous Arabic newspapers in Istanbul and who was a translator for the Protestant 
missionaries before that (Hourani, 1983: 98; Karam, 2012). 
The fact that Muslims too did not have any political role to play does not seem to 
dampen such arguments, nor that it was mainly because of modern education, and 
therefore the cultural and social capitals it generated, that certain individuals ended up in 
the civil service. Modern education, even the missionary one, did not exclude individuals 
based on confession and schools such as the Syrian Protestant College accepted students 
of all creeds, in the hopes of converting them (Hanssen, 2005: 184-5). Equally, people of 
all creeds did not find themselves integrated into the Ottoman political structure and 
were therefore excluded. So, while the socio-psychological argument might point out 
certain intellectual tendencies for Christian intellectuals - and here we cannot forget that 
all secular, socialist, and nationalist ideologies in the Arab East were formulated by 
Christians - it would certainly not help us explain the way in which they tried to break this 
exclusion, which I argue they tried to eventually do through the press. 
As for the experience of Hadiqat al-Akhbar, it was but the first attempt to create 
a newspaper, a tool of communication that aimed to spread a particular kind of 
knowledge, one which was found in the midst of the modern missionary education and 
involved modern sciences and the accompanying interest in reviving a language that 
could understand this "modernity". This chapter was a social contextualization of this 
endeavor and an attempt at trying to understand why a small group of individuals would 
embark on such an original adventure. The answer, as explained above, lies in the social 
position of this class, its dispositions, the capitals it accumulated, and the opportunities it 
had to maneuver the social space and the different fields within it. Modern education, a 
byproduct of the dual process of modernization and colonization, introduced new 
cultural capital into the social space. This new capital had very small opportunities of 
investment outside of the field of education itself, and individuals possessing it found 
employment only as translators, educators, or low level bureaucrats. These positions also 
offered very little prospects, as there was no room for improvement for the individuals 
occupying them. These individuals, who had come from more or less well-to-do families, 
possessed vast amounts of cultural capital in contrast to the great majority of the 
population back then, and professed a modernist ideology, found an outlet that could 
satisfy their newfound social position, answer their intellectual and ideological 
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dispositions, and in which they could invest the cultural and social capitals they had 
accumulated in the field of education. 
Journalism was therefore seen as both a tool and a solution. The medium 
belonged to the "modern world" of Europe and was therefore natural to the process of 
social modernization. Through it, communicating modern knowledge was possible. It 
became a tool of choice for these intellectuals who wanted to propagate sciences and 
progress, while at the same time, it offered them a chance to be more than simple 
employees, as reflected by the opening statement of Hadiqat al-Akhbar that promised its 
writers fame and recognition for their work. It was thus also a chance for them to invest 
their newfound capitals in a new chain of production which they could manage and 
where they could, as a result, garner symbolic capital. The private press was therefore a 
point of convergence between different social processes which all affected its 
foundation. At the macro or structural level, the birth of journalism was part of colonial 
modernization at play; people needed to be educated and civilized, and now there was a 
medium for the intellectuals who have seen the light to help them achieve this. At the 
micro or agential level, it was the action of a new class which came to possess new forms 
of capitals it needed to invest somewhere, and no other activity offered good enough 
prospect for that. 
This early effort lasted for a little more than a decade before major changes hit 
journalism. Educating people remained the primary professed target throughout this 
period and the one newspaper which survived and succeeded, Hadiqat al-Akhbar, 
remained above all else a platform where messages of sciences and social progress 
circulated. This intellectual project eventually gave way to a different form of journalism, 
political journalism, which stemmed from a perception that spreading modernity, civility, 
and progress was not entirely an educational endeavor, but rather a political one. And 
while it also came from the bosom of missionary education, I will argue next that it was 
more a reaction to the partial realization of the colonizing nature of the educational 





The journalist spectator: journalism as an independent field 
 
I have examined in the previous chapter how private journalism appeared in 
Beirut. It was a byproduct of the introduction of new cultural and social capitals into the 
field of education. These capitals were channeled through European and American 
missionary educational institutions and the result of this novelty in the realm of 
education was the rise of a new educated class of professionals. This class was neither 
part of the peasantry nor was it part of the feudal order that reigned in the territories of 
the Ottoman Empire. Its function was restricted to serving the demand for a modern 
workforce in the few positions introduced through the processes of modernization which 
the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt embarked on from the early years of the 
nineteenth century. The nucleus of producers and consumers of the press belonged to 
this class. It was for some of them the answer to their intellectual curiosity which they 
developed in the literary and scientific societies that sprung around the missionary 
educational institutions. It was also a promising outlet where they could transcend the 
mere status of low-level employees of the state bureaucracy, translators for diplomatic 
missions, or school teachers. The press presented potential for these individuals to "later 
become famous", celebrated and recognized by "every civilized person" (as quoted by 
Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 57). 
In this chapter, I will analyze the changes that affected the Arabic press after 
1870. It was then that political newspapers began to appear in Beirut and Cairo, and I will 
argue that it was at this point that we can consider that a field of journalism came to exist 
in the region. The journalists of this second generation, having lost interest in the 
educational mission of the founders of the private Arabic newspaper, invested the 
cultural capital they had acquired through modern schooling in an activity which lied 
outside the boundaries of the field of education: political journalism. The meaning of 
"political" was almost as new as journalism itself, having been the exclusive field of the 
ruling elite, the khassa. This necessarily meant that political journalism itself was a 
concept under construction at this period in time. But, it still held for the journalist better 
prospects for fame and recognition, and the production of news and journalism as 
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practice evolved in a way as to make cultural capital central to the structuring of a 
symbolic capital in the field. 
This chapter will thus focus on the transformation of cultural capital from an 
operating capital in the field of education to an initial capital in the field of journalism, 
where it became the key component of symbolic capital there. This capital, I will argue, 
became independent by virtue of the social position and dispositions of both the 
producers and consumers of news. They were all part of the same social class which 
existed in a state of social exclusion, unwilling to be associated with the common man, 
the 'amma, and rejected by the political and social elites, the khassa. This condition of 
marginality greatly affected the possibilities of choices journalists had in the field. It 
clearly defined their audience, their message, and the practice and ethos prevailing and 
being shaped in the field at the time. In turn, this will show that the field of journalism 
during this period existed in a state of almost complete independence, to the extent that 
it was marginal to society, as it rarely interacted with the surrounding fields in the social 
space. 
 
I. Political newspapers, a new product 
For more than a decade, Hadiqat al-Akhbar remained the only newspaper in 
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon. Its only competitor was the Istanbul based al-Jawa'ib which 
was also available on the Syrian markets. Ayalon (1995: 33) claims that Hadiqat al-Akhbar 
boasted 400 subscribers shortly after its appearance. I came across no numbers for al-
Jawa'ib during that period. In Cairo, all journalistic endeavors prior to 1875 failed. The 
only newspaper which survived the early period was still al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya. Even this 
government paper barely stayed alive, as it was cancelled for a few years. Newspapers 
had been badly received in Cairo, 'Abbas pasha (r.1848-1854), Muhammad Ali's 
successor, reportedly considered the reading of newspapers "an increasing disgrace" 
(Kendall, 2006: 9). The Beiruti paper also remained a one-man institution, with Khalil al-
Khuri writing most of its editorials and articles, and very few other people contributing to 
it until the day he died. The paper was then discontinued by his heirs, showing the extent 
to which journalism during that time was the activity of individuals (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, 
vol.1: 58). All this tends to indicate that journalism as a concept and a profession spread 
very slowly in the region. In his 1913 study on the history of the Arabic press, Filib di 
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Tarrazi (1913, vol.2: 3) introduced his second volume by claiming that "before 1870, Arab 
journalism was nothing worth mentioning; but after this date, it expanded and evolved 
due to the efforts and successes of the men who were involved in it". This section will 
follow a similar line of argument, examining the new product and its producers, the 
agents who truly constructed the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo. 
A. Identifying the new product 
The new form of journalism differed greatly from Beirut's first newspaper. This 
first clear difference is that the new periodicals began focusing on politics in the narrow 
sense of the term. Filib di Tarrazi (1913, vol.2: 7) attributed this to the level of freedom 
the press enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt at the time, discussing and criticizing 
the administration of the Empire at will. Traditional and popular history in the region tells 
us that it was at this point in time that censorship drove many of the journalists to Egypt, 
seeking freedoms which were denied to them in Syria and Beirut (Cioeta, 1979: 179). 
Evidence, however, shows that even though a censorship office had been established 
under the law of 1865 dealing with periodicals, stringent restrictions were not imposed 
on the press in Beirut until 1889. Even then, most incidents of warnings and suspensions 
seem to have been the result of ignorance of the Arabic language on the part of the 
Turkish censor, the mektupcu (Cioeta, 1979: 168, 178). It was therefore in an 
environment of relative freedom of expression that the political press in Beirut came into 
being (Farah, 2005: 217). Similarly, freedom of opinion was allowed and even encouraged 
to some extent by Isma'il, especially during the 1877 Crimean War when he permitted 
newspapers to take sides in the war and reflect on political developments within the 
Empire, in an effort to curtail the influence of the sultan with whom he was having a hard 
time ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 33-4; Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.3: 5). 
Freedom, however, is a conducive context rather than a causal one. Thus the reason for 
why the press took this turn is to be found elsewhere. 
Certainly, the big question here is why Salim al-Bustani decided to describe his 
first newspaper, al-Janna, as "political, commercial, and literary". As discussed earlier, 
the "political" was something foreign to local population in both Beirut and Cairo. It was 
the realm of the ruler and no one else. Even when Hadiqat al-Akhbar transmitted 
"political news", it always referred to foreign events, while local news were dubbed 
hawadith dakhiliyya, or "internal events" and rarely referred to political events, unless 
civil servants and officials appointments count as such and which the paper only 
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mentioned in a matter of fact style. But, as soon as al-Janna appeared in 1870, this trend 
was to shift very quickly. Salim al-Bustani, who was publishing al-Janna on Tuesdays and 
Fridays, created in 1871 another newspaper, al-Junayna, a "political and commercial" 
periodical which appeared on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, 
practically making him the first Arab to publish a daily (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 22). In 
1874, Yusuf ash-Shalafun published at-Taqaddum, first described as a "pulbic" 
newspaper, then a "political, literary, and commercial" newspaper (at-Taqaddum, 
January 14, 1874; January 1, 1881). In 1875, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani published 
Thamarat al-Funun, "a newspaper that contains political, local, commercial, and artistic 
events" (Thamarat al-Funun, June 22, 1875). In 1877, Khalil Sarkis published Lisan al-Hal, 
a "political, commercial, and literary" newspaper (Lisan al-Hal, October 18, 1877). 
Published by Nqula Naqqash, Al-Misbah, a "political, commercial, scientific, and literary" 
newspaper, appeared in 1880 (al-Misbah, January 31, 1883). Al-Ahram was one of two 
major newspapers to appear during this period and not describe itself as "political"; in 
fact, it did not describe itself at all, not even in the introductory editorial of its first issue 
(al-Ahram, August 5, 1876). It would change this trend the very next year when it became 
headed by "a political, commercial, and literary newspaper".  The other newspaper 
published during this period that did not claim to be political was the weekly al-Bashir, a 
publication in which Jesuit priests sought since 1870 to counter the Protestant heretics 
and was therefore not concerned with lesser worldly matters such as politics (Ayalon, 
1995: 34). Though even al-Bashir would later start featuring political news. 
But what news did they exactly qualify as "political"? An examination of some of 
the early issues of these newspapers tells us that the focus was still mainly on European 
political developments, but that, at the same time, a definition of what constituted the 
political realm was also developing, and this reflected in some of the articles that 
appeared during this period. In al-Ahram, one issue discussed the problems the Ottoman 
Empire faced for the past three years, mainly with regards to financial problems, the 
need for a fairer government, and a free parliament. The editorial was followed by a 
translation of the editorial of the French paper Débat, discussing the politics of 
governmental appointments in Egypt. The third page contained the "faits divers" from 
Syria, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Russia, and the United States with news topics ranging from 
the progress in the construction of the railway in Syria to the amounts of minerals and 
metals extracted that year in the United States (al-Ahram, February 27, 1876). In 1877, 
with the Turko-Russian war raging, Lisan al-Hal was reporting on the Russian attack on 
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Ottoman troops, troop movements in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, as well as the 
French elections (Lisan al-Hal, October 22, 1877). The next issue updated the readers on 
the war, using both official sources, as well as other newspapers and news agencies 
telegraphs to convey the views from the different European capitals and illustrate their 
positions from the war (Lisan al-Hal, October 25, 1877). At-Taqaddum (February 12, 
1874) reported on the eligibility of voters in the French elections, conscription laws to the 
Russian army, and epidemics in Hungary. Its "faits divers" were about a woman and her 
troubles with her husband, rain during that season, and the problems the Lebanese 
gendarmerie faced because officers would not show up to their posts. 
The differences between what each paper considered "political news" might 
partially explain why at-Taqaddum never became a successful newspaper in comparison 
with Lisan al-Hal and al-Ahram. It also tells us that the "political" was still being 
discovered and formulated and as will be discussed later, unfolding political events and 
crises helped create a demand for political news. This might indicate that there could 
have been a process of shaping this demand and need for a particular type of product on 
the part of journalists. But the inconsistency in what was considered to be political might 
also indicate that the journalists themselves did not particularly know what this type of 
product was exactly. It was a period when , in contrast with the politics of the palace, 
public politics, like political journalism, was in a stage of formation in the minds of this 
class, a point which will become more apparent throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. 
Whatever periodical was not intended to be "political" became a magazine. The 
truly literary and scientific publications became concentrated in such form, appearing at 
a slower rate, usually monthly, and with more pages than the usual four-page newspaper 
which appeared at least once a week. The most important ones that we need to mention 
here are al-Jinan, published by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870 to supplement his son's two 
newspapers, and al-Muqtataf, published in 1876 by three young men, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, 
Faris Nimr, and Shahin Makarius, who would later emigrate to Egypt and found one of its 
most influential political newspapers, al-Muqattam. It therefore becomes very clear that 
it was during this period that political journalism came to define the Arabic press, or at 
least the Arabic newspaper. 
B. The second generation of journalists and the breakaway from education 
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Salim al-Bustani (1848-1884), Salim Taqla (1849-1892), Bishara Taqla (1852-
1901), 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani (1849-1935), Khalil Sarkis (1842-1913), Nqula Naqqash 
(1825-1894), Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana (1857-1902), Adib Ishaq (1856-1885), and 
Salim bin 'Abbas ash-Shalafun (1853-1912) constituted this second generation of 
journalists. Like their predecessors, they shared two very important features. First, they 
were all graduates of modern schooling. Even Qabbani and ad-Dana, who had both 
received traditional Islamic schooling as young children, eventually joined the ranks of 
the National School (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100, 119). All of these individuals were 
also trained extensively in different languages, granting them the same privileges and 
possibilities as the first generation in terms of employment possibilities. Second, they 
also adhered to the same types of social networks and circles as the previous generation. 
Butrus al-Bustani was, once again, at the heart of these networks. Indeed, his son and 
Khalil Sarkis, who was to become his son-in-law in 1873, Taqla, Qabbani, ad-Dana, and 
ash-Shalafun were all linked to him either through the National School, or through the 
Syrian Scientific Society. It was therefore logical for all of these young people to know of 
the press and its theoretical value to society, which had been repeated non-stop on the 
pages of Hadiqat al-Akhbar and in the words of al-Mu'allim.  "There is no doubt that 
newspapers are among the most important vehicles in educating the public," Butrus al-
Bustani is known to have stated in 1859, while congratulating Khalil al-Khuri on the 
success of his endeavor (as quoted by Ayalon, 1995: 31). A decade later, he wrote that 
the role of the newspaper was to "serve truth and serve the interests of the lands" (as 
quoted by Ghassan Bustrus, 1977: 8). 
The major difference between the first and second generation of journalists in 
Beirut is that the second generation did not dedicate its life to education. Apart from 
Salim al-Bustani serving as a teacher and vice-principle of the National School for a while 
and Salim Taqla teaching Arabic in a local religious school for a short while, all the 
journalists of this period finished their learning and found employment outside of the 
business and mission of education. Qabbani, Sarkis, and ash-Shalafun worked in printing, 
Sarkis becoming one of the most successful print masters of his time, his publishing 
house having put out 650 books by 1914 (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100, 130, 151; 
Ayalon, 2008: 566). Naqqash and ad-Dana found jobs in the civil service, the first as an 
employee at the customs and the second as an employee at the telegraph post (Filib di 
Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 123, 120). In a sense, they had gone out and seen the world. Socially, 
they were no longer restricted to the small number of people who worked in the field of 
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education. They were now entrepreneurs and civil servants; they were working shoulder 
to shoulder with what could have been seen then as the "public". 
At the same time, this generation was experiencing the same process of 
modernization as the first generation, except that, by now, Europe had become part and 
parcel of the political scene in the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman 
Empire by then had become the "sick man of Europe", a term which European leaders 
used to justify their political, economic, and also military incursions into Ottoman affairs 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 134). Therefore, modernity was no longer an abstract social and 
cultural notion to the Ottomans, but it availed itself to them in all its glory under the 
guise of British, French, and Russian navies and armies. European encroachment also 
encouraged some of the European provinces of the Empire to rebel, following in the 
footsteps of the Greeks who had gained their independence with European support in 
1832. During the 1860s, most of the provinces of the Balkans were in a state of rebellion. 
Serbia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Crete had all seen one form or another of 
rebellion before 1870 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 147-152). It was a period of political 
struggle both within the Ottoman Empire and without. 
In this context of turmoil, demand for political news became a necessity. 
Newspaper readers could no longer be satisfied with the simple "internal events" section 
which merely reported short headlines on appointments and meetings. This was 
definitely the reason Khalil Sarkis gave for the establishment of a newspaper which was 
"political" in nature; many people had asked him to do so (Lisan al-Hal, October 18, 
1877). In Thamarat al-Funun, the interest in politics became clearer with their articles 
and editorials. The first page of the newspaper became usually used in its quasi-entirety 
for long editorials analyzing the political situation, focusing on the major issues of the 
day, like for example the disturbances in Herzegovina in 1876 (Thamarat al-Funun, March 
22, 1876; July, 20, 1876; October 12, 1876). Editors were now analyzing events and 
explaining their significance to their readers. This was in combination with the headlines 
and telegraphs which they reproduced as faits divers. The priority was thus given to the 
world of politics and political news. All other subjects took a backseat, but the reader 
could still find other topics being discussed in newspapers, most notably commercial 
news which included the prices of certain basic commodities like flour, wood, and grains, 
and sometimes even the stock prices of gold or silk. 
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It is therefore clear from journalistic production itself that it had broken away 
from the realm of education. The journalists were no longer educators, the stated aim of 
the periodicals was no longer to "educate the people" in civility, morality, and progress, 
and the actual subjects covered on the pages of the political newspapers were no longer 
educational in nature; they were not matters of general knowledge, sciences, history, 
language and literature anymore. It is clear that, at this point in time, the individuals who 
came to be the actors in the field of journalism chose to invest the cultural capital they 
had acquired from the modern educational system and the social capital which came 
from their networks around intellectual societies into a different field than the 
educational one. 
 
II. The formation of the field of journalism 
One of the basic foundations of a field is its ability to be autonomous in terms of 
the capitals that function within it from other surrounding fields. As previously 
mentioned, cultural and social capitals which were produced within and around modern 
education were now being invested in an activity which was completely unrelated to 
education. The education system at this point served nothing more than a support field 
for journalism. It produced people who could write and it produced people who could 
read. Of course, this means that, if someone was to embark on a career as journalist, 
they still needed the cultural capital offered by modern education at least. But the 
supplier of this type of capital no longer had sway over how it is invested. 
A. Cultural capital as the main component of symbolic capital 
But this does not mean that cultural capital was no longer the decisive capital in 
the field of journalism at this point. For even though the subject of the information 
produced in newspapers changed from educational to political, the type of information 
provided, as previously shown, still qualified as a cultural product generating cultural 
capital in its incorporated state, creating durable dispositions since it produced 
information about the world of political affairs. And as will be discussed next, the "public" 
recognition of this particular cultural capital, the one produced and displayed by 
journalists, came to constitute the core of the symbolic capital within the field of 
journalism.  Promoting cultural capital as the main source of recognition was a conscious 
act on the part of the journalists, but the process was not very straightforward since, as I 
94 
 
argue throughout this chapter, the field of journalism was still being founded and was 
therefore in a bit of disarray, whether at the level of the ethos in the field, the 
investment of the recognition and capital generated, and the concept of politics and the 
public sphere itself. 
When Khalil al-Khuri started his endeavor, barely anyone knew of him. In fact, 
what he guaranteed his readers was the promise of future recognition of him and his 
colleagues as people worthy of teaching readers (Hadiqat al-Akhbar, January 1, 1858). 
But all the second generation journalists had become people of some repute before they 
entered into the business of journalism. Salim al-Bustani benefited from the reputation of 
his father, al-mu'allim, and was also a fine intellectual himself. 'Abd al-Qadi Qabbani was 
recognized by his society, the Society of Arts, as the most capable individual to manage 
the printing house and newspaper they wanted to establish (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 
25). Khalil Sarkis was already famous for owning one of the most successful printing and 
publishing houses in Beirut (Ayalon, 2008). Nqula Naqqash had been a public figure for 
more than a decade, having been appointed as member of the administrative council of 
the vilayet of Damascus, and then serving as a member of the ill-fated majlis al-
mab'uthan, the Ottoman parliament which was convened from 1876 till 1878, when 
sultan Abdul-Hamid II became bored with other people giving opinions on how to run 
things and abolished it along with the constitution (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 13). 
It seems that public recognition that these individuals were worth listening to, 
their opinion worth being read, was a major factor in the success of their newspapers; 
the other factor being that competition over the supply of political news was almost non-
existent yet. The story of the only journalist who went from being an obscure figure into 
publishing a newspaper tends to corroborate this claim. Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana was 
a simple employee at the telegraph directorate when he decided to publish his 
newspaper, encouraged by his brother who was at that time the president of Beirut's 
Commercial Tribunal. The only subscribers to his papers were the unfortunate merchants 
of Beirut and its surroundings to whom the paper was sent and who felt compelled by 
virtue of the position of the editor's brother to subscribe to it; they did not like reading it 
(Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.2: 38). This strongly indicates that the generation of symbolic 
capital in the field was not simply a matter of displaying cultural capital and producing 
any type of product. There needed to be an initial pool of resources that the producer 
must have been endowed with before embarking on a career of journalist, forms of 
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capital previously earned somewhere else and then invested into the field. Most 
important during this time was that the producer of news must have been publically 
recognized elsewhere to be trusted by his readers. 
It is important to note that symbolic capital, or the recognition of an individual's 
cultural capital, quickly became transmissible in the field, and the press became a vehicle 
through which individuals sought to gain a reputation of possessors of incorporated 
cultural capital. Many contributors to Lisan al-Hal, for example, were not regular editors 
in the newspaper; they generally remained anonymous when published. Some, however, 
sought to be named to receive public acknowledgment and make themselves known to 
the broad public, while not becoming regular contributors so that they do not become 
committed to the paper ('Abd al-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 89). The press became a popular 
vehicle for gaining symbolic capital, especially since the owners and editors of newspaper 
encouraged this approach. As soon as Lisan al-Hal appeared, its owner claimed its second 
issue that he was inundated with articles by "reputable men of knowledge who are 
renowned to everyone for their skills and their grace" (Lisan al-Hal, October 22, 1877). 
At-Taqaddum addressed its readers with the same vocabulary (April 6, 1885). Even in the 
first issue of al-Ahram, the owners also invited their readers to contribute to the 
newspaper; they invited "eloquent men of letters to decorate the pages of the 
newspaper with their magnificent writings and wisdom which readers of good taste will 
relish" (al-Ahram, August 5, 1876). This was in practice a self-fulfilling prophecy. What 
educated man would not then send his contribution to be published on the pages of the 
newspaper? At the same time, the paper would gain further repute by featuring the 
names of prominent men on it pages. 
This practice provided mutual recognition of importance, since providing a name 
for their contributors helped newspapers' owners demonstrate to their public how wide 
and educated their readership is. It also endowed their articles with credence, or at least 
allowed them to relegate the responsibility of opinions onto their contributor. In fact, 
Lisan al-Hal had a policy of only reproducing the articles they were sent by people who 
had signed their work, because "knowing who sent the article was knowing half his intent 
from having it published" (Lisan al-Hal, January 31, 1888). They made one exception at 
one point when the editor read an unsigned letter by mistake and realized that the 
person who sent it really meant to benefit the readers with what he had to say. In Egypt, 
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this category of contributors was labeled, musahif, which could literally translate to 
"associate journalist" ('Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 99). 
Symbolic capital was also generated by some of the practices of journalists. By 
reproducing articles featured in European newspapers, newspapers were exhibiting "a 
degree of pride and boasting of the translator's knowledge of foreign languages" ('Abd 
ar-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 102). While some historians have dismissed the reproduction of 
these articles as a mere necessity because of the inaccessibility to the news due to the 
lack of a proper communication infrastructure or the high cost of employing news 
agencies like Reuters and Havas, the practice of reproducing foreign articles persisted 
well into the interwar period, even when such costs no longer constituted a financial or 
technical burden on newspaper editors (Tohme, 2012).6 There was indeed a clinging to 
the publication of translated articles, essays, opinion pieces, etc. After all, let us not 
forget the opening statements of the first Arabic newspaper in Beirut and its promise to 
feature European articles translated by the most capable of men! This is a prime example 
of cultural capital on display. 
Symbolic capital, in the form of recognized cultural capital, quickly became the 
major capital operating in what can now be certainly called the field of journalism. It was 
generated by the production and consumption of the news and analyses. It was also 
regulated to a large extent by the newspapers themselves. In the same way as they could 
bestow symbolic capital and recognition on an individual, they could as easily take away 
such capital. One of the recurring elements in all the newspapers of the time was to 
threaten to expose the names of individuals who subscribed to the newspaper but would 
neglect to pay the subscription fees. Qabbani threatened to do so on the pages of 
Thamarat al-Funun, asking those who did not pay what would future generations think 
about them when they discover that they used to practically steal newspapers (Thamarat 
al-Funun, October 12, 1876). This meant that such an act would constitute a shaming for 
the individual whose name was to appear there. Again, this was because such prestige 
was generated by the image of social superiority that came with reading the newspaper, 
an image which was consciously promoted on the pages of these same newspapers that 
                                                          
6 This practice remained a major reason why many news were distorted before they reached the 
audience. In the particular paper I am citing here, I examined how the Bolsheviks during the 
Russian civil war were represented in the Lebanese press. The result was that much of the pre-
WWI practices persisted after the war, most notably the translation and reproduction of articles 
featured in European newspapers at a time when Lebanese paper had already gained access to 
news agencies.  
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continuously praised their readers for their fine taste and greater intellect. Now imagine 
what might happen if these same newspapers were to say that you were a thief. Prestige, 
same as shaming, was recognized as a process of social recognition that was primordial 
to the class journalists and their readers belonged to. 
B. A field of competition over symbolic capital 
Most of the literature focuses on how, during this period, competition for an 
audience between newspapers, and subsequently the income needed to survive, 
increased. The argument is that sales were needed to fund the journalistic endeavor, and 
increased competition necessarily shrunk demand (Ayalon, 1995: 194-5). Some papers 
even had to close down because they could not compete on the market. This was for 
example the case of at-Taqaddum, Bayrut, and al-Bayan (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 23, 
38; Vol.3: 24-5). But, according to di Tarrazi, these papers went bankrupt because they 
could not attract a readership due to their boring style rather than because of increased 
competition. There was also the countless demands for subscribers to pay their 
subscriptions on the pages of all newspapers, which tends to indicate that, apparently, 
owners actively sought financial income. 
The same sources, however, also provide ample evidence to counter the 
argument that economic capital was at this point a determining capital within the field of 
journalism. In fact, most of the journals already mentioned in this chapter were either 
owned by well-to-do individuals who could afford the costs of publishing, or were 
financially sponsored and therefore did not have to rely on sales and subscriptions for 
survival. As was mentioned before, Hadiqat al-Akhbar was established with the financial 
support of the merchant Mikha'il Mudawwar (Zachs, 2012: 163). It also received at one 
point the support of the government, which prompted Ayalon (1992: 269) to pass the 
erroneous and ahistorical judgment that it turned the paper into a mouthpiece for the 
government, since he assumed with no historical basis that the owner wished to produce 
different opinions but exercised self-criticism for financial reasons, as previously 
discussed. Khalil Sarkis, the founder of Lisan al-Hal had also become a wealthy 
entrepreneur with a large printing and publishing business (Ayalon, 2008). He even 
supported his father-in-law and brother-in-law, Butrus and Salim al-Bustani, in their 
journalistic endeavor when he began printing their newspapers at his printing press, and 
managed distribution and accounting as well (Ayalon, 2008: 565). This evidence of the 
persistence of social capital as a determinant in the field of journalism was greatly 
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publicized on the pages of al-Bustani's al-Janna (October 30, 1881). Even when he 
wanted to feature a story about the expenses newspapers incurred, Khalil Sarkis had to 
search at the far end of Europe to find the tale of a newspaper's owner who went 
bankrupt because of his career as a journalist; he could not, apparently, find someone 
closer to home (Lisan al-Hal, October 20, 1888). One of the arguments for why al-Ahram 
managed to maintain a free position in politics, siding with whomever the editors and 
owners felt deserved their support, was that its publishers were wealthy enough not to 
barter their intellectual integrity for money (Kitchen, 1950: 160). Thamarat al-Funun was 
also founded with enough capital to ensure its survival. It was the fist Arabic newspaper 
to have been formed as a joint-stock venture, where all members of the Society of Arts 
financially contributed to its creation and ownership (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 25). 
There is also some anecdotal evidence that economic capital was also not very 
sought after among some journalists, which eventually led to the rise of a popular belief 
that the journalist was, by definition, a poor destitute. First, it was apparently public 
knowledge that becoming a journalist and establishing a newspaper was not an 
expensive endeavor. A prominent contemporary journalist and intellectual, Jurji Zaydan, 
claimed that all it took for someone to establish their paper was their thought and a 
paper and that "rarely would a person be unable to afford it" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1995: 
195). This affiliation with poverty and the lack of resources was so prevalent that, even in 
1923, at a time when more than a couple of newspapers had become media tycoons, we 
hear the story of a journalist who tried to rent an apartment in Cairo, but being refused 
on the ground that a journalist could not possibly afford to pay rent (Ayalon, 1995: 221). 
All this indicates clearly that financial capital was neither essential, nor determining in the 
field of journalism before World War I. In fact, as one contemporary journalist put it, "the 
Arab press does not pay its reporters a salary [...] therefore, the writers of the Arab-
Syrian newspapers are only those who wish to become famous as writers" (as quoted by 
Tauber, 1990: 173). 
The obvious question here is why then did newspaper owners kept pressuring 
their subscribers for their annual fees and publicizing it? This question can only be 
answered through conjecture, as there seems to be no particular evidence that lays out a 
direct and clear answer. First, these people were in the process of constructing a 
profession, that of the journalist. This profession was supposed to represent a career for 
these individuals and, by definition, this entailed that their labor must be paid for, even if 
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just as a matter of principle. This explanation falls under the broader argument of this 
chapter that the field of journalism during this period was a field under construction. Part 
of this construction also affected how the actors within the field saw themselves and, 
more importantly, what image of themselves as actors within the field they projected, in 
this case the image of a professional who took up journalism as a career. 
Another explanation for this could be that these demands were another form of 
publicity for themselves and their brands, the names of their newspapers. This practice 
was one way in which the editor could point out that his newspaper enjoyed a large 
audience, by stressing out the numbers of people who did not yet pay their subscriptions, 
indicating that his paper was in demand. This demand was the basis of their prestige 
after all. The messages addressed to the subscribers who were late in their payments 
often included some indicators that support this point. The most noticeable would be the 
insistence to enumerate the many corners of the empire where subscribers did not pay 
their fees. Thamarat al-Funun (September 21, 1875) mentioned that its subscribers in 
Beirut, Tripoli, Lebanon, and Acres had paid the newspaper's price while those in 
Damascus and Egypt were still dragging. At-Taqaddum (February 14, 1881) mentioned 
subscriptions not being paid in Alexandria and other corners of the Empire. Al-Misbah 
(February 23, 1882) mentioned Port Said. Such practice definitely showed the readers of 
the newspaper that they belonged to a widespread audience and that, as a result, the 
particular newspaper was prestigious and valuable enough to be read in the four corners 
of the Empire. This also implies that economic capital itself might not have been the goal 
of such practices, but rather the image of success it generated as it denoted widespread 
circulation of the periodical. In that sense, economic capital might have had a small 
constitutive role in the symbolic capital of the field, but that role had less to do with the 
financial aspect of that capital than with it being characteristic of levels of circulation and 
therefore public approval and recognition of the value of the newspaper. 
The argument here is that competition in the field was over the recognition of 
the cultural capital the journalist displayed, i.e. symbolic capital, as shown on the pages 
of the newspapers themselves and the opinions and behaviors of their editors and 
owners. There were early signs that symbolic capital, inasmuch as it denotes social 
recognition of the cultural capital of the journalist, was at the heart of the journalistic 
endeavor and that, sooner or later, it was to become the dominant capital in the field of 
Arabic journalism in the Middle East. I have previously mentioned one newspaper which 
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appeared in Istanbul prior to 1858, Mir'at al-Ahwal, published by Rizqallah Hassun. When 
his paper was closed down and him sentenced to death, he escaped Istanbul with the 
consolation that he became "more famous than fire on a banner; everyone knows about 
[him]" (as quoted in Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 55). Fame and recognition were clearly 
very high on his agenda. Shortly after this, with the establishment of al-Jawa'ib in 
Istanbul, it apparently became the trend for the editor of al-Jawa'ib, Ahmad Faris ash-
Shidyaq, to resort in his literary debates with other periodicals and intellectuals to foul 
language and outright personal attacks  when he did not have the necessary evidence to 
prove his point, which according to di Tarrazi (1913, vol.1: 62), happened quite often. 
This was generally perceived to be a tactic or an argumentative method in these debates 
which involved some of the major literary and intellectual figures of this period, like Nasif 
al-Yaziji, Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Butrus al-Bustani, and Adib Ishaq (Karam). But all these debates 
fell under one objective which as-Shidyaq aimed for, fame and honor. When he could not 
display his superiority intellectually, he denigrated his opponents to reduce their status 
by trying to deprive them of their ability to exhibit their cultural capital; theirs was 
supposedly not worth recognizing. All inconsistencies which plagued his life and thought 
were geared toward this purpose; he would change faiths based on who recognized his 
superiority and paid him accordingly, changing masters as he climbed the social ladder, 
and his ideas were often contradictory and inconsistent, especially when compared to his 
lifestyle and social behavior. Karam concluded his encyclopedic entry on the man by 
claiming: 
In the religious sphere no faith satisfied him, and he remained a skeptic, 
a cynic, a realist, a materialist in search of honors and pleasures. Yet, he 
rebelled, and, though joining the pan-Islamic movement, extolled the 
principles of the French Revolution. In revolt against feudalism and all 
forms of slavery, a supporter of the equality of man and the 
emancipation of women, a political and a social critic, yet he lived and 
wrote in accordance with the behests of the Sultan or the Khedive. 
In what can be conceived as a very important case of contemporary acknowledgement of 
the mechanics of fame and recognition in the field of journalism, as well as an act of 
position taking within this field, it must be mentioned that Thamarat al-Funun refused to 
ever address al-Jawa'ib because its owner considered Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq to be 
ethically inferior due to his use of demeaning vocabulary, as well as intellectually inferior 
as shown by his petty and banal arguments (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 26). This riposte 
to Shidyaq denied his strategy and secured for Qabbani the moral high ground, as his 
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move would have been recognized by his audience as an act of integrity, not stooping to 
the level of his opponent. 
This would have been recognized by the audience because, from the early days 
of Arabic journalism, the values that a journalist ought to have exhibited were morality 
and civility, values that Khalil al-Khuri had established as the foundation of his endeavor 
back in 1858 and which remained his code of conduct for as long as he was the main 
journalistic figure in Beirut. These values had apparently become entrenched in 
journalistic practice in the Arab world, to the extent that even in 1913, when Filib di 
Tarrazi was compiling his encyclopedic work on the history of the Arabic press, he judged 
Shidyaq based on the barbaric and demeaning behavior he displayed on the pages of his 
newspaper. It therefore seems that the actors within the field of journalism were also 
accepting a set of habits and attitudes which came to define the distinctive character of 
the journalist; they were also incorporating them into their behavior in the way they 
dealt with each other and the way they publically framed their personal image. Naturally, 
adhering to this particular behavioral framework also meant further recognition for the 
journalist who behaved "as he should", as exemplified by the case of Shidyaq and 
Qabbani. Shidyaq's improper behavior, which was partially caused by the fact that his 
own context and environment were entirely different in Istanbul, earned him scorn in the 
rest of the Arab world, while Qabbani's Thamarat al-Funun had always been considered 
an important and respected newspaper. Adhering to the established ethos was therefore 
also a way to earn or lose recognition, and this would then clearly explain the strategy 
Qabbani adopted while facing Shidyaq. 
It seems clear then, that even during the early phase of journalism, individuals 
embarking on a career as journalists saw the potential of gaining recognition and fame 
through the new medium. The trend of exhibiting ones' own moral superiority and 
denouncing his competitors' lack of values only intensified when journalism turned 
political during the 1870s, and the struggle for symbolic capital became more vehement. 
This became a major tool and strategy for acquiring recognition while depriving the 
opponent of his. In one of the first direct attacks I managed to come across, the editor of 
Thamarat al-Funun attacked the Paris based newspaper as-Sada which featured an 
article promoting fanaticism against Christians within the empire. He described as-Sada 
as an ugly newspaper and its editor as impolite, vulgar, petty, fanatical, and vain, calling 
for the owner to fire him (Thamarat al-Funun, October 13, 1876). One year later, the 
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same paper dedicated its whole front page to attack al-Ahram. Nothing that paper did, 
according to Qabbani, proved that it was loyal to the nation, even though it was an Arab 
newspaper. Unlike Thamarat al-Funun, it was producing false accounts about the news of 
the Russo-Turkish war, claiming the Ottomans were losing ground, therefore neglecting 
its duties to fact check its information. Qabbani ended his tirade by calling for the paper 
to be punished for its bad behavior (Thamarat al-Funun, October 25, 1877). Even though 
Qabbani was in the wrong, his article was more about producing a bad image of al-Ahram 
rather than anything else. 
Playing the game of publicity and counter-publicity to gain public recognition, 
and therefore symbolic capital, became a widespread practice. At-Taqaddum (April 12, 
1882) targeted in one of its articles at-Ta'if, al-Waqa'i', and al-Mufid. It continued its 
attacks in the following issues, focusing on al-Mufid which "did not know of politeness 
neither in essence nor in form" (at-Taqaddum, April 20, 1882). In the same issue, the 
editor publicized a new magazine published by two of his friends, "the righteous and 
most skilled, most amazing and fluent author and poet, shaykh Kahlil al-Yaziji [...] and its 
noble energetic owner, Amin effendi Nasif". It was a game of public image, and every 
journalist wanted to improve his own and his friends' image by showing their qualities 
and worth, as well as to diminish his competitors'. It seems that the rules of the game 
were forming around the public image of the journalist, and it is not surprising to see that 
the focus was on the individual because the newspaper, all the way up to World War I, 
remained the endeavor of individuals; except in the cases of al-Ahram and Lisan al-Hal, 
rarely any of them institutionalized. 
C. The consumers of news. Who were the journalists addressing? 
Bourdieu's idea of a "symbolic capital" relies heavily on the parameter of the 
consumption of the production within a field, especially when the field is outward, rather 
than inward looking, a point which is stressed in the difference between champ de 
grande production and champ de production restreinte. In the political field, and here 
Bourdieu considered the political journalist a politician proper, reverting to the inside of 
the political body negates the very basis of the external outlook of the field which aims to 
control the largest share of the general public (Bourdieu, 1981: 15). At this point, I am not 
considering the political journalist as politician yet, but this does not contradict the 
implications of Bourdieu's point that, as soon as it became "political", the Arabic press 
began to necessarily target a wider audience. The aim of this section is to examine to 
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what extent this was true in practice, as the success of the initial phase of the political 
press relied heavily on this component. 
 In his chapter on readership, Ayalon (1995: 138) began with a very interesting 
comment: "Arabic-speaking society, naturally, was interested in news. But the nature of 
the news that was demanded, and the methods used to communicate it, differed from 
the norms in the society that had first produced the press - Europe - and as such had a 
crucial bearing on the assimilation of the press in society". He went on to argue that, 
even though the literate class was very restricted in numbers and that newspaper 
circulation was even less great, the reach of newspapers far exceeded the amount of 
copies sold, focusing on some very scant evidence that points out to some practices of 
public reading and distribution of a single issue among many individuals (Ayalon, 1995: 
141-2, 156-8). It is undeniable that there is some level of truth to these observations 
which are generally shared by other historians and in popular memory alike. But it is 
equally undeniable that they hide a more prevalent role for the structure of the 
relationship between newspaper publishing and readership, production and consumption 
of the news. 
One of the obvious realizations that we must start with is that readership was 
restricted to educated males who possessed more than the basic reading requirement 
levels, which entails that they must have received some level of education which went 
beyond the traditional village or religious education. They must have also had at least a 
minimum level of financial ease, not only as means to purchase a newspaper; they must 
also have had the time to spend reading it, suggesting the availability of the "leisure" of 
free time to pursue such interests. In 1870s and 1880s Beirut and Cairo, such 
characteristics pointed to a relatively small group of individuals which had been 
previously discussed in this chapter: the merchants, professionals, teachers, and civil 
servants, all of which belonged to the modernizing sectors of society, the modern 
capitalist economy, modern education, or modern bureaucracy. In other terms, they 
were, as individuals, situated in the same position in the social space as the journalists 
and newspaper owners themselves. They belonged to the same class as them. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, this is to be expected. Bourdieu (1985: 738) 
described this as "homology" between the producers and consumers of opinion, the self-
identification of the individuals within these two groups with each other based on 
closeness in the social space. They would share similar backgrounds, experiences, 
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dispositions, and inclinations and are therefore expected to most probably make similar 
choices. The big issue here becomes obvious. All of society needed news in one form or 
another, but newspapers were a particular form of production and dissemination of news 
which served a particular class within society. It is therefore problematic to look at the 
whole of society as a consumer of journalistic news, an issue which dwells at the heart of 
the role of the press in society during those years. 
Part of the answer lies in understanding the newspaper as a medium competing 
with other mediums for the dissemination of news. From that perspective, Ayalon (1992: 
264) claimed that the local population traditionally sought its information in the mosque 
or in the marketplace. The physical place has to be considered here a medium rather 
than a location. While communication there took the form of face-to-face contact, the 
location was recognized as the place where such contact would take place. Friday prayer, 
the Sunday market, and the Sunday sermon were all socially recognized instances where 
people traditionally sought to gain relevant information. In that sense, the mosque, the 
market, or the church fulfilled the same function as the newspaper and were therefore 
competitors as communicative tools. This further builds on the previously advanced claim 
that the press was born out of a dissonant social transformation which pitted modernity 
versus traditionalism. Examining the social response to the press tends to reinforce this 
argument. 
Indeed, starting from Raymond's argument (2000: 318) that the "new" Cairo 
could not be reconciled with the "old" Cairo, and transposing this geographical locative 
comment onto the claims made in the previous paragraph, it becomes reasonable to 
suggest that the social ramifications of such a divide between "old" and "new", 
traditional and modern, transcended geography and materialized socially, notably in the 
field of consumption of news. First, while newspapers were produced and sold in urban 
areas, the great majority of the population was still rural. But even in urban areas, the 
practice of publically reading newspapers, which Ayalon and others mention, took place 
in the "new" parts of town. It took place and became a salient feature of modern 
establishments called coffee shops, where men would meet to talk, play cards, discuss 
politics, and, most importantly, enjoy their coffee while reading the papers (Depaul, 
2007: 257). 
Coffee shops were part of the novelties of modernity which created a backlash in 
the more traditional circles. It was reported that a religious state official thought that 
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"God rendered the buying of journals and subscribing to them reprehensible [...]for, as 
the holy hadith of al-Bukhari says, "you should avoid gossip, waste of money, and asking 
too many questions." Journals combine all three evils" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1992: 264). 
The common man, who remained outside of the impact and sphere of modernization and 
modernity, still went to the mosque, the church, and the marketplace for information. 
Also, during this period, this same common man, it must be noted, had no place nor 
interest in the realm of "politics", of opinions in the administration of government and 
subjects. 
Furthermore, the language of newspapers, irrespective of literacy, or lack of, was 
foreign to many within the potential audience. In Arabic, written and grammatically 
proper language (fusha) is different from the everyday spoken colloquial Arabic, both in 
Beirut and Cairo, each with its different vernacular dialect. And while most sources do 
not make this distinction, Fahmy (2010: 84-6) rightfully argued that the language of the 
political newspapers could not have possibly reached a broad popular basis. Even when 
we consider that many would be very familiar with the correct Arabic of the Quran, the 
style of the newspapers was less poetic and did not come with the margin notes and 
explanations that would render the text comprehensible to those who were unfamiliar 
with the more nuanced shape and form of the fusha. 
The alienation of the journalistic field altogether within the social space did not 
only come because it could not relate to the masses who, because of their exclusion from 
the modernizing process more than anything else, remained strictly confined to the 
sphere of the traditional, be it educationally or in terms of public communication. 
Rejection also came from above, from the state and the feudal elites. In the first 
generation of journalists, only Khalil al-Khuri managed to be "accepted" within the 
Ottoman state bureaucracy, but he remained for all practical purposes a mid-level civil 
servant, the head of a small bureau of censorship. The only notable exception was 
Ahmad Faris ash-Shidyaq, but it could be argued that he was part of the state machinery 
even before he established al-Jawa'ib; the sultan actually asked him to create the 
newspaper and it operated for most of its existence as a semi-official organ. 
The attempts of other journalists during this period to integrate the field of 
politics, whenever such attempts took place, failed. Nqula Naqqash even tried his luck in 
politics before his career as a journalist began; he was elected to the majlis al-
mab'uthayn, the Ottoman parliament of 1877, which was unceremoniously dissolved by 
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the sultan eleven months after its founding. It was inconceivable that a parliament could 
exist in parallel with the figure of the absolute monarch Abdul Hamid II aspired to be 
(Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 123; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 187). There was no real room for 
this new emerging class within the political structure of the Empire. The best they could 
aspire to was to become civil servants, which is what 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani chose to be 
in parallel with publishing Thamarat al-Funun. He became president of the municipal 
council of Beirut in 1898 and the head of the education office in Beirut until he was 
dismissed in 1908 (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 100-1). The titles he held are a little 
misleading, as both offices involved little more than administrative and bureaucratic 
duties, and had no political or policy-making impact whatsoever. 
Journalists were also socially rejected by the feudal strata. In one very famous 
incident which was to take place in 1904, 'Ali Yusuf, one of the most prominent 
journalists of the time, the owner of al-Mu'ayyad, Cairo's most successful newspaper 
then, and a close friend of the Khedive, married a young girl from the aristocratic Sadat 
family. Her father convinced the Islamic court to annul the marriage because the 
profession of Yusuf, a journalist, was a "dishonorable occupation, and those engaged in it 
were unworthy of marrying into a sharifi family" (as quoted by Ayalon, 1992: 266; 1995: 
164). The court ruling was apparently supported by a large segment of the population 
who saw in it a victory for society's moral virtues (Ayalon, 1995: 164). 
Furthermore, in the equation which pits journalists and their audiences, it seems 
that it is falsely assumed in the literature that "journalists in the Middle East [...] viewed 
their role as responding to popular needs and expectations" (Ayalon, 1995: 159). In fact, 
and as was discussed before, journalism was born out of a mission to impose a particular 
agenda on the readership, to inculcate it with a particular worldview and civilizational 
message, or, in more benign terms, to educate the readership. And when it turned 
political, despite some of the claims we see on the pages of newspapers, the press never 
saw itself in practice as responding to a particular expectation; in fact, "popular" needs 
could not have been farthest from journalists' minds. The Arabic press during this period 
completely rejected the "people", or more precisely the "common people", as a class 
which was unworthy of the civilizational mission embedded in journalism. 
None proclaimed this rejection better than Jurji Zaydan, one of the most 
renowned Arab journalists, who spent his life between Beirut and Cairo and published 
one of the most famous and enduring scientific magazines, al-Hilal. In analyzing an 
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incident that took place in Beirut and saw violence erupt in some of the city's shady 
quarters, Zaydan, quoting local newspapers concluded that the blame was to be placed 
on the "riff raff conspiring against each other", and because these lowlifes listened to 
some irresponsible notables who "set their brains on fire with the sciences" (as quoted by 
Hanssen, 2005: 207). Not only were common people riff raff, but they were also 
unworthy of receiving the teaching of sciences, a point which he shared with other 
newspapers' editors. This went in line with his autobiographical analysis in which he 
divided Arab society into three parts: the elite, khassa, which comprised wealthy 
individuals and state officials; the educated class which came to be after 1860 and 
"maintained ideas and dress codes which 'the common people considered a sinful breach 
with tradition'"; and the common people themselves, the 'amma, "the riff raff, the 
artisans, all the other people with menial occupations, and the small merchant" who 
were "immoral crooks" and "idle vagrants", drunks, and uneducated (as quoted by 
Hanssen, 2005: 16). 
Not only do Zaydan's comments reveal the disdain most journalists during this 
period felt toward the common man, but they perfectly exemplify the alienation of the 
journalist and most of the educated class. They could not adhere to the "upper class", 
which at this point still represented people involved with the state and the ruling caste, 
nor could they belong to the common people, whom for the greater majority were still 
peasants operating in a predominantly rural society. This was the same alienation that 
led many of them to go into journalism to begin with, as discussed previously in this 
chapter. And as will be discussed later, this feeling of alienation and rejection of the 
common people remained a salient feature of many journalists' behaviors and writings. 
Even at a time when many editorials and articles read "advice on the agriculture", 
it is highly inconceivable that they were in fact addressing the peasant himself; how could 
they when he could not read, nor could he afford the price of a newspaper! It is also 
equally doubtful that editors and owners did not recognize this fact. It is also highly 
unlikely that the theory that the spread of the message in the press reached higher 
numbers of people than circulation numbers indicate included peasants and even many 
of the disenfranchised segments of the urban populations, considering the unlikelihood 
of the scenario in which an educated person who could afford a newspaper would buy it 
and then make the trip all the way to some village in the vicinity of Beirut or Cairo to read 
it to peasants who have nothing better to do than to sit there and listen to the news of 
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people who probably interested them not one bit. In parallel, we must not forget that it 
was the stated aim of the editors of newspapers to provide reading material for the 
"readers of good taste" (al-Ahram, August 5, 1876) and "reputable men of knowledge" 
(Lisan al-Hal, October 22, 1877). Recognition and symbolic capital did not, in their mind, 
simply come from anywhere and anyone. It was to be generated by the learned class, 
those who could socially and culturally identify the worth of a newspaper. 
The only exception to this rule seems to have come from al-Ahram. It is reported 
that the Taqla brothers chose to adopt a simple writing style in their editorials, a style 
which was more easily accessible to a broader audience. In fact, they introduced the art 
of "news reporting", telling a story in a concise simple manner, as a writing style in their 
articles, in an effort of reflection on their part on the interests, demands, and abilities of 
their intended readership (Mahmud Adham, 1985: 14-15). This alone might explain the 
immediate success this newspaper enjoyed. The Taqlas also distinguished themselves 
with the complete opposite reaction to the common people than other journalists. Al-
Ahram was actually the first to introduce the term ash-sha'b, the people, with its political 
connotation into the mainstream Arabic language (Zolondek, 1965: 13-14). This was 
different from some of the terms previously used like al-khalq, the creations, ar-ra'aya, 
the subjects, al-'amma, the public, or al-jumhur, the crowds, which entail a connotation 
of aimlessness and sometimes dependency on something greater, whether god or ruler 
(Zolondek, 1965: 8). The People for the Taqlas had become a conscious entity with rights 
and opinions, opinions which al-Ahram thought will have to eventually weigh more on 
the government, no matter how despotic it is (Zolondek, 1969: 190). Actually, the only 
criticism which they advanced against this point was that, in a state where education was 
lacking, more democracy could be detrimental, not because the people were to blame, 
but because others might try to take advantage of that, fearing especially Europe, by 
then obviously the greatest threat (Zolondek, 1969: 194). Furthermore, the Taqla 
brothers, unlike most of their contemporaries, were very critical of the new educated 
middle class and its blind adoption in form of all that was European. They saw them as 
nothing but emulations of the foreigners only in haughtiness and prodigality, refusing to 
adopt the essence of European superiority, rather sticking to the form, the visible 
(Zolondek, 1969: 191). 
One explanation for this distinctive approach to journalism might be that, unlike 
all the other journalists discussed so far, the Taqlas were more influenced by the French 
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rather than the Protestants. Having come from a similar social background to the rest, 
the Taqlas professed a more profound attachment to the ideas and ideals of the French 
Revolution, which placed more emphasis on the people and their equality than 
Protestant bourgeois liberalism which Max Weber so aptly described in the Protestant 
Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism. The French also recognized this affection and returned it 
by protecting the Taqlas and their newspaper from political persecution, especially when 
they antagonized Khedive Isma'il. This distinction, however, did not seem to generate 
struggle within the field. This could partly be because the field had not yet fully formed at 
this period in time, and the internal mechanisms of struggle, the rules of the game, had 
not yet become clear. But it can also be explained by al-Ahram's pioneering, especially 
since it was the first Arabic newspaper to use the services of news agencies such as 
Reuters and Havas, which prompted all other local papers to copy its articles, making al-
Ahram their own source of information and news ('Abd ar-Rahim Ghalib, 1988: 90-1; 
Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1951: 77; Ayalon, 1995: 43). 
I will return to these comments more in details later, but at this point, I must 
reiterate that the field of journalism during the early stages when it turned political 
remained a very introverted field in the social space. This means that, even though it was 
outward looking, as previously argued, it continued to be socially restricted both in terms 
of producers and consumers to a close position in the social space; they emanated from 
the same social class, responded to its wants and needs, communicating with it, and only 
with it. This was because of an act of mutual rejection between this class and other social 
classes positioned elsewhere in the social space. They were rejected by their betters and 
their inferiors, and they equally rejected both their betters and their inferiors. 
 
III. The autonomous field of journalism 
In this chapter, it was established that, as soon as it turned "political", the field of 
journalism in Beirut and Cairo gained its autonomy from the field of education to which it 
was previously very intimately attached. More than anything else, this autonomy 
changed the outlook of journalists who were no longer willing to play the role of 
educators, spreading the same type of knowledge that was produced within the 
institutions of modern education. The interests of the second generation journalists 
differed greatly from the founders of Arab journalism. Their aims were no longer to 
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educate the public, but to discuss the developments within the Empire and the affairs of 
other states as well. Arab journalists had "discovered" the political realm. The biggest 
problem they faced at this point was that the political realm was completely barred to 
them. In an empire experiencing increased absolutism, there was little room for a new 
rising class to integrate the political field, where the social position and capitals required 
to maneuver or even penetrate into completely excluded the entire social class 
journalists belonged to, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Political journalism equally did not resonate with the broader public, a public 
deeply entrenched in a traditional society which could not be reconciled with the 
modernist project and spirit to which the educated professional class belonged. This 
estrangement was not necessarily civilizational in nature, even though journalists saw it 
as such. But, simply put, political journalism offered a commodity which the broader 
public had no use for. If the political field did not accommodate the educated, it certainly 
did not have room for the masses. The masses themselves saw no benefit from dwelling 
on the political and were therefore simply uninterested in political journalism. 
The result of this alienation was that the new educated professional social class 
became the producer, as well as the consumer of political journalism. This could not have 
materialized better than with the request of journalists from their readers to contribute 
to their newspapers, thus becoming producers of the commodity themselves. At the 
same time, it was only this class which generated the recognition journalists sought in 
their endeavor. Only educated men could recognize the worth of any newspaper, since 
only educated men could contribute to it. It was an act of mutual recognition between 
the producers and the consumers of political news, who often happened to be the same 
group of individuals, in a sense blurring the lines between champ de production restreinte 
and champ de grande production. This was mainly because of the inability of the 
journalists to break away from their own field and their own social position. There was no 
way they could escape the confines and the limits imposed on them by other social fields, 
and those they also imposed on themselves. The field of journalism at this point was truly 
autonomous, maybe even more literally than the way Bourdieu intended when he 
described a field as such. It was in that sense independent, clearly limited in the social 
space, not interacting with any other social field around it. 
Having said that, it becomes quite apparent that this model of journalism does 
not fall within the traditional paradigm of media behavior. It was neither liberal as a 
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popular representative tool, nor did it intend to, or was expected to play this role. In 
other words, it escaped the liberal paradigm both at the level of grande production and 
production restreinte. In terms of representation achieved at the level of grande 
production, it clearly rejected the "mystery of ministry" Bourdieu (1985: 740) wrote 
about, as journalists consciously refused to represent "people", speak in their name, or 
even address them. This is primarily why I rejected the idea that the political journalist at 
this point was a politician, as Bourdieu suggested. The rules of the game of the field of 
politics did not allow for the inclusion of both the journalist and the public, irrespective of 
how this public can be defined. The journalist thus did not seek to represent anyone 
simply because this representation would not grant him anything. There was no capital to 
be generated by it. As a matter of fact, the journalist did not even seek to represent the 
social class he was part of. Instead of speaking in the name of this class, the "mystery of 
ministry", the journalist's main strategy was to invite individuals from this class to speak 
for themselves. While some might argue that this by itself represents a liberal or 
democratic bent in the behavior of the Arabic press, they would be completely 
disregarding the conscious rejection of the common people by and in this press. Not only 
did journalists refuse to represent the common people, but they equally rejected the 
right of these people to have access to the public realm. They considered them unworthy 
of it, or at least of the modern aspects of it. At the same time, this explanation is by itself 
a rejection of the critical approach and its elite-driven argument, since the journalist at 
this point was in no way part of the dominant political class, nor did he have the potential 
to become so. This means that it could not be argued that the media at this point in time 
served the "powerful", nor that it was driving public opinion because there existed no 
such things as "public", "opinion", or "public opinion". Similarly, if one would argue that 
the very framing of the news and news analysis was an act of crafting a particular vision 
of reality, the fact that news analysis was consumed by actors from the same class as the 
producers of these analyses reveals a homology which indicates that these analyses 
would most probably have in any case been shared by the consumers and producers. This 
indicates that both liberal and critical arguments are not explanatory of the evolution of 
the field of journalism in its early stages. 
On a more normative level, the Arabic press never intended during this stage to 
profess any "liberal" tendencies. In fact, the ethos within the field was one of 
conservatism and conformity. As we have seen in this chapter, the values of civility and 
morality often entailed the connotation of acceptance of the social and political status 
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quo. Liberal values were, as a result, never part of journalism's platform and raison 
d'être, nor was it part of the journalist's thinking process. The liberal normative 
imposition of a particular set of values on the supposed role of media did not even cross 
the minds of journalists during this period. Even when they advanced a "modern" and 
"civilizational" agenda, it functioned as an exclusionary tool according to which they 
could impose a social triage and draw the lines between them, the educated, and the 
others, mainly uneducated traditional people. This is not to say that they were creating a 
group identity, but they were rather delineating the field and those who belonged to it, 
and therefore those who could bestow recognition in it. It was simply a way of 
designating whose opinions matter and whose do not, who has the right to generate and 
grant symbolic capital. From this perspective, the traditionally acknowledged normative 
function of the media cannot stand. The field of journalism was supposed to generate 
symbolic capital, a recognition of the producers within it, and completely rejected the 
representative function which the liberal paradigm assumes is the role of the press. 
It could even be argued that because of the alienation and exclusion of the 
producers and consumers of journalism, and the extent to which the field was 
autonomous, that journalism during its foundational stage was in fact completely 
independent of the public sphere as traditionally understood in the literature, even 
though it was seemingly a public endeavor. For many reasons, it is unclear to what extent 
we can say that it was "journalism for the sake of journalism", in the same way that we 
say "art for the sake of art". Journalistic production was not restricted to the producers 
themselves, as is the case with art, even though it was restricted to their class. This is 
because it did not produce an internal marginality where the rules of the game of the 
field were challenged, maybe because such rules had not been formulated clearly yet. 
The struggle within the field was one for recognition by both producers and consumers; it 
was a struggle over the recognition of the one capital that mattered then, cultural capital. 
The mere fact that there was no transmission of this capital unto other fields and that 
there was no interaction or even spillage from or into other social fields could indicate 
that there was simply no role at the time for the press in the social space, other than 






The journalist revolutionary: the opening-up of the field of politics 
 
This chapter is a historical and sociological reconstruction of the field of politics in 
the Ottoman Empire and Egypt during a crucial period ranging from 1876 till 1882. During 
these short years, the field of politics underwent drastic changes that eventually led to its 
opening up to new actors and the major events that took place then illustrate these 
changes perfectly. This short period witnessed the deposition and installment of two 
sultans and a khedive, a people-backed military revolution, and the occupation of Egypt 
by Britain. In form, these events were not entirely out of the ordinary, since the use of 
physical violence as a means of governing or making political gains is quite a regular 
occurrence in the history of empires. Dynasty change, loss of land, and military uprisings, 
were quite the norm in the history of the Middle East in general, and Islamic and Turkic 
empires in particular. In fact, they were so common that they inspired the first ever 
philosophy of history found in Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddima, in which he argued that history 
was in fact cyclical with one tribe rising up to become an empire, only to fall in the face of 
the next tribe to possess stronger 'asabiyya, or social cohesion and esprit de corps (Ibn 
Khaldun, 1967: 94-108). 
These changes, however, were not only changes in form. They brought along 
changes in the political and social order, which will be examined in the rest of this 
chapter. To do so, I will examine who the actors and would-be actors in the field were. 
What were the forms of capital needed to integrate the field, challenge the dominant 
classes in it, or change its rules? And, most importantly, how was political participation 
legitimized socially and in the eyes of the actors themselves. The last point becomes 
increasingly important when we contextualize the attempt of journalists to integrate into 
the field of politics. The first such attempt took place in Egypt during this period when 
journalists, for the first time, decided to use their public voices to advance a political 
project, and a revolutionary one at that. This chapter will conclude on an examination of 
this episode to show how journalism tried to play a new role, challenging the established 
political order, and how the habitus of the Arab journalist also evolved accordingly. 
It is important to note that this chapter will not present the reader with a 
comprehensive examination of the political field, as it only seeks to address relations and 
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changes in the field which had a direct impact on the field of journalism. From that 
perspective, some elements of the field of politics, like palace politics, or regional politics, 
even though very important on their own, will not be included here, for they impacted 
other areas of the social space that had no effect on journalism in Beirut and Cairo. 
 
I. Evolving field of politics and new actors 
Theoretically, the Ottoman sultan was the ultimate ruler over the Ottoman 
Empire. He was the master of his subjects and they, his slaves; he was their protector and 
the guardian of their religions and traditions; he was the owner of the land; he was the 
hunkar, the emperor; he was the caliph, the ultimate interpreter of faith; he was the 
khan, the ghazi, the leader of armies and conqueror of lands (Shaw, 1976: 164-5). The 
sultan embodied the nation and the nation came to be through him. This institutional 
authority grants the individual who embodies it with the political capital to rule. But to 
accede to this role, the individual needed two things: first, the social capital that was 
derived from belonging to the house of Osman; second, the recognition of this capital by 
the military and high dignitaries of the Empire through the process of bay'a, or allegiance 
oath. Both these requirements were symbolically represented in the accession ceremony 
during which the new sultan was girded with the Sword of Osman, the namesake of the 
Ottoman dynasty, in the mosque of Ayyub (Hasluck, 1929: 604). 
The institution of the sultanate therefore provided the sultan with the legitimacy 
to rule as an absolute monarch. In this case, however, legitimacy did not imply authority 
and the position of the sultan did not always in practice imply an actual absolute power 
to rule. First and foremost, it was because the institutions of the empire were by no 
means governed by rigid laws, but rather by tradition and custom. One major example is 
that of the rules of succession which did not guarantee any clear successor, and, for the 
better part of the history of the Empire meant that the position of the sultan was 
contended among brothers, sons, and uncles, the choice ultimately falling to the other 
institutions of power, usually the military. The individual who could get the most support 
would eventually accede to the throne. This makes the idea of the representation of the 
nation much more concrete than the one symbolically imbued through the institution of 
the sultanate. This means that the sultan must in fact really represent a power base 
which is willing to back him to get his position. If the political strength of an individual, in 
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this case the sultan, is as strong as the group it represents, then we can understand the 
importance of the role of the army in the process of acknowledgment of power in the 
field of politics, a point I will return to in a bit. It is not simply an institutional framework, 
like primogeniture in feudal Europe, but rather a process of negotiations and 
compromises among the different political actors which is eventually symbolically 
recognized through institutional norms and categorizations. 
The first major contention to this political structure only came with the rise of 
Muhammad 'Ali to power. With his military campaign that aimed to conquer Syria and, 
after that, Anatolia, he sought to replace the social capital of the house of Osman with 
that of the house of Muhammad 'Ali. His goal was a dynasty change, but nothing 
indicates that he wanted to change anything else about the imperial nature of the state. 
On the contrary, his authoritarian nature was very well recorded, as seen in Chapter IV. 
This challenge, however, remained a characteristic of the relations between the khedives 
of Egypt and the sultans of Istanbul. 'Ali Pasha, a famous Ottoman grand vizier, wrote in 
the early 1860s that even though they detested one another, the Egyptian princes all 
worked toward the realization of the ultimate dream, the "grande idée" of one day ruling 
over the throne of Constantinople, which they saw as the right of the descendants of 
Muhammad 'Ali (as quoted by al-Sayyid Marsot, 1975: 92). 
This struggle was mitigated by the introduction of two different actors into the 
political field. The first actor was European great powers, most notably France and 
Britain. Competition between empires for land was by far not a new phenomenon. Russia 
had gone to war with the Ottomans over the Crimea and lands around the Black Sea, 
even occupying Beirut in 1773 (Du Quenoy, 2014). France had occupied Tunisia in 1881, 
supported Muhammad Ali's military ambitions, and intervened militarily in Mount-
Lebanon to protect Maronite Christians during the civil war of 1860 (Spagnolo, 1971). 
European powers had been dealing with the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" 
for a while, trying to maintain a weak, yet surviving Empire on the southern borders of 
Russia. This was a step in the direction of cutting access for the Russians to the warm 
waters of the Mediterranean, which would have shaken the status quo of the fragile 
balance in European geopolitics of the time (Anderson, 1966; Millman, 1979). 
Becoming a player in the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire, however, 
required to some extent a different approach than the traditional military one. France 
and Britain introduced a new significant capital into the field of politics, economic capital. 
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Since 1854, the Ottoman Empire had been accumulating debts, which eventually led to 
its bankruptcy in 1875. Egypt followed a similar line, accruing debts starting in 1858. The 
larger share of these debts was owed to foreign banks and governments, most notably 
the French and the British (Clay, 2001; Issawi, 1961). The economic capital was in fact at 
the roots of the woes of the Ottoman Empire. The whole end goal of the modernizing 
policies of the nineteenth century revolved around the upgrade of the Ottoman and 
Egyptian armies, a process requiring financing and new technology, both of which were 
not to be found in the Ottoman Empire. This discrepancy between the two entities, the 
Ottoman Empire and Western Europe has been studied extensively by social and 
economic historians. Samir Amin (1993: 253-5) argued that the Ottoman Empire was a 
tributary system where the ownership of land, rather than capital accumulation, was the 
source of wealth generation. Faced with its needs in a world where industry and capitalist 
production had become the dominant mode of production, the Ottoman Empire was 
unable to produce enough output to contend with its global rivals. This is when these 
rivals stepped in and fed the Ottoman and Egyptian governments the loans they needed 
to modernize. 
When both governments defaulted, the French and British governments sent 
representatives as part of the loan renegotiations to administer the finances and reforms 
of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. These "advisors" ended up being the effective 
administrators of the Ottoman and Egyptian states. Therefore, through the introduction 
of economic capital into the political field in the form of loans, Britain and France 
guaranteed themselves a permanent position as powerful actors within that field. 
The final actor during this early period to integrate the field of politics was the 
Egyptian military, and specifically a group of Arab officers who managed to begin a revolt 
against khedive Isma'il, depose him, and rule the country for almost three years. Again, 
the involvement of the military in the political life of empires was not a new 
phenomenon. Muhammad 'Ali himself got to power by climbing the echelons of the 
military establishment before becoming the governor of Egypt. The reasons for and 
results of the 'Urabi revolt, however, are important to examine. First, part of the reason 
why the military in Egypt decided to revolt was internal to the field of the army itself. As a 
subfield of the state, the army had internal struggles among its different actors, one of 
them being the frictions between the Arab and Turkish officers over dominance within 
the field (McGregor, 2006: 163-5). Arab officers were being passed down on promotions 
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by the rules which favored Turkish-speaking and Turkish born officers; they did not 
possess the social and cultural capitals necessary to accede to the position of dominance 
within the field. In addition to that, budget cuts caused by the austerity measures the 
government needed to take to repay its debts greatly affected the Egyptian military. 
The 'Urabi revolt specifically targeted these issues at first. The demands were for 
enough money to sustain the army and equality among personnel irrespective of 
ethnicity ('Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i, 1983: 90, 102, 126; Cole, 1993: 235). The method 
through which the army managed to voice its demands and practice politics emanated 
not from within, but rather from the loosening up of the field. From the moment the 
effective authority of the khedive began to erode when he acquiesced British and French 
control over government, the image of the absolute sovereign began to crack. Half a 
century prior, Muhammad 'Ali dismissed his subject with his famous saying "it is I who 
govern" (as quoted by Hourani, 1983: 52). But when 'Urabi marched with his troops to 
the khedive's palace to hand him his demands, the khedive answered him: "I am the 
khedive of this country and I do as I please"; 'Urabi retorted: "we are not slaves nor are 
we to be inherited after today" (as quoted by 'Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i, 1983: 126). The 
image of the absolute monarch was no more. 
'Urabi had publically deprived the khedive of his power to represent. As stated 
before, the strength of a political idea, in this case that of the khedive of an absolute 
monarch, is relative to the strength of the group it represents. Depriving Isma'il of his 
representative role meant depriving him of his authority. I have also previously discussed 
the heavy reliance the Ottoman and Muhammad 'Ali dynasties placed on the army, in 
what can best be described as a symbiotic relationship. When Isma'il agreed to the terms 
of the British and French advisors and cut down the funding for his military, he broke this 
relationship and thus alienated his power base. 
This change lasted for only a little while and the army returned to its institutional 
function after the British invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882. But the importance of this 
episode cannot be stressed enough. The 'Urabi revolt was a prelude to an even more 
important such military takeover, that of the Young Turk revolution in 1908. In Egypt, the 
revolt ushered an era of colonial occupation which lasted until 1952. And, more 
importantly, it destroyed the idea of the autocratic sovereign who rules while excluding 
all others. Indeed, Isma'il was deposed and when his successor, Tawfiq, also tried to deal 
with the rebels with a heavy hand, they tried to depose him as well. The legitimacy of 
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having a political opinion had spread beyond the circle of the ruler and his close 
associates. The 'Urabi revolution spread from the army to include other groups who had 
previously shied away from politics, like the new educated class, merchants, artisans, and 
the clergy (al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 85; Cole, 1993: 235). Reid (1998: 217) argued that it 
was a true revolution because of the social depth of the actors who partake in it. The 
revolution also provided these different elements the chance to take part in the "political 
events", to participate in politics. It created an interest in politics, not just in terms of 
observation, but even more importantly in terms of participation and practice. It offered 
a platform where people had a legitimate right to political expression. It should come as 
no surprise that it was during these turbulent times that journalists first engaged in 
political action. 
 
II. Journalists and the revolution, a changing role and an evolving habitus 
With the opening up of the political field to new actors, the modern educated 
class acted in a way it had not done before. While the previous era was characterized by 
a strict support of the government and the ruler, intellectuals in the late 1870s in Egypt 
overwhelmingly placed their lot with the army against Isma'il and Tawfiq. Journalists 
decided to no longer be observers, as they appropriated the right to legitimately profess 
political opinions. I will argue in this section that this came as a reaction to the loss of 
authority on the part of the ruler and also the loss of his representative status. Journalists 
during the years of the 'Urabi revolution discovered the "mystery of ministry". This 
change came to a large extent because of the new ideas which affected journalists in 
Egypt, mainly through a new network which formed around one man whose call for 
resistance against European encroachment resonated from India to Egypt, France, 
Istanbul, and Persia. This man was none other than the great Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-
Afghani, a notorious and pragmatic revolutionary who was the first intellectual during the 
Arab Nahda to advocate freedom from both the traditional chains of autocratic rule as 
well as the reinforced control of Europe. The network that this man created, especially in 
Egypt, became the nucleus of Arab journalism that would usher in the struggle between 
the press and the dominant political class in Egypt, as well as struggles within the field of 
journalism itself. The opening up of the political field and the legitimization of the 
practice of political expression and participation constituted a conducive context for the 
development of such a brand of journalism, but it is highly unlikely that without the 
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intellectual and political guidance of al-Afghani that journalists would have so readily 
taken this route, one which ended as bad for them as for the revolution itself. 
A. Radicalizing journalists 
The process of radicalizing journalists followed the establishment of a political 
press in Beirut and Cairo. It began on the periphery of al-Azhar, where an unofficial 
teacher gathered around him a circle of young men including Muhammad 'Abdu, Sa'd 
Zaghlul, Adib Ishaq, 'Abdallah Nadim, Salim Taqla, Salim an-Naqqash, and Ya'qub bin 
Sannu' (Hourani, 1983: 109; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 44-5; Reid, 1998: 
223). All these individuals would, by the end of the 1870s at the latest, have established 
newspapers or worked as journalists. Muhammad 'Abdu would later become mufti of 
Egypt; Sa'd Zaghlul the leader of the Egyptian nationalist movement during the 1910s and 
1920s. All of them kept close contact with their teacher, even after his exile from Egypt in 
1879, some of them following him to Paris when he went there. 
A radical himself, he taught his students what he conceived to be the true 
teachings of Islam, based on rational thought and philosophy. But the core of his 
teachings revolved around the political realm. He warned them of the danger that is 
Europe and stressed the need for the unity of Muslims and the reform of the political 
system to be less autocratic. He encouraged them to write, publish newspapers, and 
"form a public opinion" (Hourani, 1983: 109). His life was a testament that the realm of 
politics was not restricted to the ruler and that radical change can come if one forces it. 
He worked behind the scenes as conspirator and diplomat, roused popular revolutions, 
and ended the rule of kings. Even while under house arrest in Istanbul, he is rumored to 
have orchestrated the assassination of Nasir ad-Din Shah Qajar of Iran; when pulling the 
trigger, the Shah's assassin told him: "take that from the hand of Jamal ad-Din" (Hourani, 
1983: 112). 
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's contribution to the radicalization of politics and the 
changes in the perception of what the political was in the region could not be 
understated. First, not unlike what al-Bustani did in Beirut, al-Afghani's students were of 
different confessions and religions. Even though he taught at al-Azhar, he welcomed 
Christians like Adib Ishaq and Salim Taqla, as well as Jews like Ya'qub bin Sannu'. This was 
very peculiar of a Muslim intellectual preaching the rebirth of Islam, except that al-
Afghani was not your typical next door cleric. His Islamic nation was defined according to 
120 
 
civilizational characteristics rather than religious ones, as attested by some of his 
writings, most notably his "Réponse à Renan" in which he completely lashes out against 
religion in general, "one of the heaviest and most humiliating yokes" (al-Afghani, 1968: 
182). Religion, like despotic rule, restricted human reason, the only prerequisite for the 
masses to develop and advance (Kenny, 1966: 20). Needless to say, these teachings 
presented a new approach to politics. The people no longer became the object of rule, 
but a tool of progress. The educated elite was no longer a mere employee of the state, 
but a shaping force in it. 
This call for inclusion was not simply an intellectual exercise, since al-Afghani 
actively sought to create the mechanisms through which the educated modern elite 
could penetrate the political realm and was relatively successful at that. He tried to 
subvert the Egyptian freemasons lodge to further political agitation, and when they 
rejected any political involvement, he and his students who had joined him formed their 
own national lodge, one of the first such secret societies that sought to influence politics 
in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt before World War I (Kudsi-Zadeh, 1972: 25). These 
same students established newspapers that would agitate the Egyptian street for more 
than two years until the British occupation of Egypt, when they all had to close door and 
many of them went into exile. The press became the other mechanism through which he 
sought to influence politics, and it is obviously the one we are interested in here. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that his immediate impact on the realm of 
politics culminated with the 'Urabi revolution, as he was one of the major reasons why 
the movement took a nationalist bend. 
But in the end, we must remember that this process of radicalization was not one 
of a simple intellectual dialogue between a group of students and their teacher. First and 
foremost, it was a reflection on the social position of these journalists, one of socio-
political alienation. As discussed in the previous chapters, journalists belonged to a class 
which was socially marginal, rejected by other classes, and refused to address other 
constituents of the social space. From this position of exclusion, al-Afghani offered his 
students a new attitude toward the political, a position-taking through which they found 
a new function that allowed them to express political opinions legitimately. They had 
found a way to break the ostracism they suffered from. 
It is from this perspective that we must understand the "radicalism" of the 
journalists of that epoch. Today, having a political opinion would hardly qualify as a 
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radical act, but back then, this novelty was as revolutionary as the military uprising itself. 
The new vision of the political that al-Afghani instilled in his students allowed them to 
perceive what is allowed and what is not in a very different way than the one that 
previous generations of journalists professed. In an article of al-Ahram, the Taqla 
brothers accused the Khedive of having spent a hundred thousand pounds from the 
blood of the peasant, at a time when Isma'il was rumored to be poisoning people for less 
grave an insult ('Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 36; Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 5). Such 
a statement, let alone thinking in these terms, would have been unthinkable only a 
couple of years before. In this new version of the political realm, journalists possessed 
the political capital necessary to voice political opinions. 
B. Journalists and journalism during the revolution 
The climax of this radicalization took place over a period of three years, when al-
Afghani's students began each publishing his own newspaper which offered for their 
better part a new experience of Arab journalism. Between the middle of the year 1877 
and the middle of the year 1882, Filib di Tarrazi accounts for the appearance of seven 
different political newspapers. Four of these were either owned or controlled by a 
disciple of al-Afghani. Two others followed the same nationalist anti-European political 
line. Only one newspaper, az-Zaman, published by the Armenian Aliksan Sarrafyan in 
1882, opposed it and was quickly closed down by the Egyptian authorities even prior to 
the revolution. These were in addition to al-Ahram, and at-Takbit wat-Tankit (mockery 
and joking) founded by 'Abdallah Nadim in 1881. The date of 1877 is not random though. 
Due to the tension between Isma'il and the Ottoman sultan, newspapers in Egypt were 
given more freedom to comment on the ongoing Turko-Russian War. The hope was that 
they would draw support away from the sultan, as most, if not all of the journalists in 
Egypt at this time were Syrians who left their homes to find better lives in Egypt ('Abd al-
Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 33-4). Little did he know the extent to which this measure 
would backfire. 
Ya'qub as-Sannu' founded a very successful, yet short lived, satirical paper 
entitled Abu Nadhdhara Zarqa' (the man with blue eyeglasses) in 1877. It was to appear 
fifteen times before Isma'il suspended it and ordered the assassination of its owner who 
managed to escape to Paris with the assistance of the Italian consul (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, 
vol.3: 8-9). As an example of one of his most wounding articles, he addressed the rumor 
that if the Khedive was displeased with someone, he would invite them over and offer 
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them coffee that was laced with poison. Sannu' created a fictional dialogue between 
himself and other characters where they invite him for a drink. When asked if he 
preferred beer or coffee, he rejected the offer for coffee because it was a very dangerous 
beverage to drink during those times (as quoted by  'Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 60-
61). 
His paper, alongside Nadim's at-Takbit wat-Tankit, were watersheds in Arab 
journalism for many reasons, the most important being that they managed to 
communicate with the common man at a level never previously achieved. This was 
because they usually dropped the fusha Arabic in favor of the vernacular, making their 
language more accessible to people. They also added pictures and photographs which 
made their papers easier to read even for people with lower levels of literacy. 
Furthermore, Sannu' derived much of his inspiration from the letters he received from his 
readers, therefore literally addressing the concerns of people (Kendall, 2006: 15). Nadim 
equally reached a broader audience by supplementing his newspaper with public 
speeches, as he was an unusually gifted orator (Goldsmith, 2000: 146). 
Adib Ishaq founded Misr in 1877 and it became a sort of front for the teachings 
of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani who even contributed to its pages with two famous articles, 
"al-hukumat ash-sharqiyya wa anwa'uha" (Eastern governments and their types) and 
"ruh al-bayan fi al-inkiliz wal-afghan" (the spirit of the statement on the English and the 
Afghans) (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 13). This was highly unusual because al-Afghani 
rarely published anything under his own name and we are left today with very few 
writings of his. This, coupled with Adib Ishaq's famous prose writing made of Misr a great 
success, that is until it was suspended during the early days of Tawfiq's rule. 
Haqiqat al-Akhbar (the truth of the news), a pro-Ottoman newspaper founded in 
1877 by Anis Khallat at-Tarabulsi, featured Muhammad 'Abduh and 'Abdallah Nadim 
among their most prominent writers (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 9). Even Mir'at ash-
Sharq, which Salim 'Anhuri founded in 1879 to support Isma'il, was bought by Amin Nasif 
who appointed Muhammad 'Abduh as its editor in chief. He used it as a mouthpiece of 
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and became from then on a mouthpiece of the nationalist 
movement (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 16). 
Al-Watan (the nation) founded by the Copt Mikha'il 'Abd as-Sayyid late in 1877 
and al-Mufid (the beneficial) founded in late 1881 by Mustafa Thaqib and Hasan ash-
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Shamsi also supported the nationalists during this period. Al-Watan's nationalist line only 
changed when it was sold in 1900, a point which will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Al-Mufid was so vehement in its support for the nationalists and its opposition to the 
British that it was shut down even before the revolution. Its owners simply changed the 
name of the newspaper to an-Najah (success) and published it. It was quickly shut down 
again; it changed its name to as-Safir (the ambassador) and appeared again (Filib di 
Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 21). 
When we look at the mentioned individuals, the first thing to notice is that they 
did not socially differ from the previous generation of journalists in any perceivable way.7 
Adib Ishaq was the child of a small Damascene notable family who was sent to missionary 
schools before his family moved to Beirut (Goldsmith, 2000: 89). Ya'qub bin Sannu' was 
born in Cairo into a Jewish family. He went to Livorno to study under the patronage of a 
nephew of Muhammad 'Ali and then came back to Egypt to work as a teacher and a 
playwright (Goldsmith, 2000: 181). 'Abdallah an-Nadim began his life with a traditional 
Islamic education. He quickly lost interest in his studies in favor of literature, which 
forced his father to make him choose between continuing his studies and losing his 
financial support. The result of his choice was that he had to work at odd jobs for a while 
(Goldsmith, 2000: 146). Muhammad 'Abduh also came from a humble background and 
received a traditional religious education, ending up at al-Azhar (Von Kugelgen). There 
was nothing about these individuals which, in terms of biographical context, differed 
them from Sarkis and Qabbani. They shared the same social position as the second 
generation. 
They differed, however, in their position-taking, as mentioned before. They no 
longer accepted the role of spectators of the political field and, given the changing 
context brought about by the revolution and the opening up of the field to new actors, 
capitals, and practices, they decided to reposition themselves so as to be journalists and 
revolutionaries at the same time. They were in many ways the spearhead of the 
nationalist aspect of the revolution, representing the nation of Egyptians and Ottomans 
against foreign influence and all the ills it brought onto Egypt. This new position-taking in 
the field of politics can only be traced to the teachings of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. His 
political capital came from the imagining of the nation which came to be through the 
rhetoric of liberation he advanced. Public discontent with the poor management of the 
                                                          
7 Access to biographical information on the mentioned individuals who were not students of al-
Afghani proved impossible to find in reliable sources. 
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affairs of the country became possible to categorize under the political project of national 
liberation, and the spokespeople for national liberation became the new representatives 
of the nation. The network that al-Afghani created was not an institutional one, nor was 
it a recognized network to produce social capital. It was, however, a way through which a 
political message spread. It was through this network that the idea of anti-colonial 
struggle materialized and was disseminated throughout Egypt. 
C. An evolving habitus 
I have discussed how the changes affecting the field of journalism emanated 
from the changes in the political context within which journalism operated. The opening 
up of the political field due to the challenges the dominant class faced during this period 
"[destroyed] the consensus among the ruling elite over the shape of legitimate 
discourse", opening the room for a change in the form of public communication (Cole, 
1993: 233). Political journalism during these turbulent years tried to integrate the 
political field as part of the changing rules of the game within that field. The field of 
journalism therefore witnessed and internal metamorphosis because of this new 
experience. 
One of the most important of these changes was that the main target audience 
of the new form of political journalism became the masses, the common people, thus 
breaking with the previous alienation from the common man. This was in many ways a 
two way change. In the same way that an-Nadim and Sannu' actively sought to interact 
with and broaden their audiences, addressing the common man as much as the educated 
intellectual, people began identifying with the different political messages in the press. 
Historical accounts tell us that the more the press spoke of European control over the 
government and impending European invasion, the more people supported the army and 
those who opposed the khedive and the elements of his government who were seen to 
support European encroachment (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 87). It is difficult, however, to 
make a distinction whether the press was simply following popular feelings or if it acted 
in any way as an opinion shaper. What can be said for certain is that people definitely 
reacted to what was being said in the newspapers. When al-Ahram opposed the 'Urabi 
revolution, the Taqla borthers were attacked and their printing press was destroyed by 
'Urabist crowds, prompting them to escape back to Syria for a short while, returning as 
soon as the 'Urabi revolution ended (Goldsmith, 2000: 207). Even the political 
establishment recognized this change and the potential danger it might create. Out of the 
125 
 
nine newspapers mentioned in this section, six were suspended by the Egyptian 
authorities for their opposition. They were Abu Nadhdhara Zarqa', Misr, Mir'at ash-
Sharq, al-Mufid, al-Ahram, and az-Zaman. 
The second most important change was in the journalists' perception of the field 
of politics. It was no longer the warded off realm of the ruling class which they could only 
observe. It had become accessible to them because the taboo of participating in politics 
had been broken. As previously mentioned, the "legitimate" discourse the press allowed 
itself had been completely altered because of the changes to the political field itself. This 
was an experience which journalists would not easily let go of. They had discovered at 
the same historical moment both the power of shaping public opinion as advanced by the 
critical approach to the role of media in politics, and the power of popular 
representation, as advanced by the liberal approach. The "mystery of ministry" came to 
be not at all as a mystery, but as a conscious realization of the many facets of the power 
of "ministry" and its social implications. The only problem facing these journalists, 
however, was that the 'Urabi revolution was but a fleeting moment in the history of the 
region and that the field of politics was not to change as much in the years after. 
 
III. The 'Urabi Revolution, a revolution in the "public" 
The fate of the 'Urabi Revolution itself was sealed with the first shot of a British 
canon off the coast of Alexandria. Fearing the changes that such a revolution would bring 
to their interests, the British and French set their traditional imperialist rivalry aside, 
endorsing a British invasion of Egypt to "restore order there". It took apparently more 
than seventy years for this order to come and the British stayed in Egypt until 1954. True 
to imperialist form, the British brought with them the rhetoric of the "mission 
civilisatrice" characteristic of the "White Man's Burden", promising an age of freedom 
and socio-economic reforms. True to imperialist nature, the priority was for Britain's 
interests while indigenous interests either fell in line or were inconsequential (Tignor, 
1963: 148). 
The brief experience of the opening up of the political field to the active 
participation of different social actors had ended with a reverting back to the old practice 
of absolute rule, except that, after 1882, the absolute ruler was no longer the khedive, 
but the British consul-general in Egypt. As a result, the political field returned to being 
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exclusionary to some extent. But as will be seen in the next chapter, there remained 
enough room for public political communication. This was because the taboo over the 
right over the expression of political opinion had been broken. From this perspective, we 
can see how the habitus and positions of different actors within the political field and the 
field of journalism evolved and changed during these few years. 
The dominant classes or actors within the field of politics changed, but the 
relations within the field remained to a large extent unchanged from before 1879; the 
new dominant actors simply replaced the old ones and continued governing the same 
way, a sort of elite revolution that never changes the political system. The bigger change, 
however, was that new actors experienced the political during these short years, and 
they had by then realized that they could participate in politics; some of them believed 
that they even should participate in politics. Journalists were of the latter category. But 
that does not mean that they were the only group who professed such interests. Other 
groups like lawyers and notables were also to become key political actors, not only in 
Egypt, but also across the whole Ottoman Empire. The legitimate right to produce a 
political opinion was no longer monopolized. Not only that, but the legitimate right to 
political participation had spread across all social groups. Professionals, journalists, 
military, clergy, peasants, artisans, and common folks of all social, political, and economic 
standing had participated in the revolution. For a short while, an all-inclusive public 






The journalist politician: journalism as a sub-field in the field of politics 
 
The events of the 'Urabi Revolution, mirrored to some extent in the Ottoman 
Empire with the deposition of two sultans in one year, changed the political landscape for 
the remainder of the existence of the empire. The British, having gained authority in 
Egypt, never possessed the legitimacy to rule. Abdul Hamid II, while being the legitimate 
ruler of the Ottoman Empire, always feared he might lose his authority the same way his 
brother and uncle did. In this context of political insecurity, journalists saw the potential 
of penetrating the political field as actors. Naturally, the dominant class in the political 
field would have none of that. Whether it was because of the authoritarian nature of the 
rulers or as a strategy to preserve their position of dominance, they tried to control the 
field of journalism which had proven to be a major nuisance during the 'Urabi Revolution 
and even during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War when the Ottoman Empire lost most of 
its territory in the Balkans. 
In this chapter, I will examine this two-way attempted encroachment. On the one 
side, the political authorities tried to dominate the field of journalism by introducing new 
capitals that they possessed to act as a dominant capital in that field and by also 
supporting some journalists whose position-taking in the field of politics coincided with 
theirs. On the other side, journalists continued to challenge the legitimacy of the 
absolute ruler, publicizing their resistance, and claiming an increased representative 
status. During these turbulent times, journalists tried to capitalize on every opening up in 
the field of politics to become relevant actors in it. I will argue that this ended up 
incorporating the field of journalism into the field of politics where it became a sub-field, 
with journalists becoming also political actors who possess a legitimate right to produce a 
political opinion through which they represent the "people". 
 
I. Politics and journalism, an uneasy coexistence 
One of the first measures of the British was to supposedly restore freedom of the 
press and allow it to criticize its measures as much as it wanted. It was for the British 
occupation, represented by the figure of Lord Cromer, a safety valve which decreased the 
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pressure of the Egyptian street, while portraying themselves as the promoters of 
freedom and progress in Egypt (Taysir abu 'Arja, 1997: 12). Lord Cromer even considered 
himself to be successful in this endeavor, writing in a 1903 report that the Egyptian press 
had "no history" for the past twenty years ('Abd al-Latif Hamza, [1958-1961]: 65). Abdul 
Hamid, on the other hand, could not care less about the freedom of the press. Having 
become sultan due to the loss of authority brought about by the two successive coups 
and the internal palace politics which favored other elements inside the government, 
such as the Young Ottomans, his immediate concern was to consolidate his own 
authority. In the first few years of his reign, a parliament and a constitution were 
promulgated and his efforts turned toward curbing these liberal advances which "clearly 
contradicted Ottoman traditions of statecraft" (Akarli, 2002: 266). Achieving absolute 
command over the affairs of the Empire passed through the route of controlling the 
press, which Abdul Hamid did skillfully (Boyar, 2006). Both rulers therefore adopted a 
similar stance toward the press. Wanting to control it rather than abolish it, they adopted 
a slow pace in their attempts. Therefore, for the better part of the 1880s, authorities and 
journalists were involved in a polite sparring duel, in which the former tried to control 
the latter, while the latter resisted, both using the capitals available to them within their 
own respective fields to do so. 
A. The myth of the liberal empire, a search for legitimacy and authority 
As stated before, the new regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt got to 
power in extremely unconventional circumstances. The British conquered Egypt and 
Abdul Hamid became sultan after a coup that deposed his brother. Both faced 
challenges, the British to the legitimacy of their rule and the sultan to his actual authority 
as a ruler. These insecurities clearly materialized in their behavior and policies. 
From the moment he was appointed consul-general in Egypt, Lord Cromer made 
sure that no other force could oppose him, not even symbolically. When 'Abbas II 
succeeded his father at the age of eighteen in 1892 and seemed unwilling to politely get 
in line and accommodate British wishes, Lord Cromer made it a point to publically 
humiliate him by removing him from official public ceremonies and threatening to 
depose him at will, forcing him to apologize and promise that he would not make any 
future decisions without consulting the British representative and getting his stamp of 
approval (Tignor, 1963: 150; Daly, 1998: 241). Even when the colonial authorities 
bestowed democracy on the Egyptian people and granted them an  elected parliament, 
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Lord Cromer completely disregarded representatives and refused to grant them any 
power, in an equal display of humiliation than that shown toward the Khedive. 
Tignor (1963: 152, 158) argued that it was the personality of Lord Cromer, having 
been corrupted by power, that established such an authoritarian system, blocking locals' 
access to decision making in their own country. This agential approach, however, 
completely disregards the structure of the colonial administration of Egypt which could 
only function as such. As an executive practice, it was supported by the same physical 
force that had put it in place to begin with. But this monopoly over physical violence 
never imbued British rule with any legitimacy. Such recognition had to be created to 
justify this rule both for the British and the locals. As an act of self-legitimacy, the colonial 
power constructed an image of the Egyptian "Other" that was characterized by 
"ignorance [that] was too widespread, despotism [that] was too ingrained, the religious 
influence [that was] too reactionary [...] [and that] respected only superior force and 
could be governed only by instilling in [it] fear of established authority" (Tignor, 1963: 
148, 152). As an act of showcasing a legitimate rule, the British advocated an image of 
their spirit of enlightened liberalism, seeking only to reform Egypt, never to rule it. This 
was made easier by Lord Cromer's own political convictions. A staunch liberal himself, his 
official and private messages back home indicate that he promoted this image both in 
Egypt and back in Britain (Mowat, 1973). Incidentally, it was only a few years later that 
Kipling wrote: 
Take up the White Man's burden, Send forth the best ye breed 
Go bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives' need 
The myth of the liberal imperialist resonated with many contemporaries and 
even by some historians, especially as it pertained to the freedom the press enjoyed 
under British rule (Ayalon, 1995: 50). Shibli Shumayyil, one of the key intellectuals of the 
Nahda period, a strong supporter of Darwinism and positivism, an internationalist, and a 
regular contributor to many newspapers, supported British rule over Egypt. According to 
him, British rule was enlightened and offered much freedom in comparison with the 
Ottoman government's censorship back home in Syria (Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 47-8). This 
did not mean that he was oblivious of the nature of colonialism, as he argued that the 
British only cared to reform the sectors that would financially remunerate their own 
coffers, but his personal scale of priorities favored freedom of expression and, under 
British rule freedom was such that "jail cell doors opened on their own" (as quoted by 
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Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 49). Al-Ahram also believed, at least for the first year of the 
occupation, that the British were indeed proponents of freedom and selfless reformers, 
an attitude which quickly changed afterwards. 
Appearances might support this view at face value. The British indeed allowed 
the press to operate in relative freedom. But, as will be shown later, authorities tried as 
much as possible to control the press through different mechanisms: bribery, access to 
information, censorship, suspensions, legal proceedings, threats, etc. Freedom of the 
press was therefore granted to newspapers and journalists who supported British rule, 
while the nationalist press that resisted it suffered as much censorship and repression as 
the one that fell under Abdul Hamid's rule. The question as a result is to what extent can 
this qualify as freedom. The straightforward answer is that it does not. Freedom only 
existed as a rhetoric in the myth of the liberal imperialist which hid the truth that access 
to politics had become restricted to the British colonial authorities. 
Abdul Hamid's approach to establishing his authority did not greatly differ from 
the British. As soon as he succeeded to the throne in 1876, he agreed to the 
establishment of a parliament, the promulgation of a constitution, and kept the liberal 
Young Ottomans in positions of power within the government (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 
174-5). He spent the next few years dismantling the institutions which limited his 
authority, showing through a series of relatively successful measures how a strong and 
central leadership was preferable to the squabbles of democratic liberals who could not 
keep up with the many crises which hit the Empire (Akarli, 2002: 266). 
He approached journalism with equal patience, unlike what most secondary 
sources tend to conclude about him.8 It was not until 1888 that he produced, for the first 
time, his own legal decree on printing in the Ottoman Empire, the Matbaalar 
Nizamnamesi, or the Printing Houses Regulation (Boyar, 2006: 422). Its effects were only 
felt in Beirut a year later (Cioeta, 1979: 173). Abdul Hamid reflected on his relationship 
with the press in his memoirs, reflections which admittedly must be taken with a grain of 
salt. He wrote: 
                                                          
8 Most secondary sources base their arguments on primary material produced mainly by Abdul 
Hamid's detractors, his political opponents, and Turkish nationalists who were behind his 
deposition and the eventual replacement of the Ottoman Empire by the Republic of Turkey. Even 
Western contemporary sources sought to delegitimize Abdul Hamid's regime by stressing his 




If I were an enemy to writers, I would not have endured Akram Bey and Abu ad-
Diya Bey's arrogance. And if I were an enemy to writers, I would not have paid 
Abdul Haq Hamid Bey's debts which appeared every now and then despite the 
excellent salary I gave him. If I were an enemy to writers and the art of history, I 
would not have endured Murad Bey's impudence when he worked against my 
crown and my throne and I would not have let him remain at the service of the 
state and with a decent salary until the last day of my reign. 
[...] If I were an enemy of writers and editors, I had men who could then kill them 
in the middle of the street. ('Abd al-Hamid, 1991: 64-5) 
While such a statement would today sound quite surreal, using such violent measures 
was back then a legitimate, normal, and legal response that the sultan could have chosen 
to take but did not. And even though this statement must be taken with a pinch of salt, 
evidence suggest that 'Abdul Hamid was relatively lenient with journalists and did not opt 
to use violent means with them, means that he had at his disposal. When he was 
deposed, one of his famous remarks was: "if I were to go back to Yildiz palace, I would 
put all newspaper editors in a sulfur furnace" (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.1: 42). The clear 
implication is that he did not do that but deeply regretted it. This tends to corroborate 
that his approach to the press was not as tyrannical as traditional historians would like us 
to believe. 
Such an approach to dealing with the press was, however, not the product of an 
enlightened mind or a kind forgiving heart. Boyar (2006: 424) argued that Abdul Hamid 
thought the press to be dangerous, yet useful if it was controlled. He went on to show 
that the relationship between the Turkish press in Istanbul and the sultan was a very 
symbiotic one, as each relied on the other and mutually benefited from such a 
relationship. Playing the public through the press became, for Abdul Hamid, a major 
component of his increasing authority. Although the context and nature of the 
relationship between the authorities and the Arabic press in the provinces was 
completely different than the one joining the Turkish press and the sultan in the capital, 
Boyar's study tends to support the argument that Abdul Hamid's approach to dealing 
with the press was both prudent and patient, at least for the first fifteen years of his 
reign. Still, the goal of this enlightened approach was to eventually control the press 
better by finding the right mechanisms through which he could do so. 
B. The post-1882 field of journalism 
It must be noted at this point that, even though the political fields in Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire were split into two separate fields after the British invasion, 
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journalism in Beirut and Cairo still constituted a single field shaped by the same actors, 
practices, and capitals. Even the journalistic product remained to a large extent the same 
across the two cities. First, journalists in Cairo and Beirut were still in their majority 
Syrians who travelled back and forth between the two cities. The Taqla brothers, Jurji 
Zaydan, and Shibli Shumayyil are but some of the more famous journalists to do that. 
Second, because of the practice of reproducing articles from other newspapers, 
especially those of al-Ahram which received its news directly from Reuters and Havas 
news agencies, Beiruti newspapers were in fact reproducing much of the news and news 
analysis from Cairo newspapers. The change in attitude there was equally paralleled in 
Beirut, irrespective of whether it was a question of natural inclination or simply a matter 
of emulation of content. However, evidence suggests that there was a true identification 
between journalists in Beirut and those in Cairo. From the year 1881 till 1884, it was very 
common among all Beiruti newspapers to see their front pages or their biggest coverage 
focusing on al-mas'ala al-misriyya, "the Egyptian question". The political issues of the 
time were common to all journalists in the two cities. 
Similarly, the press in both cities faced a comparable situation whereby the 
dominant class within the political field kept blocking all access to the field to other 
possible actors, while trying to integrate and control the field of journalism. The press 
behaved in a similar way to the challenges posed by both the sultan and the British 
consul-general. It began to symbolically resist the pressure of the political authorities 
throughout the 1880s. By the end of the decade, these authorities clearly felt the 
pressure not only from their failure to adequately control the field of journalism, but also 
from journalists managing to dispute their power over the field of politics. By this time, 
journalists had clearly learned two important lessons. First, given the right circumstances, 
they can have a role in the political field. Second, the masses which they had disdained so 
much in the past could play a vital role in that. The habitus of the Arab journalist was 
evolving. As will be shown later in this chapter, the "discovery" of the mystery of ministry 
allowed journalists to transform the public recognition they received in the field of 
journalism into political capital they invested in the field of politics both in Beirut and in 
Cairo. 
C. Polite coercion and polite resistance, the shaping of cross-field struggle 
Polite coercion was the way in which political authorities decided to face the 
press during the 1880s. The main tools used were a strengthening of the application of 
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legal censorship and, more importantly, the introduction of economic capital into the 
field of journalism in an attempt to counterweigh the dominance of the second 
generation of journalists in it. This took the form of sponsorship for some newspapers 
which were created or allowed to exist to be compliant with the authorities, speaking in 
their name while being "privately owned". I had previously mentioned the example of 
Muhammad Rashid ad-Dana's Bayrut, which his brother, the head of the commercial 
tribunal in Beirut, and the governor of Beirut urged him to publish. He spent twelve years 
between 1886 and 1902 working on this paper which simply reported government 
activities and reproduced official opinions on issues; it was never willingly read or bought, 
but merchants and officials were forced to subscribe to it because they felt ashamed not 
to, considering his brother's position and the support he received from the vali (Filib di 
Tarrazi, 1913, Vol.2: 38). In Cairo, British authorities allowed many newspapers to reopen 
their doors after having been shut down by the Egyptian government under the khedive 
or the revolution leadership. This automatically got them the support of some of these 
papers, like az-Zaman and al-Ittihad al-Misri, which were able to witness firsthand the 
liberalism of the British colonial administration (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 22; Taysir Abu 
'Arja, 1997: 13). 
I described this behavior as polite since it was still not yet on the offensive in the 
way it approached the field of journalism. Official newspapers receiving almost no 
audience, authorities had to find a way to gain a foothold in the field of journalism, no 
matter how small it was. The sultan had already felt the effect of an unruly press during 
the Turko-Russian war and the British witnessed how problematic journalists could 
become given the right circumstances. Unlike during the 1860s and much of the 1870s, 
authorities could no longer disregard the press as a benign and marginalized educational 
endeavor. They attempted to impose some sort of control on it by introducing economic 
capital into the field of journalism as the main support for the authority-friendly press. 
None of these newspapers, however, was successful in acquiring a sizeable audience and 
most of them simply failed and faded away. Their effect on the field was minimal at this 
point as they could not establish themselves as serious competitors in it. They lacked the 
recognition which the dominant newspapers enjoyed, and financial backing was not 
about to change that. 
The private press also exercised polite resistance to authority during the 1880s. 
In Cairo, al-Ahram's position was dominant, and no other newspaper rivaled it in 
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circulation and fame. This was despite the fact that it did not oppose the British during 
the first two years of their presence in Egypt, as attested by its editorials. In the opening 
days of the year 1884, the editor wrote against those calling for the immediate 
evacuation of the British military from Egypt, arguing that the country was in a state of 
chaos and that the British themselves were not keen on staying, confirmed by many of 
their politicians' speeches (al-Ahram, June 8, 1884). As soon as the newspaper realized 
that evacuation was not really part of British plans, they shifted their stance and became 
strong supporters of Egyptian nationalism, and the banner holder of the slogan "Egypt for 
Egyptians". This was not, however, a statement of Egyptian separatism, as it still 
considered Egypt to be part of the Ottoman Empire, and the sultan to be the rightful 
ruler of Egypt with the khedive as his viceroy (al-Ahram, August 1, 1889; Zolondek, 1969: 
186). Therefore, as soon as it recognized that the British had established their permanent 
authority over Egypt, the newspaper began to openly oppose the occupation, targeting 
above all else its hold over symbolic power. In al-Ahram's discourse, the British were not 
the real authority. The sultan was. Egypt was not a colony of the British Empire, it was a 
territory of the Ottoman Empire. As the decade neared its end, al-Ahram's stance 
became more challenging, employing among its ranks journalists, most notably Mustafa 
Kamil, who would later become the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement ('Abd 
al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 59). 
In Beirut, the process was similar. Starting in the late 1870s and carrying on 
throughout the 1880s, the Beiruti press, and most notably its two major newspapers at 
the time, Lisan al-Hal and Thamarat al-Funun, kept pressuring the central government to 
give more administrative weight to the city at the expense of Damascus. This was not a 
new debate, as Hadiqat al-Akhbar had covered the issue back in the mid 1860s, arguing 
that such a move would greatly benefit the merchants in the city (Hanssen, 2005: 44). In 
1878, though, Thamarat al-Funun was not presenting a request. It was presenting an 
argument, a countering opinion and evidence that opposed the official rhetoric on the 
topic. The paper argued that since other areas in the Empire had received an 
independent administrative status, nothing prevented Beirut from gaining autonomy 
from Damascus, especially that the port city had become such an important commercial 
center (Hanssen, 2005: 45-6). In 1887, when news that the central government was 
considering the possibility to reorganize the administration of Syria, the press took up the 




When looking at the government's response to this pressure from the press, 
Hanssen (2005: 50) revealed that there was absolutely no consideration for it 
whatsoever. The concerns and calculations of 'Abdul Hamid all revolved around the 
curtailment of European influence. A strong administrator in Beirut could in fact block 
European influence inside of Syria, and that was the reason why the province of Beirut 
was created in February 1888. The press and its opinions still had no role in the realm of 
politics and policies. Still, the local newspapers upped their rhetoric, and when the first 
provincial governor was appointed, Lisan al-Hal (March 12, 1888) featured an article 
telling him what he should do when he gets to Beirut, his list of priorities. He should 
"spread justice and security among the Beirutis, improve education, facilitate trade, 
revive agriculture, and initiate public works project" in return for the support of the 
people there (as quoted by Hanssen, 2005: 52). The change in tone is quite clear. The 
shift very distinct. Newspapers had moved from uncritically reproducing official 
statements, to dictating policy programs, irrespective of the extent to which they were 
effective in achieving this. More importantly, this article featured a conditionality which 
would have been unthinkable only a few years before. The support of the people was 
presented as being conditional of the application of the policy program offered in the 
newspaper. It was a renegotiation of the social contract which governed the region, a 
rejection of the "natural" political order, and the beginning of the erosion of the symbolic 
power of the state. In many ways, this was a continuation of the spirit of the 'Urabi 
Revolution; the legitimacy and authority of the state were being put into question. 
 
II. New strategies in fields of struggle 
In order to explain behavior within fields, Bourdieu often resorts to the analogy 
with the game of chess. Each act is both part of a conscious strategy and a reaction to the 
adversary's strategy. Each move is equally a counter-move. It is from this perspective that 
we must also read the evolution of the game that pitted journalists on the one side, and 
the political authorities on the other. The 1880s witnessed the opening moves of both 
the authorities and journalists. But from 1889 onward, the game turned into full-blown 
hostilities, each side trying aggressively to assert its authority in the field dominated by 
the other. 
A. The authorities go on the offensive 
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The year 1889 marks an important turning point. In Beirut, 'Aziz pasha, the new 
provincial governor appointed Kemal bey as new mektupcu. The latter was known to be a 
harsh censor and entirely ignorant of Arabic. The age of enlightened censorship which 
qualified the period of Khalil al-Khuri's holding of the post had ended. Between 1889 and 
1908, 64 warnings and suspensions were issued in Beirut, twice as many as those given 
over a period of thirty years before that (Cioeta, 1979: 179). The choice of mektupcu in 
this case was not innocent or uncalculated. His harshness and ignorance of the language 
made his decisions both unpredictable and impossible to argue against. His decisions 
were reported to be capricious and absurd (Cioeta, 1979: 173). Journalists were at a loss 
at what and how to write. Words and expressions were understood randomly by the 
censor and it became impossible for a journalist to know beforehand what was expected 
to pass censorship and what was not. Words such as islahat, reforms, or even junun, 
madness, would be interpreted, irrespective of context, as targeting Abdul Hamid 
(Cioeta, 1979: 176-7). This practice was similarly used in Istanbul, where the use of words 
such as yildiz bocegi, firefly, would cause an article to be censored because it could be 
read as the beetle in Yildiz, an insect in the sultan's palace, which might be construed as 
alluding to Abdul Hamid himself (Boyar, 2006: 420). This reveals an important change in 
the state's strategy to counter the press. The state had previously tried to incorporate 
economic capital into the field of journalism to bolster its position within it and failed. 
Now, it was trying to deprive its opponent the capital he enjoyed. By making it more 
difficult for journalists to utilize language effectively, they were depriving them of their 
ability to appropriately display their cultural capital, the main component of their 
symbolic capital in the field of journalism. Journalists who once boasted their linguistic 
prowess on the pages of their newspapers were now lost as to what words they should 
use for their articles to even appear. 
In Cairo, realizing that none of the newspapers that supported the British rivaled 
al-Ahram in its reach and credibility in the eyes of its audience, Lord Cromer resorted to a 
different strategy. It was the establishment of a strong credible newspaper that would 
support the British presence while finding a niche in the field of journalism. The answer 
came in the form of al-Muqattam, a newspaper that later came to be known as "the 
newspaper of the occupation in Egypt" (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 13). With this choice, the 
consul-general was also moving away from the previous use of economic capital to try 
and control the field of journalism. The first indicator came in the form of his choice of 
journalists to establish this newspaper. They were Faris Nimr, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, and 
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Shahin Makarius, three journalists from the first generation who had previously 
published a very famous and successful scientific journal in Beirut, al-Muqtataf. 
The three of them had received their education in the circles of the American 
missionaries in Beirut and continued working with them until they left for Cairo in 1885. 
Nimr and Sarruf taught natural sciences at the Syrian Protestant College and then 
collaborated with Makarius, a master printer in the employ of the missionaries, to publish 
their scientific journal. Al-Muqtataf became one of the most famous periodicals of the 
time, introducing its readers to some of the most important scientific innovations, 
reaching a broad audience across the whole of the Arab world. A contemporary Egyptian 
notable mentioned that their success in Egypt was in fact due to their reputation which 
they had gained from al-Muqtataf they published in Beirut and which had gathered a 
large audience in Egypt even before its editors moved there (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 22). 
Lord Cromer was therefore relying on cultural and symbolic capital that already existed in 
the journalistic field to counter the influence of al-Ahram. Furthermore, because these 
three journalists belonged to the first generation, they had a different habitus that was 
not as politically engaged as the fourth generation. In fact, and as stated before, their 
position vis-à-vis political authority was conservative and to some extent submissive, 
rendering them easier to control by the British consul-general, and less likely to rebel and 
challenge him. 
Furthermore, he was also trying to introduce a new form of social capital into the 
field of journalism. The increased employment of Syrians in governmental positions and 
high level administration in Egypt was a process which started under Isma'il and 
intensified with the advent of the British. Because of the policy of Arabization of the 
bureaucracy in Egypt in 1870, Isma'il had to rely on the new educated class of Syrians 
who could speak both Arabic and European languages. They, in turn, were escaping a 
context of post-civil war and under-employment in Mount-Lebanon and Beirut, and 
found in Egypt a welcoming atmosphere where they could find employment adequate to 
their skills. In 1906, when Syrians constituted less than a third of a percent of the overall 
population in Egypt, they held thirty percent of top rank positions in the Egyptian 
administration, compared with the twenty-eight percent held by Egyptians (Philipp, 2009: 
65-6). With Egyptians' increasing education came an opposition to their obvious exclusion 
from the bureaucracy, one which sometimes targeted the Syrians as dukhala', or 
infiltrators. By choosing three Syrians to carry the word of the occupation, the British 
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were in fact consolidating the rift between the two communities in what is traditionally 
coined as a "divide and rule" policy (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 25). The fault line was drawn 
along communal lines. Communal identity therefore became a new social capital that 
appeared  in the field of journalism at this time. 
We can, as a result, see that after 1889, the authorities adopted a completely 
different strategy than the one they previously had used to control the field of 
journalism. They introduced new forms of struggle within the field, using forms of capital 
which were already defining it, cultural and social capitals. They were therefore using the 
internal mechanisms of the field of journalism, which the second generation had 
constructed and consolidated, to shake their dominant position within it. 
B. Journalists parry 
Journalists after 1889 also adapted their strategy to counter the challenge posed 
by the dominant political elite to their own position of dominance in their field. 
Resistance, at this point, was no longer polite, as the challenge became real. One of the 
first responses we see is the increased and eventually complete rejection of political 
authority which materialized in the form of censorship. Cioeta (1979: 178-9) examined 
the 64 warnings and suspensions issued between 1890 and 1908, comparing them to the 
33 issued prior to 1890. Prior to 1890, most of the warnings were for unintentional 
violations, while after that year, 48 out of 64 warnings were issued for purposeful evasion 
and intentional defiance of censorship. Purpose and intentionality imply a deliberate 
choice to defy the censor, with the clear knowledge of the expected results. This was, 
again, a clear rejection of the symbolic power of the state which authorities sought to 
mirror onto the field of journalism. 
The authorities' attempts to deprive them of their advantageous incorporated 
cultural capital, embodied in their skillful use of the Arabic language, also did not 
succeed. This was in part due to the malleability of the Arabic language and the vast 
lexical and grammatical choices it offers its users. Journalists exploited the idiomatic gifts 
of the language, countering with their linguistic tricks the ignorance of the mektupcu. 
They would use obscure words, change words slightly after censorship, use synonyms 
unknown to the censor, add or subtract dots on letters to change them, or substitute 
sentences after having received the approval of the censor (Cioeta, 1979: 178-9). While 
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these ploys did not always succeed, they nevertheless proved that it was impossible to 
effectively block the circulation of incorporated cultural capital in the field of journalism. 
As for the introduction of a new social capital, the network revolving around 
regionalist identity, journalists and even society generally speaking mainly disregarded it 
and it rarely came to play any significant role in the fields of journalism and politics. 
Taysir Abu 'Arja (1997: 40-42) reproduced seven different contemporary newspapers' 
opinions about al-Muqattam, out of which only one mentioned the Syrian origins of the 
owners of the newspaper as being a reason for their opposition of the Egyptian 
nationalist movement. The other two mentions to that effect were produced in the years 
1922 and 1925 (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 39, 51), during a time when the redrawing of state 
borders had become a reality and the intellectual and political debate had shifted to the 
formation of new national and state identities, a fact that Abu 'Arja does not take into 
consideration. This does not mean, however, that there were no frictions among the two 
communities, as many Egyptians during this period demanded to be included more fairly 
in state positions and there is even evidence to suggest that communal intermarriages 
were not very frequent (Philipp, 2009: 66-7). These frictions did not affect the fields of 
journalism and politics though for two main reasons. First, even though al-Muqattam was 
owned by and employed Syrians, there were also Syrians who were staunchly opposed to 
the British occupation. Two main examples are the Taqla brothers and Farah Antun 
whom I will discuss next. They were some of the most prominent anti-occupationist and 
nationalist voices until the rise of Mustafa Kamil and 'Ali Yusuf in the early 1890s. Second, 
politics was a domain that was still barred for Egyptians and Syrians alike, and therefore 
no friction between the two communities could exist there. The introduction of this new 
social capital had therefore very limited success in challenging the dominant group of 
journalists. Journalists disregarded it as being simply unimportant and being Syrian did 
not affect the anti-British position of many among them. 
The act of defending both the autonomy of the field and the dominant position 
of a particular class within it was a continuation of the process of evolving the habitus of 
the journalists. They were facing new experiences, adapting to them, and incorporating 
them into their mode of behavior and thinking. This becomes clear in some of the 
innovative positions and actions they take, always introducing new features of 
legitimization and recognition, molding the ethos within the field in a way that 
perpetuated their own position of dominance. In this case, the biggest example is their 
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enactment of resistance not only as an actual choice of action, but also as a projected 
image, an illusion of sorts. Cioeta (1979: 176-7) reported that journalists at this point 
were inventing lists of supposedly banned words they were forbidden to use in their 
articles lest they be censored. They sometimes bordered the ridiculous, like when Jurji 
Zaydan claimed that words like al-baqiyya ta'ti, "to be continued" at the end of an article, 
was not permitted. Khalil Sarkis boasted that he had completely fabricated a story that 
passed censorship (Cioeta, 1979: 177). It was therefore important for them to present 
and maintain a well-defined image of their position of opposition to the authorities, an 
image of resistance that was not purely symbolic, but palpable and observable. This can 
only be explained by their need for their resistance to be publically recognized. It was 
probably a message to both readers and journalists alike who needed to understand that 
resistance was possible and under way. 
This projected image of resisting authority became such a major component of 
journalism at that point in time that boasting about it gained the journalist more public 
recognition. Farah Antun, a Syrian intellectual, novelist, playwright, and journalist who 
edited many of Cairo's major newspapers, including al-Balagh al-Misri, al-Liwa', Misr al-
Fatat, Misr, al-Watan, al-Ahali, and al-Mahrusa, became famous for being the reason 
why several of them closed their doors due to suspensions. In one case, his articles led to 
the closure of al-Ahali. He directly changed its name to al-Mahrusa and it was suspended 
a month after. When the suspension period of six months ended, al-Ahali reappeared 
and Antun wrote its editorials again; the government closed it down two days later (Rif'at 
as-Sa'id, 1973: 88-9). This is not to say that his point was to close the newspaper, but he 
clearly understood this process as a strategy, literally comparing it to military 
maneuvering. This strategy, however, served a purpose. When he was approached by an 
official with a warning, he replied: "I am sorry to tell you that I do not see my profession 
of writer as simply one of subsistence, but I chose this career to write exactly what you 
are reading. If I shall as a result be banned from writing what my conscience dictates, 
then I pray to find my livelihood in a profession other than writing", which the official 
advised him to start looking for (Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 86). He was immediately 
responsible for closing down three papers in quick succession.  
 Resistance to the attempts of changing the rules of the game inside the field of 
journalism was therefore both an action and an act. The image of resistance was as 
important as resistance itself. But unlike the action of resistance which was a riposte 
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against the actions of the authorities, resistance as a performance act was directed 
toward a different actor, the audience. The previous examples show two separate 
attitudes toward the audience. The first, represented by Jurji Zaydan and Khalil Sarkis, 
focused on the journalists themselves as the center of resistance. The act of 
simultaneous boasting and self-victimizing placed emphasis on the person of the 
journalist. It was Zaydan who could not use the words he wanted and was therefore a 
victim; it was Sarkis who was brave enough to defy the censor and ridicule him. 
The second attitude was that of Antun who placed the emphasis on his audience. 
In his strategy of maneuvering, he told fellow intellectual Nqula al-Haddad that, even if 
the authorities closed down his newspaper, he could always "write books, pamphlets, 
novels, and plays about the inhabitants of the island of Waq Waq, and the people are 
smart enough to understand" (as quoted by Rif'at as-Sa'id, 1973: 88). This emphasis on 
the common man was based in his strong belief in socialism, and Farah Antun is 
reputedly considered the first modern Arab socialist. His whole mission from going into 
journalism was to influence and benefit the "silent, ignorant, and oppressed people [that 
lives] at the bottom of the social ladder and does not recognize whether it really exists or 
not, with misery, suffering, and all the vices known to mankind surrounding it" (Makki 
Habib al-Mu'min and 'Ali Hujayl Munhil, 1981: 83). This distinction between the two 
attitudes, as will be demonstrated next, was probably the result of the generational 
difference between Sarkis and Zaydan, on the one hand, and Antun on the other. They 
were second-generation journalists, while Antun was part of the fourth generation, a 
point that will be discussed next; he was situated in a completely different social position. 
 
II. A new journalist for a new audience 
The different strategies reveal that the field of journalism during the 1880s was 
transforming into a field of struggles after it had been a field under construction in the 
previous decade. These struggles were the result of the attempt to dominate the field by 
a class that dominated the field of politics, and the challenge therefore came from 
outside the field of journalism. Having said that, the 1890s produced a different type of 
struggle, an internal one, which emerged from the adoption of a different strategy by the 
authorities, that of using capitals from within the field of journalism itself. The response 
came in the form of distinct position-taking on the part of some journalists. This can be 
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traced to both the evolving habitus, as well as the shift in the social position these 
journalists start from. Indeed, while the second generation still dominated journalism in 
both Beirut and Cairo, and the third generation having been physically removed from the 
field because of the failure of the political project they adhered to, a fourth generation 
emerged in the closing years of the 1880s to bring major changes to the field, most 
notably the first enduring challenge to the dominant political class. 
A. A field of position-taking rather than social position 
It began with the only largely successful measure taken by the British authorities 
to curb the influence of the press, the establishment of al-Muqattam, named after a 
mountain on the outskirts of Cairo; it was also the most important challenge established 
political journalists faced. The three founders of al-Muqattam possessed and used all the 
forms of capital already present in the field of journalism, placing them, in terms of social 
positioning, close to the political journalists of the time. As previously mentioned, they 
had received modern education at the hands of the Protestant missionaries in Beirut and 
worked in their education institutions for a time, before publishing al-Muqtataf, the most 
successful Arabic scientific journal of the time. The three men's unwavering support of 
liberalism as an ideology, political program, and intellectual framework, made them the 
best candidates to carry the banner of British rule, especially under the frame of the 
liberal image the British were trying to construct in Egypt. In fact, it was their 
wholehearted belief in liberalism which got them to Egypt in the first place. Having fully 
absorbed the modernist liberal ideology that came along with the Protestant 
missionaries' education in Beirut, they had to face the bitter fact that the missionaries 
themselves did not really believe in it. They worked for the better part of their lives to 
disseminate the liberal values of Western education, but eventually came face to face 
with the utter unwillingness of the missionaries to accept scientific notions that 
contradicted their faith, most notably Darwinism (Hanssen, 2005: 167). After the 
infamous debacle of 1882 at the Syrian Protestant College, when many students and 
teachers were expelled and fired over their support of Darwinism and its proponents, 
Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius, felt that they had to leave, justifying their move in al-
Muqtataf: "All our high schools in Egypt and Syria boast of such religious freedom except 
the school which was foremost among them, for it has abandoned this policy... turned 
away from its original purpose of spreading learning and sought to impose a particular 
creed on its pupils" (as quoted by Tibawi, 1967: 210). It is ironic that the one major case 
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of censorship driving journalists from Syria to Egypt during this period in time was the 
censorship imposed by the same group that ushered the era of the "free" private press in 
Beirut, and not the Ottoman authorities as many accounts would like us to believe. The 
result was that Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius found their holy grail in the liberal rhetoric of 
the British colonial government of Egypt and were unconditionally supportive of it 
(Tibawi, 1967: 210; Cioeta, 1979: 179; Hannsen, 2005: 171). 
Al-Muqattam proved to be a mighty challenge to its competitors. Even al-Ahram 
was not able to contend with it and its growing influence (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1945: 152). 
This was partly due to the relative moderation of al-Ahram, the incompetence of other 
nationalist newspapers like al-Watan, and the practices of al-Muqattam and the support 
it obtained from the authorities. For example, it became public knowledge that al-
Muqattam received much of its income from subscriptions by state officials who were 
forced to accept the paper because the fees were automatically deducted from their 
salaries (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 40). Ibrahim 'Abduh (1945: 152) rightly argued that 
Cromer's policy of "fighting journalism with journalism" was succeeding. 
On December 1, 1889, however, a young man named 'Ali Yusuf received the 
financial and political backing of some nationalist figures and published al-Mu'ayyad (the 
supported one), the newspaper which will become the banner holder of the nationalist 
movement in Egypt for more than a decade and the most successful newspaper in Cairo 
before World War I. When al-Muqattam appeared on February 14, 1889, its mission 
statement read: 
It is our belief that the most esteemed function the press ought to 
achieve is to bring together both the rulers and the ruled, so that both 
could walk the simplest and shortest path. [...] The ruler of these lands, 
his highness the great Khedive, his most important vizier, the rest of the 
stately ministers, and other state officials have these lands' best interest 
at heart and seek its wellbeing. [...] It is therefore the object of this paper 
to convey the intentions of the rulers to the ruled, portraying their 
goodwill, as well as relaying the hopes and wishes of the ruled. [...] The 
paper will follow a creed of moderation and respect of laws and 
manners. 
Their call of submission to authority was answered in a much simpler manner by al-
Mu'ayyad (December 1, 1889), which claimed that its goal was to "fight the occupation 
and al-Muqattam". The newspaper's priorities were clear, its language held very little 
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ambiguity, its message resonated greatly. By 1897, it had become Egypt's most sold 
newspaper according to the confession of an editor from al-Ahram (Ryad, 2009: 38). 
'Ali Yusuf (1863-1913), the founder of al-Mu'ayyad, came from a very peculiar 
background. He was born into a rural peasant family and was orphaned at an early age. It 
is unclear under these circumstances how he managed to receive even a basic religious 
education, yet he even advanced to join the ranks of al-Azhar. Unsurprisingly, he was 
bored with religious education and decided to shift his attention to literature and history. 
It was probably around that time that he came under the influence of the teachings of al-
Afghani (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1945: 152; Kelidar, 1981: 14). He worked for a bit as a 
journalist, editing a literary magazine, al-Adab (humanities) for a few years before he was 
chosen by a group of nationalists to head the newspaper that was to oppose al-
Muqattam (Goldsmith, 2000: 230-1; Kelidar, 1981: 11). His low reputation and lack of 
political experience led many to believe that he was only a front for the nationalists who 
truly controlled the  newspaper; the fact that their articles filled its pages reinforced this 
belief (Kelidar, 1981: 11).  'Ali Yusuf's distinctive style was, however, the eventual reason 
why the paper succeeded. 'Abbas Hilmi II (r.1892-1914) attributed this success to his 
humble origins which allowed him to better understand the common Egyptian man and 
to be able to better communicate with him ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993: 112). Indeed, his 
complete lack of knowledge of European languages made him quite an exception to the 
general notion of the journalist of that age (Sulayman Salih, 1990: 19). His career still 
shone as he climbed the social ladder, becoming a close associate and friend of khedive 
'Abbas Hilmi II whose interests he represented in his paper from the moment the young 
man acceded to Egypt's nominal throne in 1892 till the moment Yusuf retired from public 
life in 1912. 
This background, however, was not characteristic of a class which followed 
similar political choices or career interests. An-Nil appeared on December 17, 1891, and 
was published by Hasan Husni at-Tuwayrani, a journalist who had previously edited al-
Insan, an Arabic newspaper in Istanbul. His new endeavor quickly failed for two reasons. 
First, as Filib di Tarrazi (1913, vol.3: 44) claimed, Tuwayrani chose to adopt a position 
similar to al-Muqattam, which proved to be disappointing for the public who shied away 
from the paper. He also quoted a contemporary commentator who had a very interesting 
remark that emphasizes one of the key arguments of this chapter: 
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the failure of the paper was because it did not fulfill its role like al-
Muqattam, for even if they had the same position, one failed and the 
other succeeded. [...] The owners of al-Muqattam were raised in the 
most prominent Western school in the East, the Syrian Protestant 
College, learned at the hands of the most brilliant Western scholars, and 
were therefore  trained in modern civility, sciences, liberty, all of which 
were fundamental to them. The owner of an-Nil was, on the other hand, 
a product of a system of emulation and memorization, an old system 
which produced great writers, but fanatics all the same (as quoted by 
Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 45). 
Traditional Islamic education might partially account for why the style of Tuwayrani did 
not encourage readers to pick up his newspaper. We must remember, however, that 
Yusuf received similar education, and it was exactly his style that earned him his fame as 
a journalist. This difference might be explained by the position-taking of Yusuf which 
resonated with his public who are readers and consumers of news in the field of 
journalism, but also have their views and opinions in the field of politics, no matter how 
marginal they are. This, as a result, explains how a traditional style would greatly 
resonate among an audience that shared a similar position from British occupation. 
This was equally the case with Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and his newspaper, al-
Manar. Rida received his education in a kuttab school in Tripoli and, fascinated by copies 
of al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's newspaper published in Paris and young 
Rida found among his father's papers, he left Syria for Cairo to pursue a career as 
journalist (Ryad, 2009: 33). He continued his education in al-Azhar, becoming 
Muhammad 'Abduh's chief disciple (Goldsmith, 2000: 166). In 1898, he established al-
Manar with the support of his master who bolstered the reputation and circulation of the 
newspaper by featuring in it his explanations of the Quran. 'Abduh by then had become a 
major figure and authority as an Islamic scholar. Al-Manar became known as a major 
flagship of Islamic journalism, featuring subjects such as mystical reflections, explanation 
of doctrine, a famous commentary  on the Quran, fatwas, and Rida's views on political 
developments (Ryad, 2009: 28). The success of the newspaper was achieved despite the 
old traditional writing style that characterized it. Even a quarter of a century after it was 
founded, al-Manar's style had not evolved to become more easily readable. For example, 
in one of the newspaper's most famous articles, the reader has to wait till the fourth 
page to encounter the first full stop (al-Manar, 1924: 310-314). This is not surprising, 
considering that traditional Arabic does not use punctuation, but this practice had been 
dropped during the early days of Arabic printing in the nineteenth century. As a result, 
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even though Rida tried to find a broad audience among notables and government 
officials, his only success remained within the class of jurists (Ryad, 2009: 44). The success 
of such an endeavor can therefore be only attributed to the particular audience it 
targeted, its niche in the field, and therefore the homology between Rida as a producer 
of information and news, and his audience as its consumers. 
The importance of position-taking at this point is further highlighted by the 
experience of Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908). The son of an army officer of the new military 
order, he was educated at government schools and the French Law School in Cairo. He 
then went to Toulouse to obtain a law degree and then returned to Cairo to become one 
of the most recognized, respected, and successful voices of the nationalist movement 
there (Goldsmith, 2000: 101-2). Kamil mixed a career of journalist, public orator, and 
street agitator. He personally headed a mob that assaulted the offices of al-Muqattam in 
January 1893, right around the time he began writing for al-Ahram (Ayalon, 1995: 55, 57). 
Having gained notice with the khedive, he entered his close circles and also began writing 
for al-Mu'ayyad. In 1900, he chose to establish his own newspaper, al-Liwa' (the 
standard). This is generally attributed to the competition between Kamil and 'Ali Yusuf 
over the graces of and influence over the khedive (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 59). Four years 
later, when the French and the British agreed on their spheres of influence in the colonial 
world with their "entente cordiale", the khedive, and consequently Yusuf, decided to 
tune down their rhetoric since there was no longer any possible assistance Egypt could 
expect from any European power to counter Britain's dominance and thus conceded to 
the reality of their powerlessness. Mustafa Kamil was therefore left alone as the main 
nationalist journalist in Egypt, his rhetoric inflaming the readers. He was known to be the 
first secular Muslim reformer to use the term "ash-sha'b", "the people" in the modern 
political sense of the word to refer to the common Egyptians who refused to be ruled by 
the British (Zolondek, 1965: 1). 
Mustafa Kamil's social background therefore differed from 'Ali Yusuf, even 
though they shared a relatively similar outlook on the political field. It equally differed 
from that of the second generation journalists, in that they received their European 
education from missionary schools and the educational system they had established, 
while Kamil received his education from the new government schools established around 
the European model, but which remained largely secular. It was during this period that 
we see a rise in the number of people who received their education at secular 
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government schools and who chose to pursue a career in journalism, which had never 
been the case before, since government schools usually graduated individuals who found 
waiting employment in the state bureaucracy, as indicated at the beginning of this 
chapter. One explanation for this change in the choice of a prospective career might have 
to do with the fact that government schools in 1900s Egypt, and particularly Law School, 
had begun to overproduce graduates who were no longer able to find employment (Reid, 
1977: 367). It was equally during this same period that lawyers began to increasingly be 
involved in politics. Reid (1977: 362) counted four lawyers in the six-man 1908 cabinet in 
Egypt; the first lawyer to become a minister two years before was Sa'd Zaghlul. This 
indicates that other professionals were equally trying to integrate the field of politics and 
that journalists were not a unique group who saw the period as one of opportunity. 
Kamil thus shared a similar background with Farah Antun and Dawud Barakat 
(1870-1933). Barakat received his education at a very famous government school in 
Beirut (Rizk, 2003). He then moved to Egypt where he worked as a teacher for four years, 
until he made a career change and began writing for al-Mahrusa. He then helped Yusuf 
al-Khazin to establish al-Akhbar, before becoming an editor in al-Ahram in 1899. He took 
over the position of editor-in-chief of the paper when its founder Bishara Taqla died 
suddenly in 1901. Barakat, unlike his other two contemporaries, chose not to conflate 
politics and political journalism, which might have been the reason why al-Ahram was 
seen to be not radical enough during this period, even though it still espoused a 
nationalist line in its editorials. He was the one journalist who sought to make of 
journalism a "professional" vocation, trying to convene journalists on many occasions to 
try and define what a "journalist" was, and even tried to establish a syndicate before 
World War I (Rizk, 2003). These attempts largely failed because no one at this point was 
interested in the "professionalization" of journalism. It was such a failure that there does 
not seem to be any evidence of it, not even in al-Ahram itself. I could not find a mention 
of a journalists syndicate prior to World War I, nor is it mentioned in the very lengthy and 
detailed content analysis of the newspaper presented by Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951). 
Barakat's views on how journalism ought to be had, however, an entirely 
different result which still lives on even today. While he did not manage to 
professionalize journalism as a practice, he did succeed in promoting a spirit of 
professionalism and institutionalization into the newspaper he managed. He is one of the 
main people who are credited with promoting practices that made al-Ahram transcend 
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its contemporary competitors and become an institutional endeavor rather than the 
materialization of the efforts of a single individual, as almost all other newspapers were. 
Some argued that it was because of the style adopted by the newspaper, that of 
investigative journalism and news reporting, which professionalized the journalists and 
reporters working for the newspaper, while creating a pool of dedicated readers who 
gathered around it (Mahmud Adham, 1985: 14-16). 
If we examine the pages of al-Ahram, though, we can easily notice that the 
professionalization of the position of journalist and reporter who worked for it had begun 
prior to Barakat's appointment as editor-in-chief. When it turned from a weekly to a 
daily, al-Ahram declared on its first page that some improvements to the paper were 
needed, and that it will start following the journalistic methods used in the West to do so 
(al-Ahram, January 3, 1881). The first step, according to the editor, was to drop the use of 
the long lists of titles newspapers usually used to refer to different officials, to be 
replaced by the short official title that such people held. Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951: 58-9) 
noticed that there was also a shift in the writing style of the newspaper at the same time. 
When it was a weekly paper, al-Ahram could afford the time to care for an eloquent form 
of writing known as saj'. But when it became a daily, this style had to be dropped for the 
more direct, simple, and quick style known as mursal, the style which came to define 
journalism later on. To showcase his point, he compared the two styles. In the first, the 
journal was reporting on the weather: "the face of our skies has cleared and there 
appeared the light in its glory after the clouds had blocked it from us for a few days"; in 
mursal, a reporter wrote about the first usage of a telephone in the city: "at nine in the 
morning, the telephone was tested in our city. The event was witnessed by the governor, 
the police chief, and other notables. Tomorrow's issue will cover more details of the 
event". From August to October 1881, Bishara Taqla also introduced the Arabic 
newspapers to the art of interviewing, as he published a series of interviews he had with 
European politicians during his European tour. When the Dinshawi incident took place, 
al-Ahram was the only newspaper to actually send a team to investigate and report on 
the events on the spot (al-Ahram, July 13, 1906; July 16, 1906). I could not find any 
explanation on the pages of the newspaper as to why its editors decided to pursue this 
particular style of journalism, except that they often claimed that they sought the "truth" 
or that this was how Western newspapers operated. 
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The result, however, was this process of professionalization which Dawud 
Barakat pushed forward. What made him such a key figure was that he acted as a 
caretaker for the newspaper until Taqla's only remaining descendant, his son Gabriel, 
came of age and acquired his education so that he could manage the business of running 
the newspaper. By carrying on the style of journalism that the Taqla brothers decided to 
adopt, and then passing on the paper to Gabriel, Barakat must have created a sense of 
continuation for both the paper and its readers. At the same time, operating and writing 
in the paper became dominated by a detached style which permitted its 
professionalization. It was the first newspaper which was not driven by the fire of a 
political project or a zealous mission. Journalism for al-Ahram, its writers, editors, and 
owners, was a job and a profession. Many saw this as the height of the representation of 
Arabic objective journalism and reporting (Ibrahim 'Abduh, 1951; Mahmud Adham, 1985; 
Kitchen, 1950). Taha Hussein would later describe al-Ahram: "it is the record of our 
modern existence, a keeper of the minutes of Egyptian life" (Taha Husayn, 1951: 1-4). Al-
Ahram was the closest journal to advance the notion of journalistic neutrality in its news 
reporting. It clearly differentiated between that and polemic editorials which were an 
entirely different matter. 
Examining these different individuals, their social backgrounds, and their 
different choices in the field of journalism, clearly indicates that the field was radically 
changing during the 1890s. It opened up to actors who came from different social 
backgrounds, breaking the second generation's hegemony over the field of journalism. 
The new actors came mainly from the new government educational system, a more or 
less secular system which was a hybrid between indigenous and European. While it 
advanced the use of European sciences and techniques, the cultural normative values it 
promoted were still to some extent native. This is what Sharabi (1970: 87) labeled the 
"intellectual polarity" of the Muslim seculars for whom secularism never reached the 
point of becoming dogma and were therefore stranded between an acceptance and a 
rejection of modernity, or at least different facets of it. What Sharabi conveniently 
dismisses, however, is the fact that this class was comprised of both Muslims and 
Christians, as shown above. This clearly indicates that position-taking had come to take 
priority over homology in the field, especially due to the newfound diversity in the 
producers, consumers, and challengers inside the field. 
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We see that during this period, social position started becoming less important 
than position-taking in determining the success of a newspaper, whether financially or in 
terms of audience. With the second generation, acquiring an audience was partly a 
product of the homology between the producer and the consumer of news. They were 
both part of the same class, shared similar positions, and had similar interests. With the 
fourth generation of journalists, emphasis was placed on position-taking in the field of 
politics, which producers and their respective consumers shared, even if we could still 
see homology playing a smaller role, as journalists still attracted segments of their own 
class to their newspaper. Claiming that position-taking became more important simply 
comes from the comparison of 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil who came from two very 
different backgrounds but ended up sharing the same views on politics and the same 
audience for their publications. 
B. Social capital as the new dominant capital 
One thing that further brought them together, though, was the social capital they 
shared from belonging to the close circle of the khedive. Social capital during this time 
became much more pronounced as an operating capital in the field of journalism. Being 
close to the khedive meant more prestige and exposure for both Yusuf and Kamil. Yusuf 
invested this capital  both in the field of journalism, as well as to try and improve his 
position in the social order. All sources agree that his humble social background haunted 
him for the rest of his life, and being so close to the most prestigious position in Egypt, 
that of the khedive, was one means for him to try and turn the page on this past (Kelidar, 
1981: 12-3). He also tried to further his ambitions by marrying up into an aristocratic 
family, but the father of the bride took him to court and had the marriage annulled on 
the basis that someone from the 'awam, the common folk, could not marry into the 
ashraf, the nobles, and, furthermore, he accused Yusuf of being a journalist as a further 
proof of his lowly status (Kelidar, 1981: 18; Ayalon, 1992: 266). The intervention of the 
khedive eventually led the father of the bride to accept Yusuf who even ended up 
succeeding him as the head of the Sufi order his father-in-law once lead. 
In the field of journalism, his social capital translated into access to information. 
One of the first ways in which Lord Cromer tried to curb the growing influence of al-
Mu'ayyad was to bar its access to officials and news, issuing a decree that forbade 
officials and government bureaus from giving the newspaper any information or news 
(Sulayman Salih, 1990: 75). The palace, however, was a constant source of such 
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information, especially at the time when it was at the center of the nationalist 
movement, that is between 1892 and 1904 (Kelidar, 1981: 12). Yusuf also used his 
contacts to receive information in more original and unconventional ways. In 1896, when 
the British sent their expedition to the Sudan, access to information was restricted to al-
Muqattam which would only feature the official version of events.  In July of that year, al-
Mu'ayyad began publishing the complete telegraphs sent from the army in Sudan, which 
told that they were suffering from an outbreak in cholera, a fact which the British 
administration was trying hard to cover. 'Ali Yusuf had apparently convinced a telegraph 
employee to supply him with copies of the telegraphs. Both Yusuf and the employee 
were dragged to court where Yusuf, in a very interesting twist, refused to admit that it 
was the employee who supplied him with information, claiming that it would contradict 
usul al-mihna, the "ethics of the profession" (Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 
79). He was acquitted to public acclaim for his victory over the British administration. This 
is very interesting because, at that time, there was nothing even resembling a 
professional ethic for journalists, a point which a couple of contemporary journalists 
actually lamented over (Ayalon, 1992: 262, 267-8). He would never refer to such ethics 
again, nor would any other journalist during this period, which leads me to believe that it 
was only a practice and a notion used in Europe he had heard of and used to circumvent 
the British accusations without it meaning anything for him nor anyone else at that time.9 
As for the social capital and its use in the field of journalism, we can see that it 
applied not only to the case of 'Ali Yusuf, but to others as well. It was mentioned on many 
occasions here that its closeness to the British administration gave al-Muqattam steady 
and sometimes privileged access to official information and also generated economic 
capital, as discussed before. From this perspective, it was a different social capital than 
the one the British intended to incorporate into the field of journalism, as the social 
capital which came to influence the field was the division of recognized networks which 
were to a large extent institutionalized - the colonial administration on the one hand, and 
the palace and the nationalists on the other. These two networks, while seemingly simple 
political groups, operated in different fields differently, but often in as struggling factions 
within each field, whether the political field, the field of the state (champ étatique), the 
                                                          
9 Ibrahim 'Abduh (1951: 344) mentioned that al-Ahram used the same reason to refuse identifying 
one of its own writers whom Sa'd Zaghlul had accused of slander. 'Abduh, however, does not give 
a date for when this happened, nor does he quote or cite the source of his information, even 
though he is very thorough in the rest of his book. Also, I could not find any evidence on the pages 
of al-Ahram to corroborate this story, which makes me doubt its authenticity. 
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economic field, etc. In the field of journalism, they served each class within them 
differently. For the journalists, the networks were primarily a source of information, but 
also of a certain legitimacy, as was the case of Yusuf 'Ali for example. 
But others, like the British administration and the khedive, were equally investing 
this social capital in the field of journalism, influencing the position-taking of its actors, 
even if not always successfully. A most striking example is given in khedive 'Abbas Hilmi 
II's autobiography. Discussing Mustafa Kamil, he claimed that the young journalist "said 
things in my name I could not say myself" ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993: 117). There is no 
evidence, however, that there was any kind of active cooperation in terms of rhetoric 
between the khedive and Mustafa Kamil, and the khedive's statement might have been 
more a matter of posterior reflection on what was most probably a matter of 
convergence of opinions rather than anything else. Again, we see the issue of position-
taking coming to the front, for it tells us more about the investment of social capital in 
the field of journalism on the part of different political actors. And in the same way as 'Ali 
Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil could through their rhetoric identify with the interests of the 
khedive and the nationalist forces, Nimr, Sarruf, and Makarius identified with the British 
administration and thus promoted its interests within the field (Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 
37). 
Social capital thus became the dominant form of capital in the field of journalism 
at this point, and the networks to which the journalists belonged came to qualify much of 
their work as journalists. These networks were the starting point for these journalists. 'Ali 
Yusuf, Mustafa Kamil, Faris Nirm, Ya'qub as-Sarruf, and Shahin Makarius, all had their 
preferences, positions, and the will to go into political journalism to begin with, but they 
also wanted or received the backing of either the palace or the British administration. 
This backing materialized in the form of public exposure, legitimacy by association, and in 
more concrete ways, such as financial benefits and access to information. Sometimes, 
some of these elements were combined. For example, sources tell us that many people 
were forced to receive al-Muqattam simply because its subscription fees were 
automatically deducted from their salaries. They do not tell us, however, how many 
people chose to read the paper knowing that it was the most reliable publication of 
official information. With the change in the form of the dominant capital, however, the 
shape of the field also changed, especially that, in this case, the source of the new 
dominant capital came from outside the field. It was not generated by the journalists 
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themselves, but by the social groups who were trying to dislodge these journalists from 
their dominant position in the field. It was the start of a process which will completely 
change the relationship between the fields of journalism and politics. 
 
III. From political journalist to journalist politician 
The previous section revealed that as soon as journalists tried to escape their 
social seclusion in which they existed in prior to the early 1880s, the field of journalism 
became a field of struggle, not only among journalists themselves, but between 
journalists and the dominant political class. The struggle took place mainly within the 
field of journalism where the dominant position of the journalists of the second 
generation was being challenged. The reaction of the journalists, however, initiated a 
different process through which the symbolic power of the authorities was being 
challenged. With the introduction of a new form of social capital into the field of 
journalism, these two opposing tendencies began to diverge into a single form of 
struggle. The literature traditionally understands this struggle as one between authority 
and opposition, and most historical accounts of the press in Beirut and Cairo during the 
closing years before World War I argue that it was playing a role of increasing resistance 
to authorities (Ayalon, 1995: 60; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 97; Tauber, 
1990; Tauber, 2006). These accounts, however, disregard the presence of newspapers 
that strongly supported authorities, like al-Muqattam and al-Watan, as well as a few 
newspapers which stayed out of the political debate like al-Ahram, al-Manar, and al-
Fallah. The Arabic press was far from being homogeneous. This is the starting point from 
which we can conceive these camps acting as forces of status-quo and forces of change 
within the field of journalism and in an inverted role in the field of politics.  
The final major transformation to the field of journalism before World War I once 
again came from changes within the field of politics. Two events shook the fields of 
politics in Beirut and Cairo. They occurred almost simultaneously and had similar effects 
in both cities. The first was the resignation of Lord Cromer in 1907 from his position as 
consul-general after the Dinshaway incident. The summary execution of four innocent 
Egyptian peasants accused of killing a British soldier galvanized Egyptian nationalists and 
ended the political career of Lord Cromer who was succeeded by Eldon Gorst. In the spirit 
of the liberal mission of the British occupation, he began promoting self-government and 
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a reconciliation with the khedive (Daly, 1998: 243).The second event was the Young Turk 
revolution which deposed Abdul Hamid II and reinstated the Ottoman constitution and 
parliament in 1908. Both these events opened up to some extent the political field in a 
similar way as the events of 1879 did. From the perspective of their evolving habitus, and 
having experienced such changes in the past with the 'Urabi Revolution, journalists 
recognized the opportunity and jumped at the occasion. 
A. New politics for a new journalism 
The very instant the political field supposedly opened up, journalists introduced a 
new vehicle through which they and their newspapers could enter the political arena: 
political parties. By 1907, 'Ali Yusuf had founded Hizb al-Islah (reform party) with al-
Mu'ayyad as its mouthpiece. Mustafa Kamil founded al-Hizb al-Watani (the national 
party) represented by al-Liwa' . Al-Muqattam became the organ of al-Hizb al-Watani al-
Hurr (the free national party). Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid founded Hizb al-Umma (the party of 
the nation) and the newspaper al-Jarida (the newspaper) simultaneously (Ayalon, 1995: 
60; Taysir Abu 'Arja, 1997: 71; 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza, [1958-1961]: 84). In Beirut, the 
process was somehow similar, except that the vehicle of political integration was 
different. Politics there turned into a competition between the notables of the 
nineteenth century and the zu'ama', the old traditional feudal leadership. Parties and 
political associations revolved around these individuals, and the press attached itself to 
them, some journalists becoming part of their political movements and even ran with 
them in the elections (Hanssen, 2005: 72-6). This was a phenomenon worth noting, 
according to 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad Hamza ([1958-1961]: 84), since it shows that politics 
was born out of the press, a comment I will return to later.  
Journalists took their newfound role very seriously. It was the culmination of 
decades during which they danced around the field of politics without being able to 
become actors within it, except for that brief moment during the 'Urabi revolution. At the 
same time, it became a trend that if anyone had anything to say in the realm of politics, 
they would simply create a newspaper and say it. During those years, Ayalon (1995: 60) 
claims that 250 newspapers were founded in Cairo alone, most of them with names such 
as al-Jihad ("Holy War"), al-Hurriyya (liberty), al-Nahda (renaissance), al-Istiqlal 
(independence), al-Indhar (the warning), and al-Ahrar (the liberals). To these we can add 
many Beiruti newspapers which also bore similar names, such as al-Haqiqa (truth), al-
Islah (reformation), and Lisan al-'Arab (the voice of the Arabs). They truly believed they 
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were free and that the dawn of liberty had come, for both those who consistently 
supported the government as well as those who opposed it. 
The newspapers' discourse changed accordingly, as journalists unleashed what 
can only be described as pent-up frustration that had been building up for a while, and 
with the new transformations to the political field, they could now say whatever they 
wanted. This was reflected by a score of publications which were nothing more than 
handwritten student newsletters, showing that their aim had little to do with circulation 
and more with political expression (Ayalon, 1995: 63). Ayalon further stressed that such a 
fast rate of growth in the number of publications after 1908 could hardly be supported by 
the still relatively low numbers of possible readers, many of whom were already used to 
reading the more established newspapers, further showing that the act of producing a 
political discourse was more important for some than its circulation. The more radical 
rhetoric of some of the new periodicals, however, earned them an audience in the fast 
changing political landscape, and newspapers quickly became a "vehicle to spread 
national ideas" (Tauber, 1990). 
Doing otherwise proved to be fatal to some newspapers. When the constitution 
was reinstated, Thamarat al-Funun praised the new age, describing it as a test according 
to which the people's maturity and worth is judged (Thamarat al-Funun, August 3, 1908). 
In the same issue, Rafiq al-'Azm, a respected shaykh, wrote that the new age was all 
about forgetting the past and working toward reforms undertaken by the most qualified, 
a moderate and reasonable call. It was not, however, a time for moderation. Only three 
months later, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani wrote the editorial of the last issue of the 
newspaper, claiming that no one was reading it, even after thirty-four years of being the 
most prominent Muslim newspaper in Beirut, and that since there were now others like 
it, his newspaper became less useful than it was before (Thamarat al-Funun, November 
2, 1908). Another example of this can be found in al-Haqiqa, founded by Ahmad 'Abbas 
al-Azhari and with Hasan an-Natur as editor-in-chief. In its opening article, it accused 
previous Ottoman administrators and officials of being criminals, promising them 
retribution now that the constitution had been promulgated again. Such accusations 
were now permitted because "the sword of injustice was now sick and the jail door 
opened" (al-Haqiqa, February 6, 1909). These attacks soon subsided for a more moderate 
and conciliatory position from the government often calling for a less radical approach to 
reforms; that was until 1913 when the Young Turks began their policy of Turkification of 
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the Arab provinces. Still, moderation once again proved a bad choice for someone trying 
to gather an audience or spread his message. Al-Haqiqa gained such little attention that 
when its founder died, a lengthy obituary in the Islamic al-Manar (1926: 386) never 
mentioned his periodical once. 
Other more radical publications like al-Mufid gained wide readership extremely 
fast. Founded by 1909, it became one of Beirut's most read newspapers before the war. 
'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, the newspaper's co-editor and its most famous polemicist, had 
become one of the most followed advocate of Arab nationalism (Khalidi, 1981: 43). 
Throughout 35 issues Khalidi (1981: 47) chose to study, nationalist themes with titles 
such as "the Arab youth and his general duty", "nationality and language", "how to 
reinforce the Arab nationality", and "how the Arabs can rise", made up 25 of their 
editorials. 'Uraysi was even more vehemently anti-European. In Egypt, the political 
debate heated up even more than before. Taysir Abu 'Arja (1997: 80) quotes a "dialogue" 
between al-Muqattam and al-Liwa', in which the first says: "the only ones opposing the 
extension of the Canal's concessions are al-Liwa' and its people, but al-Liwa' and its 
followers are worthless", to which al-Liwa' answers: "a mercenary has no dignity; let al-
Muqattam shut up". 
Political opinions had become the backbone of political journalism in Beirut and 
Cairo, and the more radical these opinions were, the more successful the journal was. 
This was not just for opposition newspapers. Al-Muqattam during this period was still 
growing strong, as its wrath became more focused with the establishment of political 
parties in Egypt and the adoption of clear opinions in the Beirut press. In an article about 
the political parties in Egypt written by an unnamed "major intellectual and famous 
imam", opposition parties were berated and ridiculed. They were accused of fostering 
discord, promoting the self-interests of their leaders, and not caring about the national 
interest of Egypt (al-Muqattam, January 30, 1908). In 1911, they attacked the Ottomanist 
newspaper at-Tanin for being clueless about Syrian patriotism, as the Damascene paper 
had accused the local press of promoting Arab nationalism which, for an Ottoman 
subject, amounted to treason. Al-Muqattam defended the Syrian press, making different 
and sometimes contradictory claims. At one point this press was innocent of such 
accusations, at others it admitted that Arab nationalism was a claim of the press in Syria, 
but that this did not constitute treason, and finally that this press was right in calling for a 
break from the backward Ottoman authorities (al-Muqattam, April 28, 1911; April 29, 
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1911; May 6, 1911; 26 May 1911; July 1, 1911). At a time of political turmoil, consistency 
seemed to matter very little for newspapers, correctness even less. 
Another example of such behavior can be found in al-watan, one of the most 
nationalist papers in Cairo before it was sold to Jundi Ibrahim in 1900. Ibrahim sought to 
become the most prominent Coptic figure in Egypt, and adopted a strategy of scorning 
and vilifying other Coptic leaders to do so. Under his supervision, al-Watan became a 
staunch opponent to the nationalist movement, claiming that Egypt deserved neither 
constitution nor independence, and resorting to slander and personal attacks to promote 
its owner's position within his own community. Ibrahim's strategy seems to have 
backfired, as he often found himself dragged to court on accounts of defamation of 
character and slander, and he never became the Coptic representative he wanted to be 
(Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.3: 11-12). 
B. Journalism as a vehicle 
In the same way as journalists attempted to become politicians through their 
periodicals, aspiring politicians found in the press a ready and willing vehicle to spread 
their ideas. I have previously mentioned Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid (1872-1963) who founded 
the Party of the Nation and the newspaper al-Jarida in 1907. Coming from a family of 
landowners, he received his education at the Cairo Law School from which he graduated 
in 1894. He worked until 1907 as a lawyer, first as a prosecutor and then as in private 
practice (Goldsmith, 2000: 183). As-Sayyid then got together with a small number of 
notables and decided to found a newspaper that was truly "free, and that spoke for Egypt 
and Egypt alone, without having to support Turkey, the executive, or the real power in 
the country, a paper that was owned by the notables" (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 22). 
The newspaper introduced itself to its readers in its first issue:  
This is an Egyptian newspaper. Its slogan is moderation and honesty and 
it seeks to guide the Egyptian nation toward the proper path of 
evolution, advise the government and the nation as to the priorities and 
benefits to consider, and to criticize both individuals and government 
with full freedom [...]. Politics is the bringing together of people's 
opinions, for this is what a public opinion means [...]. But people in newly 
developed country still do not think about the public good and are rather 
taken by their private needs, that is until the newspapers reminds them 
daily that there is a public existence beyond the individual [...] (al-Jarida, 
March 9, 1907). 
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This is one more case of moderation gone wrong. Even though Ahmad Lutfi as-
Sayyid was generally well respected and he had close contacts with many high ranking 
officials, his political ambitions and career came to naught. His autobiography is an 
account of one failure after another in trying to implement anything in politics, and it 
seems that the only thing he managed to do successfully was write what he wanted in his 
newspaper. He suggested the adoption of an Egyptian flag; the British politely declined. 
He, along with Dawud Barakat, helped found a journalists syndicate in 1912 in which he 
was voted co-deputy; the efforts did not go beyond that and the syndicate was 
abandoned. He ran for election in 1913; he failed (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 81-86). 
This string of failures led him to eventually despair from politics altogether and even stop 
his work as a journalist (Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, 2013: 99-100). Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid's 
experience is a perfect example how cultural and social capitals during this period had 
taken a backseat to position-taking in the field of politics. It did not matter how educated 
one was, or whom in the government he personally knew. If he did not find a niche for 
his political opinion, the previous capitals could not become political capital and his 
involvement in politics would come to naught. 
Others chose a less conciliatory path, as the burgeoning secret societies began 
taking over newspapers to propagate their messages and project an image that went 
beyond their relative strength as a political group (Tauber, 1990: 167). A prominent 
member of jam'iyyat an-nahda al-lubnaniyya, the Lebanese Renaissance society, a secret 
society promoting independence for a Lebanese state along the lines of the 
mutasarrifiyya, Rizqallah Arqash managed to place members of the society at the head of 
most of Beirut and Lebanon's newspapers, including al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani, al-Ahwal, an-
Nasir, at-Thabat, al-Arz, Lisan al-Hal, and al-Mir'at (Tauber, 1990: 165). The 
Decentralization Party and the Reform Party also found their niches in their respective 
newspapers. The Decentralization Party, the most prominent Arab nationalist party at the 
time managed to gain support across the Arab world, and was therefore equally present 
in Cairo as it was in Beirut, represented there on the pages of al-Ahram, al-Miqdam, al-
Mahrusa, al-Manar, al-Mu'ayyad, and al-Muqattam (Tauber, 1990: 166). Why these 
political groups chose to invest their political capital in journalism and why they saw the 
press as the appropriate vehicle for their ideas is a very important indicator as to what 




IV. An autonomous field no more 
All these changes put together brought about the complete transformation of 
the field of journalism from an autonomous field to a sub-field of the political field. The 
first signs of this came when the dominant political class tried to challenge the rules 
within the field of journalism, until they were able to do so with the introduction of new 
forms of capital, social capital revolving around networks with this dominant class at their 
center. The social capital, being foreign to the field, i.e. generated within a different field 
and then invested in the field of journalism, was the first and most important element of 
this transition. At the same time, this process was accompanied by a clear challenge to 
the symbolic power of the state and its representative, the absolute ruler. This, in 
practice, was a result of the investment of symbolic capital on the behalf of journalists in 
the field of politics and specifically in what can be perceived as the sub-field of the state. 
In this case, it is conceivable to conflate the two since the shape of the political game, 
which can be labeled as absolute despotism, meant that the state was but a 
materialization of the authority and power of the ruler, especially when we consider the 
role and impact of the institutions of the state, and most notably the army, in 
consolidating a rule both in terms of authority and legitimacy. 
The result is that, like stated before, the relationship between the two fields 
involved the production of a particular form of capital in one, and its investment on the 
part of the field's dominant class in the other field, hoping to change the relations of 
domination there. Since this was a two-way process, this meant that each dominant class 
was also trying to preserve its position of dominance within its own field. The authorities 
had quite an advantage in this regard. They had ample supplies of different forms of 
capitals and they could also use a key tool in their hand, the symbolic power of the state 
taking in this case the form of the ultimate authority of the ruler, the legal framework of 
censorship, but also access to official information which they were its source. Journalists, 
on the other hand, only had their symbolic capital, the recognition they received from the 
product they placed on the market. Their production process served them more in this 
regard, as they managed through it to subvert the authorities attempts to infiltrate into 
the field. 
Eventually, what allowed journalists to go on the offensive was first the 
transformation of the political field, allowing them access. And, more importantly, 
journalists managed at this point to combine their symbolic capital with a weakness they 
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had suffered from before, their political exclusion and alienation. Since they shared this 
exclusion with ash-sha'b, the people, the common man, they were able to claim 
representative status over this people by voicing opinions in its name. 'Abd al-Latif Hamza 
([1958-1961]: 97) considered that the press during those years fulfilled its "true role of 
opinion journalism". His assessment reveals that opinions and position-taking were the 
most important components which allowed journalists to entirely assimilate the "mystery 
of ministry", the power of representation of a group which comes to exist because of this 
representation. In this case, the creation of opinions was combined with a position-taking 
that placed the journalists in the field of politics with people who came to be Arabs, 
Ottomans, Lebanese, or Egyptians, group identities which were represented by their 
respective press outlets by journalists who therefore spoke in their names. This mystery 
of ministry and the power of representation were therefore the ultimate demonstration 
that the symbolic capital generated by journalists within the field of journalism was being 
invested as political capital in the field of politics. 
This transformation affected all the elements of the field of journalism. The 
journalist who was once deemed worthy to read based on his education or the 
intellectual circles he belonged to was no more. During the closing years before the Great 
War, the journalist who attracted an audience was the one with better connections to 
political circles, and who could therefore gain better access to information and present 
more valuable opinions, as reflected by the success of newspapers that were by then 
focusing on "opinion journalism" rather than political analysis, as was the case with the 
second generation. The determining capital therefore shifted from the cultural to the 
social capital which became the most important component of the symbolic capital 
within the field. This symbolic capital, coupled with the power of representation, allowed 
journalists to present themselves as the legitimate speakers in the name of their 
communities. This act of representation only had value in the political field where the 
liberalization of the system was seemingly introducing the model of the modern 
Europeanized system of governance. As shown throughout this chapter, the apparent 
liberalization of the political system seemed for journalists to be the stash of leprechaun 
gold at the end of the rainbow they had been chasing ever since the threat or promise of 
Europe had revealed to them the superiority of this foreign system which they sought 
since so hard to emulate. 
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 The bigger implication here is that the goal from journalistic production had 
become the generating of political capital. It was the main objective of acquiring the 
mystery of ministry; and it was the main reason why political actor with little political 
capital, like secret societies, chose to pursue representation via journalistic production. 
Tauber (1990: 167) argued that, by using the press, these societies were in fact seeking to 
present themselves as more powerful and representative than they really are. The 
mechanisms which allowed this revolved around this newfound role of journalism. But 
most importantly, the generation of political capital from journalistic production meant 
that journalism could no longer be counted as an independent field. Journalistic 
production had become a process that was internal to the field of politics, operating 
based on capitals which were generated in the field of politics, with actors who saw 
themselves first and foremost as actors in the field of politics, and generated a capital 
which only served as an investment in the field of politics. Journalism had become a sub-






The role of the Arabic press, a path to a social theory of media 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the evolving roles that the Arabic press 
played throughout this period. I argue that the current theories that fall under the liberal 
paradigm do not explain any of these roles, as they impose a particular teleological and 
decontextualized reading on the role of media. In this case, it distorted the explanations 
offered in the literature about the roles the press played in Beirut and Cairo. It has been 
presented as a liberal and liberating force in society, whereas evidence shows that 
journalism was mostly a tool of political conservatism, accepting and participating in the 
game of elite politics, while it played at the social level the role of a mechanism through 
which journalists could climb the social ladder and gain recognition for it. The chapter will 
conclude with some notes and reflections on Bourdieu's theory, how it helped properly 
understand this case study and address the shortcomings of the current theories, as well 
as the obstacles it raised. 
 
I. The role of the Arabic press 
The question of what is the role of the Arabic press in the politics of the time is a 
very misleading question. It connotes that the press played a single role in politics, a trap 
in which the literature always fell, promoting a teleological analysis of that role. The usual 
story is that the Arabic press was a promoter of a vibrant bourgeois liberal democracy 
which was fought and nipped in the bud by tyrants, both homegrown or foreign, 
depending on the origins of the historian and the particular axe he has to grind. Filib di 
Tarrazi (1913), composing the first ever encyclopedic account of the Arabic press in the 
world, wrote his four volume book at the heyday of the first wave of Arab nationalism, 
and at a time when anti-Hamidian and anti-Turkish feelings were also at their height. His 
short analyses of some journalistic trends were often tainted by these feelings and he 
was one of the first to spread the myth that journalists escaped Beirut for Cairo during 
the late 1870s early 1880s because of censorship. 'Abd al-Latif Hamza ([1958-61]) read 
the history of the press as a step toward the liberation of the Arab world from European 
dominance. He wrote his book during the years when Nasser had united Egypt and Syria, 
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and the Nasserite Arab nationalist project was spearheading the national liberation 
movements in the region and even globally. Ami Ayalon (1992; 1995) wrote about a press 
that was desperately looking for its political freedom which it was achieving had it not 
been for the dictatorial Arab regimes that stifled it. He concluded his book, the only book 
in English dedicated to the history of the Arab press, with a note on Lebanese 
exceptionalism in the field of the press (Ayalon, 1995: 246). Lebanese exceptionalism was 
a topic of great interest to Israeli intellectuals who have been trying since the 1950s to 
argue that their newly created state was not a regional anomaly at the social and political 
levels.  The sociological reading of the history of the press in Beirut and Cairo, which I 
have advanced throughout this dissertation, allows us to escape this teleological trend 
that imposes conclusions based on the initial assumptions of the researcher, and answer 
the real question of what are the roles of what press in which context, thus bringing to 
the forefront the context within which that press operated. 
A. A press with no social role 
The first generation of journalists had accumulated cultural capital from the new 
educational institutions and needed an outlet where this capital could be invested. Some 
served as low-level administrators in the bureaucracy of the state, others as translators 
for European merchants and diplomats, and the rest remained teachers in the field of 
education. The prospective careers of this new educated class of professionals were very 
limited. Furthermore, their newly acquired knowledge was to a large extent socially 
useless. What good would it do to the village doctor to learn anatomy and pathology if all 
he needed to know to cast a leg or cure constipation was already available to him in 
traditional medicine. What would physics mean to the peasant whose only relationship 
to the moon and stars was dictated by the agricultural calendar. Knowledge learned in 
the missionary institutions had therefore no meaningful social value. This signified that 
journalists, and more broadly the new educated class of professionals, were also socially 
marginalized. They possessed a type of cultural capital which could not be identified by 
society, as they could not communicate with their surrounding in a meaningful way.  
Newspapers, a tool which could only be used if the consumer had the same 
cultural capital as the producer, was therefore a tool for propagating this newfound 
knowledge among the constituents of the same class. This could not have been 
represented better than by the invitations on the pages of the different newspapers of 
the time  for readers to contribute their thoughts and knowledge; at the same time, it 
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was for these same readers to judge the value and quality of their contributions , 
bestowing recognition on those who were deemed worthy and whose cultural capital 
was recognized as symbolic capital. Journalists and contributors gained famed by 
exhibiting their cultural capital on the pages of newspapers, which was the professed 
interest of the founders of the earliest Arabic newspapers, whether it was Rizqallah 
Hassun al-Halabi who jubilated when someone paid him enough attention by ordering his 
death, or Khalil al-Khuri who promised his writers fame and recognition. The first 
generation of journalists was therefore looking for recognition of cultural capital among 
peers; they were looking to be first among equals, going beyond what their education 
offered them in terms of possible careers. 
A dozen years passed before a change in outlook hit the nascent field of 
journalism. The succession of crises which shook the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s 
raised the need for a different kind of information, a type of information which was less 
devoted to scientific and literary innovation and more concerned with the developments 
of the state of affairs of the empire. As a result, journalism during this stage became 
divided between magazines and journals on the one hand, covering the same issues that 
the first generation of journalists were interested in, and newspapers on the other hand, 
covering a new topic, politics. Starting in 1870, but picking up more quickly in 1874, 
political newspapers began to appear. This was quite an innovative step, considering that 
even the word "political" held very little meaning at the time.10 It took more than a few 
years for the journalists themselves to formulate what the "political" meant and entailed, 
but were unable to present a consensus on that point. Traditionally, the political realm 
was warded off as the domain of the ruler and the ruler alone. Whether it was Islamic or 
imperial tradition, people had no say in the administration and politics of the realm. In 
practice, this meant that journalists were writing about a topic they knew very little 
about, prompting some to include issues like a familial dispute between a man and his 
wife in the political events section of their paper. It also meant that journalists were at 
the same time molding the public's conception of the political. They were shaping the 
demand for their product simply by defining it. 
                                                          
10 In Arabic the word siyasa, politics, traditionally held two major idiomatic meanings. In 1791, Az-
Zubaydi defined the first as the act of governing, and the person practicing the verb as the ruler. 
The second meant the taming and humiliation of beasts. This might indicate to some extent the 
type of governing that was meant in the first definition. See Faysal al-Hafyan, 2002. 
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But even with this shift in interest, journalists of the second generation could not 
transcend the social exclusion which had plagued the earlier generation. There was no 
room for them among the social and political elites. The political field was completely 
barred to those who did not already belong to the ruling elite, and even more so to 
people from the provinces. The social field was also restricted to them by the feudal-like 
social divisions to which they were but lowly newcomers. Similarly, the journalists as a 
class thought of themselves as better than the common man, completely rejecting the 
notion of belonging to the masses and did not even want to address the plebs whom they 
thought were uneducated ruffians who did not deserve the treasures of sciences and 
modern life. They had ascended in the social hierarchy high enough to no longer be 
reducible to members of the crowd, but not high enough to be accepted as an elite. This 
social seclusion allowed them to focus on their field, shaping the modus operandi of a 
journalist's behavior and the ethics that governed his writings. It was a period when the 
field of journalism was truly taking shape, but it was as marginal as the class which 
produced and consumed the journalistic product itself. 
B. The journalist as a political actor 
We could only start talking about a role of the press in the public sphere during 
the turbulent times of the 'Urabi Revolution in Egypt, when newspapers, for the first 
time, became engaged with their social surroundings. This is not to say that newspapers 
before that date did not address the social realities of their producers, since they clearly 
engaged the social issues of the day; we cannot forget Butrus al-Bustani's pamphlet, Nafir 
Surya, the clarion of Syria, in which he preached moving away from social action based 
on religious belonging in what many have described as the first call for secularism in Syria 
(Seikaly, 2002; Makdisi; 2002). But newspapers were rather detached in the sense that 
they only addressed a narrow audience consisting of the same social class that the 
journalists belonged to. They were to a large extent talking to themselves. But during the 
'Urabi Revolution, something changed in the behavior of journalists and in the way the 
perceived their social surroundings. It was a combination of the complete shattering of 
the authority and legitimacy of the ruler, khedive Isma'il, as well as a new and 
revolutionary conceptualization of the political brought about by the teachings of Jamal 
ad-Din al-Afghani, that opened up the political field for journalists to express political 
opinions for the first time (Hourani, 1983: 195). 
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But the change was not restricted to the shift of discourse from political analysis 
to political opinion, for this change required a perception of the legitimacy to produce 
political opinion which the journalists were only able to get by acquiring a representative 
status. They achieved this by shifting their audience from themselves, the educated class 
of professionals, to the "people", the common folk whom they had previously haughtily 
dismissed as inconsequential and inept. This shift took many forms. The Taqla brothers 
used for the first time the notion of ash-sha'b, the people, in its modern political 
connotation in their writings (Zolondek, 1965). Ya'qub as-Sannu' wrote in the vernacular 
that everyone understood rather than the grammatically correct fusha that few could 
fully follow (Kendall, 2006: 14-5; Fahmy, 2010). Others acted as street agitators, rousing 
the mobs to support the military in their takeover. By doing that, journalists galvanized 
people by giving them a voice, while people gave power to the opinion of the journalists 
who now came to represent them. The mystery of ministry had been discovered by the 
Arab journalist. His habitus evolved. He understood that he could play an actual role in 
politics if he could become the minister of the people, their representative, the one who 
could speak in their name, and the one who could, through his opinions, transform the 
rabble into a politically valuable force. He was now predisposed to carry this mantle if the 
legitimacy of the politically dominant class was threatened, as was the case during the 
'Urabi Revolution. 
The importance of this episode for the field of journalism cannot be stressed 
enough. For the first time, journalists played a truly public role in that they engaged with 
other social and even political groups. They became political actors themselves when 
their opinions, which they propagated through newspapers, turned the symbolic capital 
they generated in the field of journalism into political capital in the field of politics. They 
were investing in the political field the benefits of the recognition they received as 
journalists worth reading. During the early days of journalism, the consumption of the 
journalistic product by a small class of educated people the journalists belonged to 
served to give shape and form to the newspaper and to journalistic practice. But once the 
journalist managed to gain an audience which went beyond his immediate circle or class, 
the consumption of the journalistic product came to define the very role newspapers 
played in politics. This role was the introduction of the journalist as a political actor who 
could, given the right circumstances, garner enough political capital to affect the struggle 
within the field of politics. In a way, this was the ultimate desire of journalists who 
suffered social and political exclusion and marginality, but wished to be recognized above 
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the crowd, to "become famous", "more famous than fire on a banner" (Filib di Tarrazi, 
1913, vol.1: 55, 57). 
But once it had opened up to the field of politics, journalism no longer belonged 
to the journalists. Political authorities, having noticed the harm that the press could do in 
case of trouble, and recognizing the possible value it held if reigned, tirelessly worked 
toward bringing the private press under control. They did so by introducing new capitals 
into the field of journalism. Networks revolving around the main political figures of the 
time became synonymous with access to information. The palace of the sultan, that of 
the khedive, or the headquarters of the British consul-general became recognized 
political circles where journalists could gather to receive information, protection, and to a 
lesser extent, money. This new social capital came in parallel with measures that 
authorities took to shackle the ability journalists had to exhibit their cultural capital, 
which till then had been the backbone of their symbolic capital in the field of journalism. 
Censorship greatly restricted their ability to use words and language as freely as they did 
before. By the end of the 1880s, there came to be a struggle for dominance within the 
field of journalism, not among journalists themselves, but between some journalists and 
the politically dominant class which was trying to extend its domination into the field of 
journalism as well. 
Journalists used the arsenal of strategies at their disposal to counter this threat. 
The Arabic language, which constituted the core of their cultural capital, was malleable 
enough for them to escape censorship. Sometimes, they chose not to even do that, 
accepting or even calling for sanctions. This was for them a public act of resistance that 
legitimized their positions within the field as uncompromising journalists. The theatricals 
of resistance were for many of them as important as resistance itself, as many boasted of 
their exploits that resulted in the derision of the censor. For others, though, the focus 
was on acts of public resistance. Their words were meant to rouse the people rather than 
gain them notoriety. The difference between the two attitudes can be clearly attributed 
to whether the journalist belonged to the second or fourth generation of journalists. The 
second generation still focused on the importance of the journalist himself, a person who 
stands above the rest of society and who was still looking for public acknowledgment of 
that fact. The fourth generation, carrying the tradition of the third generation that calmly 
disappeared in exile after the failure of the 'Urabi Revolution, focused more on its social 
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surroundings, and most notably the common people whom it perceived to be at the core 
of the political value of the journalist. 
Acts of resistance, however, did not only target the political authorities' attempts 
to infringe on the journalists' dominant position in the field of journalism. It also targeted 
the position of dominance of the political elite in the political field itself. By resisting the 
absolute power of the ruler, which in this case materialized in his attempt to control the 
press, journalists were in fact challenging the legitimacy of the ruler's right to absolute 
governing. This came at a time when the ruler of Egypt was facing a crisis of legitimacy 
and the ruler of the Ottoman Empire was facing a crisis of authority, which meant that 
the field of politics was a field of struggle among different competing elites such as the 
sultan, the khedive, the British consul-general, and the Egyptian and Ottoman militaries. 
Journalists were necessarily drawn to this struggle since their position-taking in the field 
of politics coincided with the interests of one political actor or another. They 
conglomerated based on this position-taking, forming publically recognized circles and 
networks, thus providing journalists with information and protection, a social capital 
which became dominant in their own field. At that point, the dominant capital that drove 
the field of journalism became generated in the field of politics. The symbolic capital in 
the field of journalism was invested in the field of politics in the struggle for legitimacy, 
power, and authority, and was therefore transformed into political capital. Also, 
journalists began to see themselves as political actors and journalism became a vehicle 
for many marginal and aspiring political actors to spread their political ideas beyond their 
group strength. The field of journalism had become completely absorbed into the field of 
politics. 
The functions of the press shifted accordingly. For the producers of the 
journalistic product, the press was their ticket into becoming politically relevant. They 
supplied their audiences with political opinions. These opinions allowed the journalist to 
present himself as the face of the crowd, the embodiment of an audience, the "people", 
and therefore provided him with political capital, allowing him to maneuver the political 
field. This journalist who was once destined to work as a school teacher for the rest of his 
life now saw himself as deciding how the nation should be governed and where its future 
lay. The fact that this was little more than an illusion does not negate that many actually 
saw the press as a vehicle through which journalists also became politicians. The illusion, 
however, was that journalists believed that they had more political value than they 
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actually did. They really believed that politics was an act of public communication and 
they were undertaking this very particular form of political practice. 
C. The innovation of political communication 
This belief was reinforced by the fact that the suppliers of social capital, the 
political elites, also saw the press as a tool that changed the traditional practice of 
politics. In their struggle for legitimacy and authority, political actors saw newspapers as 
a new generator of political capital. It was the only tool which could effectively change 
the balance of power in the field of politics and through it, they could gain legitimacy and 
authority while depriving their opponents of theirs. Here, we must take a closer look at 
how we examined the field of politics because the sociological approach dismisses a 
simple and crude reality. In an imperial system like in the Ottoman Empire or the British 
dominions, political capital, legitimacy, laws, public perception, and many other such 
concepts hide the simple fact that true authority and power reside in the military 
capabilities of the political actor. This is why, for example, the British consul-general did 
not possess any legitimacy in Egypt, but had all the authority and power to govern. It is 
the same reason why Abdul Hamid had all the legitimacy he needed at the beginning of 
his reign, but had to slowly build his authority by increasing his control over the state 
bureaucracies, including the army. And while this fact remained hidden from the 
journalists back then, the major political actors clearly understood it and engaged with 
the press accordingly. 
The khedive could not challenge the consul-general's authority because British 
military power was vastly superior to his. The British consul-general, on the other hand, 
could not take away from the legitimacy of the khedive because nothing but military 
conquest justified his authority in Egypt. The sultan' power was also greatly restricted by 
the weakness of his armies, as he was unable to take back Egypt or defend the Balkans, 
thus greatly limiting his authority and legitimacy as the ghazi. The military, whether 
'Urabi at first, or the Young Turks who eventually overthrew Abdul Hamid, had no 
legitimate ground for their actions, but still managed to overthrow the absolute ruler and 
govern in his stead. All these political actors recognized that military power effectively 
granted political authority and power, and that whoever possessed more military power 
could not be realistically challenged. But, at the same time, military power by itself lacked 
legitimacy, a legitimacy which could not be gained because it always asserted itself on 
the ground at the expense of the legitimate ruler. Given this, the press offered political 
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actors a new and original tool which they could use, each to pursue what he lacks in the 
political field. It brought forward a new level at which politics could be played: the public. 
This change of venue from the politics of the palace to the politics of the public 
did not, however, translate into a change in the political field. The laymen still had no 
place in politics as there were no mechanisms through which people could participate in 
any way in decision-making, or even influence decision-makers. This is reflected in the 
way common people sometimes acted when faced with a political issue. They reverted to 
the mentality of the mob, either sacking the offices of newspapers they disagreed with, 
like what happened with al-Muqattam, or cheering for things they knew nothing about 
except that they were told that it was something to be happy about, like what happened 
when the Ottoman constitution was promulgated for the second time in 1908. This was a 
perfect instance that illustrates the level of public participation in politics. 
"Men and women in a common wave of enthusiasm moved on, radiating 
something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in such intense emotion that 
human deficiency and ugliness were for the time completely 
obliterated..." But what were they shouting for ? "Tell us what 
constitution means," shouted the crowd. "Constitution is such a great 
thing that those who do not know it are donkeys," answered a speaker 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 272). 
This is not a reflection on the lack of political education that the Ottoman populace 
exhibited during those years, for it is doubtful that many among the elites knew better, 
but rather on the relation that the public had with politics. They simply reflected the 
sentiments of the political elites and had absolutely no impact on policies and decision-
making in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Public opinion was still worthless in the 
political field. 
Why then were the elites interested in moving the venue of their struggle from 
the palace to the street? Why did they choose to include the press as part of their 
struggle within the field of politics? The answer lies in the impossibility of changing the 
status quo in the field of politics using traditional methods, especially when military 
capabilities are clear for everyone to judge and compare. About three-quarters of a 
century before, Muhammad 'Ali could gamble and pit his army against the Ottomans. But 
by the turn of the century, the discrepancy in military power between the different 
political actors simply made such games impossible. The public, which the different 
political actors could reach through the press, became an alternative framework for 
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political struggle among the elites. This process involved both politicians and journalists, 
and an exchange of capitals between them. The politician invested his person and 
position within the field of politics as social capital that the journalist took to the field of 
journalism. In turn, the journalist, having acquired political capital through the 
appropriation of representation, uses this capital to back the same politician, delegating 
this status of representative to him. This is best illustrated by khedive 'Abbas Hilmi who 
explained in his autobiography how his relationship to 'Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil 
worked. They said what he would have wanted to say ('Abbas Hilmi II, 1993, 112-3: 117) 
and he was at the center of the nationalist project they preached for in their editorials. 
From this angle, the press can be seen not only as a field that produced a 
particular cultural product, but also as an alternative institution from which legitimacy 
was derived. The institution which had previously served this purpose was neither strong 
nor obedient enough to fulfill this function.  An unruly military was actually the reason 
why the khedive lost his power in Egypt and the sultan lost his in the Ottoman Empire. 
Needless to say, not even the strongest of militaries could imbue legitimacy on the British 
occupation of Egypt. The old system of institutional legitimization, the bay'a, was 
therefore replaced by a more subtle form that allowed political players to present 
themselves as legitimate contenders in the field of politics. It was legitimacy via ministry 
and it was through the press that this ministry was achieved. This clearly materialized in 
the position-taking of journalists in the field of politics. Some journalists like 'Ali Yusuf 
and Mustafa Kamil opposed the British and therefore supported the khedive and the 
notables who stood behind him. Others like Faris Nimr and Ya'qub as-Sarruf sided with 
the British with whom they shared an ideological worldview, and therefore opposed the 
khedive and the sultan. Khalil Sarkis consistently supported the sultan, making his 
allegiance known on many public occasions (Filib di Tarrazi, 1913, vol.2: 133). It was not 
simply a matter of political opinions which these journalists shared with politicians. The 
closeness in the field of politics was more importantly dictated by the social capital which 
bound these journalists to the political elites, granting them access to information, 
protection, and, more importantly, the perceived image of closeness to the political field. 
By holding claims to representation, political elites sought to showcase their legitimate 
position within the field, no matter how little authority or power they had. The press 
therefore provided political actors with a new institution-like base for promoting and 




The role of the press from this perspective was to play the game of political 
legitimization by bestowing the image of public representation to the respective political 
actors who shared the position-taking of the journalist in the field of politics. The political 
inclusion of the journalist cannot be therefore seen as a process resulting from opening 
up of the political field in absolute terms. This opening up was indeed allowed by the 
main political players as much as it was sought after by journalists. It allowed journalists 
to be recognized as socially pertinent, while it provided a new venue for political 
contestation among the elites. Let us not forget that the political elites could have struck 
journalists down in the streets had they not really wanted their inclusion into the political 
field. Even at a time when we see different groups in Egyptian and Ottoman societies 
coming to the forefront of the political scene, groups like lawyers and provincial notables, 
they still participated in elite politics; they never truly managed to escape choosing one 
political figure or another to support. The only notable exception came with the rise of 
the different forms of local nationalisms in the Levant after the CUP began its open 
campaign of Turkification in 1913. But even then, it could be argued that it was still elite 
politics at play, since this ideological, intellectual, and political transformation in the 
rhetoric and discourse of the press came as a result of the breaking up of the old imperial 
system. The new elite, the Young Turks, was undertaking a project of flattening out 
identity differences across the Empire, which had been at the core of the social structure 
of the old system. The nationalist movements of the last years before World War I could, 
from this perspective, be read as powers of the status quo that the Young Turk revolution 
had shaken. 
But, in the final analysis, the heart of the issue remains the extent to which the 
press really represented a public defined as a conscious, informed, and interested group, 
or multiple groups of people, who truly consumed the news and political opinions on the 
pages of the different newspapers and who felt compelled or convinced to take the same 
position as the journalist in the political field. This form of public representation is simply 
assumed in the Western secondary literature because there is the possibility to actually 
assess it in empirical terms. But in a situation such as turn of the century Beirut and Cairo, 
to what extent can we really claim that the mystery of ministry reflected any true 
ministry, and not just only a mystery? Circulation numbers indicate that the press was 
consumed by a relatively very small number of individuals, mostly residing in urban areas. 
Can we therefore claim that it was a bourgeois or middle class representation? These 
questions are difficult to empirically answer because the very answer lies in the object of 
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study itself. The press, as Taha Husayn (1951: 4) described it, is the "record of modern 
life". In fact, it is the only truly complete record we have of a public life in Beirut and 
Cairo. This necessarily gives journalism a much more important and magnified role than it 
might have possibly had because of simple historiographical necessity. The lack of 
alternative evidence for daily public behavior leaves us with almost no other view on 
social reality back then than the one provided by the contemporary press. In simpler 
terms, the literature accepts the assessment on the importance of this class based on 
how this class described itself and its own vision of self-importance, which, as we have 
seen throughout this thesis, was a central socio-psychological issue for journalists. 
D. The value of political communication in an imperial context 
By May 6, 1916, Jamal pasha, commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, and later 
nicknamed al-jazzar, the butcher, had executed most of the Arab nationalists in Syria, 
and imprisoned and deported others. Many among them were journalists, including 'Abd 
al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, Ahmad Tabbara, Filib al-Khazin, Farid al-Khazin, and Sa'id 'Aql. Also 
among the executed were 'Abd al-Hamid Zahrawi, Shukri al-'Asali, Rushdi ash-Sham'a, 
and Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad al-'Azm, all of whom were either senators or members of 
parliament and many of whom were regular contributors to the press (Tauber, 2013: 45-
54; Antonius, 1938: 188-190). Jamal pasha also made the courts pass death sentences on 
activists outside of the reach of the empire, many of whom were journalists working in 
Egypt and parliamentarians who had realized this eventuality and escaped with their 
lives. In Cairo, as soon as the British felt that the opening up of the political field to other 
actors might endanger their dominance, they re-imposed censorship, dissolved the 
assembly, declared martial law, declared Egypt a protectorate, and deposed Khedive 
'Abbas Hilmi, installing his malleable uncle Husayn Kamil as sultan (Daly, 1998: 246). 
In both cases, we can notice how the previously advanced argument applies 
perfectly. The truth that political elites recognized and the reason for why they chose to 
bring their political struggle to the realm of the public was that it was impossible to 
conduct political struggle in an imperial system without the possession of enough 
capacity for physical violence. This was one aspect of the political field which journalists 
did not recognize in their bid for becoming actors in the political field themselves. It was 
one card in the hands of the governing elites to play whenever they felt that they needed 
to revert back to the old style of absolute rule at a time when legitimacy was no longer a 
very sought after goal. In fact, the British closed down newspapers in Egypt to prevent 
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the Ottoman sultan from using his legitimacy as the ultimate ruler of all Muslims and 
causing them trouble in the opening years of the war. They no longer needed to promote 
their own legitimacy given wartime exigencies. The same applied for the Turkish military 
who saw in the Arab nationalist project a problem for their presence in the Arab 
provinces of the Empire. This means that practicing politics as an act of communication 
was an interesting new experience in the Arab world prior to World War I, but that, at 
the same time, this communicative level was very far from being actually effective in 
terms of practical rule which still relied on the possession of the means for physical 
violence. 
This means that, at the level of communication, the press played a seemingly 
important role. It was the loud cry of a modern educated class that permitted it to voice 
opinions, share their worldview, and even participate to some extent in the process of 
shaping social reality by crafting said reality in the eyes of anyone who could read their 
product and therefore examine the politics of the day on the pages of their newspapers. 
This might seem very important if we do not recognize that politics in the Ottoman 
Empire and Egypt was not a discursive practice, but one of violence and counter-violence. 
The political elites who welcomed journalists in their midst understood this fact. They 
played the game of politics accordingly. But the journalists, born from the bosom of a 
different worldview, a liberal and modernist ideology of progress and liberation, had very 
little experience of the political. Their only experience, in fact, was at a time when the 
political field in the Ottoman Empire was experiencing crises and uncertainty with an 
external threat. The only political violence that journalists therefore experienced was one 
which pitted the Empire against foreign powers, and never that of an empire establishing 
power internally. Politics was a multi-layered realm where legitimacy, authority, and 
power, were never truly sought simultaneously and journalists could hardly acknowledge 
this fact, since the social reality they were themselves shaped by was completely 
detached from that of the local population, as acknowledged in the literature in the 
dichotomy between modern and traditional and the different shades that occupy the 
space between these two archetypal views. 
It is also important to acknowledge these shades, not only because revisionist 
historiography challenges the absolute dichotomy between modern and traditional, but 
more importantly because they help explain the different predispositions of certain 
actors in the field of journalism and the way they perceived their social milieu. For how 
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else could we explain the ideological differences between the second generation of 
journalists who received its education in missionary educational institutions, and the 
journalists who inflamed their readers right before the war and who received their 
education at government professional schools. Each learned of a different modernity, or 
more precisely a different path to modernity. At the same time, each had a different 
history with modernity. Sharabi makes a plausible case with his psycho-sociological 
reading of the Arab intellectual of what he calls the first phase, in which he argued that 
Christian intellectuals in Syria had a more profound attachment to the European liberal 
values, whereas their Muslim secular counterparts represented the "focal point of 
intellectual polarity of this period" (Sharabi, 1970: 3, 87). But irrespective of this divide, 
all journalists had a particular perspective of the type of politics they wanted to be 
involved in and the type of politics they practiced before World War I. It was a politics of 
communication, where discourse translated into the political capital necessary to practice 
politics in the sense of policy-making, mainly under the different titles of reforms, 
identity, representation, rights, etc. But simply because they saw the world of politics 
that way did not magically transform it to be so. Politics at its most liberal stage in the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt followed Frederick the Great's saying: "my people and I have 
come to an agreement that satisfies us both. They are to say what they please, and I am 
to do what I please" (Knowles, 1999: 324). 
 
II. The Arabic press, pluralist or elite-driven? 
In this section, I will examine how the case study of the rise of the private Arabic 
press can shed light on the debate between the liberal and critical interpretations of the 
role of media in society and more precisely politics. This will reveal that the dichotomy 
between the two archetypal categories is both empirically and theoretically irrelevant to 
a context that differed from the experience of modern Europe, and that the assumptions 
that underline both arguments do not apply because they rely heavily on the model of 
the Western liberal capitalist society. 
A. Pluralist neither in practice nor function 
The pluralist argument can be broadly divided between two major themes. The 
first revolves around the function of the press in informing its audience of political 
developments for this audience to politically act based on an informed decision (Keane, 
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1992; Lazarsfeld et.al., 1968; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). In the context of Beirut and Cairo 
prior to World War I, this argument is simply meaningless on many levels. First, most 
information during this period was still spread through traditional methods of 
communication rather than modern media outlets. If someone wanted to know about 
general developments, the mosque, market, or church were the places to go. The 
physical space was a very important medium for the travel of information, as it was more 
easily accessible both in terms of physical presence, as well as in the format of the 
information found there. It was orally transmitted and the language of information was 
the spoken everyday vernacular, instead of the formal literary writing style that was 
found in the newspaper. The high illiteracy rates and difficult economic conditions of the 
great majority of the population made newspapers highly inaccessible. Furthermore, 
newspapers offered a subject of great disinterest to the local population. As discussed 
throughout this dissertation, this was the result of the intellectual and social alienation of 
the journalists for the first three decades under study here. Even when newspapers still 
qualified as an educational cultural product, covering scientific and literary topics, the 
knowledge produced on their pages had very little value in the lives of the locals. 
It is even more difficult to conceive that newspapers became more relevant once 
they turned "political". The "political" was a foreign realm that people, whether peasants 
or educated professionals, had nothing at all to do with. It was the realm of the ruler, and 
they were nothing but the ruled. The very base concept of siyasa, "politics", had to be 
invented. Once it did, the informational element which used to qualify newspapers was 
replaced by the production of political opinions. Journalism was no longer about 
informing a public, irrespective of who that public was, but about propagating political 
views. Not only that, but newspapers like al-Ahram that mainly, but not exclusively, 
focused on producing information rather than opinions, introducing the art of 
investigative journalism and news reporting into journalistic practice, had to take a 
backseat to the more politically committed newspapers, as attested by their distribution 
numbers (Ayalon, 1995: 148; Ryad, 2009: 38). The few people who read newspapers had 
no appetite for information. 
The second theme of the pluralist argument is that media reflects public opinion. 
It is a representative tool or institution (Katz et.al., 1973; Chowdhury, 2004). This theme 
is highly relevant to this case, since this representative status is exactly what journalists 
relied on to garner political capital and give weight and worth to their political ideas and 
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opinions. The big question here, however, is to what extent was this representativeness 
actually representative? The way in which journalists acquired their representative 
status, and that Bourdieu aptly qualified as "mystery", is nothing more than an assumed 
role we bestow on the producer of the journalistic product because of the assumption 
that, if people read their newspapers, then they must identify with their ideas. The 
question in this case, however, is that this assumption presents a leap from identification 
to representation. This leap deprives the audience of its agency to actually reject, rather 
than accept, this representation. In relation to this case study, there was no alternative 
institution which could justify the claim of the validity of the representative status. In 
liberal Europe, opinion polls and elections might be an indicator that the ministry was 
actually there. It is this process of audience feedback which allows an individual who 
speaks in the name of the group to actually prove and justify his representative status. 
There is a way to assess the strength of the group and that the group in fact identifies 
with its minister. In Beirut and Egypt, there was no such feedback process, whether 
institutional or otherwise. In fact, if people's reaction to journalists is evidence of 
anything, it is that the journalists did not really create a group by qualifying it as such and 
speaking in its name. A striking fact that corroborates this argument is to be found in the 
gloomy accounts of the executions of journalists by order of Jamal Pasha. In the lengthy 
accounts of these events, not once is there mention of any popular reaction to the 
executions (Tauber, 2013: 47-52). Even politically active individuals, whom we can count 
as the constituents of the politically active journalists and the group whom they shaped 
and represented, were merely counted in the dozens. In fact, the first account to give 
prominence to these events was produced as late as 1955 (Volk, 2010: 42), one more 
indicator that journalists truly held very little representative status at the time their ideas 
were supposedly shaping public consciousness. This, however, does not mean that the 
journalist did not perceive himself and politically act and speak as if representing a group, 
a point which will be addressed in the next section of this chapter. 
Finally, I want to address the possibility of considering a sort of relative pluralism 
and understand the role of the press in the Arab world as pluralist in context, which 
means that the press played as much a pluralist role as the political and social context 
permitted. It was, after all, an intellectual platform where ideas, such as the redefinition 
of the political as a field that included the opinions of other elements than the ruling 
elites, were formulated. It was also a mechanism through which individuals acquired 
political capital that allowed them to become political actors in a field which was 
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previously exclusive of their class. On this point, we cannot disregard neither the content 
of the political messages across the different political newspapers, nor the function that 
the press played for the political elites. The position-taking of journalists, which placed 
them close to political actors within the field of politics, as well as the exchange in 
capitals between these groups, meant that the political messages promoted through the 
press really functioned as a rallying cry for different political elites who represented 
different political ideas. Furthermore, elites used the press as a legitimizing mechanism 
through which they scored legitimacy points against one another. This interpretation of 
the role of the press clearly shows that it was attached to the same political actors of the 
pre-opening up period, and that it merely substituted an old mode of institutional 
legitimization with a new "modern" one, but that, in essence, it participated in the same 
elite politics that had always existed in the Empire. The inclusion of a new class into the 
field of politics was therefore not truly an act of liberalization of politics, inasmuch as it 
was a shift in the platform where elite politics was played. Even during the Great War, 
when journalists came to completely reject the standing political elites in the Arab East, 
they still waited for the advent of a new representative of the old elite, Husyan, the sharif 
of Mecca, to provide them with an acceptable alternative to the Young Turks and their 
failing sultanate. Even in relative terms, journalism in the Arab world was still playing the 
game of elite politics; journalists just wanted to get closer to those elites. 
B. Elite-driven, minus the elite 
The critical argument also revolves around multiple themes. The "follow the 
money" argument is core to the critical approach, and it promotes the idea that media 
behaves according to the financial interests of its owners (Murdock, 1982; Herman and 
Chomsky, 2002; Curran and Seaton, 2003). In this case, this argument can be very quickly 
dismissed since it was clearly demonstrated that economic capital played almost no role 
in the field of journalism in Beirut and Cairo. Journalists were not interested in money, 
the establishment of newspapers was not an expensive endeavor, and most journalists 
made a conscious choice of not being involved in mercantile enterprises, even though the 
nahda intellectual, as Zachs (2012) pointed out, was closely affiliated with a new class of 
urban merchants, a career which have definitely made more economic sense. Even 
though some journalists did make a fortune from their careers as journalists and 
newspaper owners,  the general image that a journalist used to bring in the minds of his 
contemporaries was one of poverty. 
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I must mention an exception here, Lisan al-Hal, one of the most enduring Arabic 
newspapers. All evidence tends to indicate that Lisan al-Hal started and was run as a 
financial enterprise. Its owner, Khalil Sarkis, as well as his successors, made a fortune 
from this business. It must be noted, however, that the newspaper was but a fraction of 
Sarkis' business, as he was the most prominent printer and publisher in Beirut (Ayalon, 
2008). It is very doubtful that Lisan al-Hal constituted his major source of revenue. This 
indicates that, like the rest of the second generation of journalists, the newspaper was, 
for him, a way to gain recognition. He accepted too many awards and medals throughout 
his life to simply disregard this because of his management style. Again, economic capital 
was in no way a decisive capital in the field of journalism, and it did not during this period 
dictate the journalists' practice. 
The other theme in the critical approach to the role of media is that of the 
propaganda approach. Media is seen to be serving elite interests by promoting their 
worldviews and opinions, thus framing the public's perspective of the political world, as 
well as setting the political agenda. Media therefore serves as a tool for population 
control (Chomsky, 2002; Baudrillard, 1982; Marcuse, 1964). Much evidence displayed in 
this dissertation points toward this argument as a possible explanation for the role of 
media in Beirut and Cairo prior to World War I. First and foremost, the networks that 
journalists created around particular camps in the political field generated the social 
capital necessary to produce their political opinions and analyses; it was the defining 
capital during the last stage of the development of journalism before the war. At face 
value, the journalists were representing the views of political elites, but a close 
examination of the production of these opinions revealed that they were simply a 
question of position-taking in the field, based on which political elites and journalists 
came to create these networks. With the exception of al-Muqattam, the different 
political elites did not initiate the formation of any newspaper, nor the formulation of any 
journalist's opinion. Journalists themselves chose when and if they wanted to be 
associated with a main political actor. Mustafa Kamil's story is but the most striking 
example. Unwavering in his position as an anti-colonial nationalist, he chose to end his 
relationship with the khedive and the palace nationalists when they opted for a more 
conciliatory tone toward the British. Journalists were generally more free to make their 
own choices and have their own preferences. Furthermore, there is absolutely no 
evidence of dictating or manipulating journalists' opinions on the part of the political 
elites. On the contrary, the position of many among them to oppose political authorities, 
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the political elite that had power, reinforces the argument that any coming together 
between journalists and elites was the result of a conscious choice of the journalist. The 
political elites could therefore enable or limit journalists' potential, but their sway over 
the field of journalism, and more specifically over the production process, was very 
shallow. 
But can we say the same of the relationship between the producer and the 
consumer of the journalistic product? Was the journalist not inculcating his audience 
with his political opinions? The most simple answer, in this case, is the value of 
journalism for the broad public in Beirut and Cairo which, as previously argued, 
amounted to very little. I must go back to the episode of the journalists' execution and 
the lack of public outcry to point out that, even when newspapers boasted about their 
daily circulation that amounted to the hundreds and thousands, the effect that they had 
on their readers was far from being described as socio-political control. Also, 
understanding journalism within the context in which it evolved revealed that one of the 
most prominent features that characterized its development was that the political field 
was completely barred to actors outside of the politically dominant class. The people had 
no weight in the political process. They had no function in the political field. Ownership of 
the layman, which Bourdieu (1981: 13) qualified as the ultimate function and goal of 
political communication, was to a large extent irrelevant in the case of pre-WWI Beirut 
and Cairo. This ownership generated no capital whatsoever, which makes us question 
whether it was at all a goal of journalists. The image of this ownership might have 
mattered, since the assumption that journalists represented a political group was at the 
heart of the generating of political capital. But effective representation was 
inconsequential. It did not matter if people were unaffected by a political opinion, as long 
as the journalist presented himself as their representative through such opinion. There 
was no need and no value for such a control. 
We must equally question to what extent was the journalist part of an "elite", a 
point which has been constantly addressed throughout this dissertation. Initially, the 
social marginality of the journalists was partly caused by their rejection by social elites. 
Socially, this remained the case across the period under study. Even when journalists 
managed to enter the field of politics and become recognized as a socially relevant class, 
they were still looked down on by the social elites, the case of 'Ali Yusuf's annulled 
marriage being a major example of this. Furthermore, as their role in the field of politics 
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attests, they remained to a large extent very marginal as political actors. They allowed 
the major political actors to promote an image of legitimacy by appropriating the mystery 
of ministry, but never played any actual role themselves. They saw themselves as 
politicians, they established political parties, and they ran for parliamentary elections in 
both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. But all this involvement in the field of politics was 
inconsequential. Politics was still a field of inter-elite and intra-elite struggles and the 
only true measure of a class' ability to dominate in the field remained its ability to 
effectively use physical violence. Journalists did not even recognize this. They were not 
part of the elite, nor did they have the chance to be so. From this perspective, it is 
difficult to argue for a type of elite-control through the press, since journalists never 
managed to become an elite, a class that was either dominant or vying for dominance in 
the political field. 
C. The liberal paradigm, or the failure of decontextualized assumptions 
One of the core findings of this dissertation was that, not only did journalism in 
the Arab East not play a role that promoted liberal democracy, but it also did not even 
seek to play such role. Many historical accounts, both in Arabic and English, fell in the 
mistake of simply assuming that journalists wanted to "mobiliz[e] public opinion and [...] 
increas[e] public involvement in political affairs" (Ayalon, 1992: 269). All the evidence 
produced in this dissertation suggests the opposite trend. Even when journalists spoke 
for the "people", their ultimate goal was to create an image of representation that would 
generate the political capital necessary to navigate the field of politics. This was not 
necessarily the product of a conscious and vicious attempt at population control, but 
rather the result of a political context in which people had a particular viewpoint of what 
the "political" entailed. Indeed, it was generally perceived that the political realm was the 
exclusive domain of the ruler. This meant that people did not think that they had the 
legitimate right to produce a political opinion and have no role in the realm of politics. 
The structure of the field of politics, represented by the actors operating in it, the 
relevant capitals they possessed, and the relations of domination within it, created a 
context where journalists and, more broadly, intellectuals in the Arab East were 
restricted in the scope through which they could perceive their public role. 
This materialized mostly in the way journalists formulated the ethics of their 
field. Being polite in demeanor and language, as well as promoting proper social values 
came to define the way a journalist should behave. Deference to authority, with the long 
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eulogies that preceded any mention of the ruler and the constant delegation of failure 
and responsibility onto his subordinates, was a strong sign that journalists constructed 
their role around very conservative socio-political values that revolved around respect of 
authority and the standing social order. Even when they came to challenge authorities, 
journalists could not escape this, which translated in the way they addressed one another 
and bickered over particular issues. The topic and arguments always came second to the 
personal insults in which journalists sought to present their opponents as morally 
debased and corrupt. Conformity, whether presented under the guise of politeness, 
authenticity, or morality, defined to a large extent the way these journalists perceived 
the limits of their social maneuverability. 
The evidence for this argument is not a new discovery. Most accounts of the 
history of the Arabic press during this period present very clear confirmation to this 
effect. Ayalon (1992, 267-8) quoted Butrus al-Bustani who did not want the press to 
"violate ... the right principles", which Ayalon correctly read as a "euphemism for political 
compliance". He noted that Khalil al-Khuri never deviated from the official bulletins which 
he reproduced on the pages of his newspaper (Ayalon, 1995: 32). Still, he went on to 
conclude that journalists wanted to transform political realities and, if they did not try, it 
meant that they were exercising caution (Ayalon, 1992: 269; 1995: 32). The problem, 
which the interpretation presented in this dissertation solves, is the imposition of the 
normative role that media should play instead of answering what role it did play. It is the 
socio-political decontextualization of media and the consequent imposition of a foreign 
interpretation of its supposed role, therefore clouding a possible grounded 
understanding of this role. 
This is one of the major shortcomings of the critical theories of media. They all try 
to impose this same normative teleological understanding of what role media should 
play, as a solution to the supposed lacking role it actually plays (Habermas, 1989; 
Bourdieu, 1996). As a result, all these theories begin with the assumption that there is a 
particular goal toward which our understanding of media ought to take us. This greatly 
distorts our understanding of the evolution of said media, as is the case with all the 
accounts on the history of the Arab press. Contextualization, as presented in this 
dissertation, offers a solution to this problem and allows for a clearer, more precise, and 
empirically correct interpretation of the role of media, an interpretation which escapes 
the imposition of normative judgments that unconsciously dictates conclusions. The case 
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of the development of the Arab press in Beirut and Cairo indeed demonstrated that the 
entire liberal paradigm, as presented by both pluralist and critical camps, could not 
explain the role that journalism played in the two cities. 
 
III. Revisiting Bourdieu's theory, toward new ways to understand media's role 
Bourdieu's theory has become increasingly en vogue in the different disciplines 
studying media. Some criticize it, others use it like a bible, but it seems that engaging 
with the theory of fields has become a necessary step of sorts for different sociologists. 
Nick Couldry (2003), a professor of media studies, chastises Bourdieu for not going far 
enough and identifying a "media meta-capital". Critical Discourse Analysis theorists 
Norman Fairclough and Lilie Chouliariaki (1999) argued that Bourdieu's theories simplify 
the role of language and conflate discourse with social reality. They call for the 
consideration of a "linguistic capital". These calls for the elaboration of a more complex 
and diverse theory are in contrast with the position of most French sociologists who 
adopt Bourdieu's theory to the letter (Champagne, 2000; 2005; 2006; 2011; Marchetti, 
2002a; 2002b; Benson and Neveu, 2005). In this thesis, I have shown that Bourdieu's 
theory can help us better understand the role of media because it allows for a 
contextualized and multi-layered analysis of that role. Still, it did not come without some 
challenges and shortcomings that will be addressed here to try and point the way toward 
a theoretical conceptualization of the role of media in politics. 
A. Bourdieu and the field of journalism 
One of the main reasons for having adopted Bourdieu's theory of fields in this 
thesis was that it allows for a simultaneous analysis at the structural and agential levels, 
which most other theories consider to be an irrevocable antagonism. But the macro and 
micro-levels were not the only layers that Bourdieu's theory allowed me to develop. 
Indeed, the social space, as Bourdieu understood it, was the collection of the different 
social fields that constituted social life. These fields, like education, even though they are 
not part of the macro-level structure, i.e. the economy, an ideological zeitgeist, etc., act 
as elements structuring the psyche and social position of actors, therefore determining 
their predispositions, shaping their habitus in more concrete ways than a structuralist 
analysis would permit. His theory therefore offers three distinct, yet complementary 
levels of analysis, the macro, meso, and micro levels. It was therefore possible to lay 
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together the three spheres in which journalists, readers, and investors in the field of 
journalism were formed as actors, and practiced their roles in the field. 
The macro-level, which is denoted by the "social space" connotation, but which I 
chose to examine in less theoretical terms, revealed the impact of the changing economic 
order in the Middle East, a change which brought with it a major intellectual challenge 
represented by the ideology of modernity and modernism. Within this broad sphere 
encompassing both materialist and idealist contexts, I looked at the fields within which 
journalism was born, and was later absorbed: the fields of education and politics, 
respectively. Linking these fields, the capitals which determined and delineated them, 
and the struggles within them, to different social classes, here understood from 
Bourdieu's (1985: 725) definition of a social class as "sets of agents who occupy similar 
positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar 
conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and 
therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances", allowed me to 
reconstruct the meso-level of analysis, a level which was structured by the social 
structures, but structured the social actors themselves. Finally, at the micro-level, 
Bourdieu's theory allowed for a psycho-sociological understanding of the different actors 
in the examined fields. Practice, ethics, beliefs, language, and the perception of the social 
world could then be presented from a historicist perspective, thus contextualizing 
thought and action without imposing on the actor a de-historicized version of what they 
were doing and thinking. 
Aside from these three levels of analysis, Bourdieu's conceptualization of a field 
of cultural production, like the field of journalism, in terms that are similar to economic 
production allowed for a differentiation of the actors and classes of actors in the field. 
Investor, producer, or consumer, each actor had a different attitude toward the press, 
each saw its role differently, and each used it in a different way from one another. Not 
only that, but the journalism had a different function for each of these actors at the 
different levels of analysis. In the search for an answer to a question as broad as what are 
the roles of which media in which context, Bourdieu's theory offered us with an analytic 
plan that, if crudely drawn, can be best described as chessboard, where each case 
constitutes the intersecting point between the level of analysis and the particular social 
layer, here understood as a vertical line dividing different social classes. The answer was 
therefore position-specific. The press fulfilled a particular function for certain journalists 
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as individuals, and another function that they fulfilled at the structural level, for example. 
Similarly, it had different functions for the different political elites, etc... Including the 
variable of time to show how these roles evolve historically as a reaction to changing 
social contexts, which I have presented as changes in adjoining fields, added one more 
dimension that demonstrates the extent to which Bourdieu's social theory allows for an 
all-encompassing analysis of jouranlism. 
The closest thing in the literature to come close to such a complete 
understanding of the role of media in society comes from the discipline of critical social 
history of media, with a few historical accounts that manage to cover most, but not all of 
the multiple aspects which Bourdieu's theory sheds light on (for example, see Conboy, 
2004; Briggs and Burke, 2009). Others within the discipline approach more narrow 
aspects of the topic, like the ethics of journalism or the communicative process, but 
successfully adopt a similar approach that combines the big picture with the small details, 
the sociological with the historical, to produce a contextualized account both at the social 
and intellectual levels (Thompson, 1995; Ward, 2004). Bourdieu's theory appears to be 
the only theoretical framework which could offer the possibility to combine disciplines 
which have so far remained detached from one another, media history on the one hand, 
and the sociology of media on the other, in a way that offers a consistent prism through 
which each discipline might complement the other. 
This, as shown throughout this thesis, is a necessary step which the different 
disciplines that are interested in understanding the social role of media within the broad 
spectrum of media studies need to take. The historical and historicist approaches are the 
ultimate key to answering this question. First, the historical approach is needed to 
properly contextualize the development of media in relation to the developing social 
world around it. It is therefore the first step to escaping the teleological analyses that 
currently pervade the literature. Second, the historicist approach, which even critical 
social historians sometime miss, remains the ultimate tool to escaping the imposing of 
normative values, assumptions, and expectations on the development of media in a 
particular context. This has traditionally been the criticism advanced against scholars 
such as Jurgen Habermas (1989), who imposed not only his own norms and values on the 
past, but even his own interpretation of what the views of journalists from the past were, 
a point which I have argued is also characteristic of Ayalon's  (1995) account of the Arabic 
press. But the most notable of such impositions remains that of the image of journalism 
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and media as supposed promoters of democracy, liberal or otherwise, a theme which 
slices across the great majority of the current literature (Curran, 2002; Habermas, 1989; 
Bourdieu, 1996; Chomsky, 2002). 
Bourdieu's theory, in which he emphasizes a historical reading of the past, i.e. a 
reading of the past from the viewpoint of its contemporaries, a point which I have further 
methodologically developed by incorporating the thought of Quentin Skinner and the 
Cambridge School of intellectual history, advances a very important solution to this 
normative burden. This approach promotes a truly contextualized understanding of the 
thought process of the actors studied. It is not, for example, for us academics to impose 
our vision of the political onto journalists, whether those from the past, or currently 
operating in non-Westphalian and non-liberal contexts, those who think differently and 
conceptualize the world differently than the academics who study them and are 
overwhelmingly Western or Western-based. This is why I searched for their 
understanding of the "political" both linguistically and thematically, in order to see how 
they understood this social activity, which, as shown before, was completely different 
than the one which has been imposed on them in the literature. 
It is thus that we must understand Bourdieu's theory and its importance to the 
study of medias, their different roles in different societies, how they operate, how they 
are perceived by different social actors, etc... It is a multi-layered approach that 
contextualizes media on different levels at which analysis is undertaken, therefore 
offering a very important critical alternative to the current theories on the roles that 
media play. This is not to say, however, that the theory of fields did not need some 
tweaking to better address this particular case study and the specific aim of this research 
project. 
B. Some notes on the obstacles facing the theory 
In this research, I did not find a need to come up with any alternative "meta-
capital", as suggested by Bourdieu's critics. And even though I sympathize with their 
recommendations, for it is normal that they consider their fields, and consequently their 
lives' work, important and complex enough to deserve a meta-capital of their own, 
Bourdieu's theory provided all the tools necessary for a complete understanding of this 
case study without having to resort to further complications and needless complexities. 
In fact, one of the key issues that I had to deal with was that I sometimes needed to 
187 
 
further simplify his theory, or at least disregard some aspects of it, to advance the 
relevant argument. The main obstacles that truly faced the use of the theory of fields in 
this research were mainly that I was employing it in a context that was completely 
different from the one Bourdieu usually conducts his studies on, and it therefore needed 
to be adjusted accordingly. It is important to note here that Bourdieu (1981; 2000b) 
himself acknowledges this shortcoming when he clearly states that what he is looking at 
in terms of empirical evidence is mainly coming from liberal parliamentary democracies, 
while he conceived of his theory as being critical of, and transcending, liberal social views. 
a. A non-Western case-study 
This issue first materialized when I had to disregard geographical boundaries and 
divisions in a way as to make the state as a national entity irrelevant. This was because 
the Ottoman Empire was not a Westphalian state. It was, as its name suggest, an empire. 
Its territory was never clearly delineated, nor did it ever accept a demarcated and fixed 
border; the logic of a border was a very fluid one, even internally, and sovereignty over 
the realm was negotiated differently at different times. The most important facet of this 
argument is that we cannot, in such case, divide populations and societies in geopolitical 
terms. It does not matter that Cairo and Beirut were two cities in different provinces, and 
eventually in different states, if people moved from one city to the next as if they were 
one, and, more importantly for our case study, if the literary elite was the same in the 
two cities. 
Second, being a non-Western state, and more specifically an Eastern empire, 
meant that the culture of governing was different from the contemporary European 
state. Autocratic rule and the use of physical violence was the norm. This is not to say 
that Western states do not use violence in the same, if not in a more vicious way. But in 
the empires of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the use of violence was the 
legitimate and unquestionable right of the ruler. This aspect of social behavior is 
completely absent from Bourdieu's theory, most probably because the use of physical 
violence in such cases is not really a question of interest for sociological analysis. A 
realist, albeit cynical, understanding of politics would suffice in such cases. In fact, it was 
the ultimate component which explained the true limitations journalists faced in this 
context, but were completely unaware of, a fact which brought about their untimely and 
gruesome demise. I must note here that this aspect of politics persisted well into the 
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future, and some might say till the present, even when the region fell under the 
"benevolent" rule of the mandatory great powers, France and Britain. 
b. Politics of non-communication 
Baudrillard (1982; 1985) advanced a theory of non-communication. He based this 
argument on a philosophical understanding of what media is; if communication is 
understood to be an exchange, a dialogue, "a reciprocal space of speech and response," 
then media can no longer fit within the category of communication because it simply 
represents a medium of a one way flow of information, and therefore non-
communication. The issue of non-communication for the purposes of this thesis was 
never related to media. In fact, journalism in the Arab world was a prime example for the 
possibility of media to play the role of a platform for dialogue, as exemplified by the 
participation of the readers in producing analyses and opinions on the pages of the 
different newspapers. 
Non-communication in the case of the political and journalistic fields in Beirut 
and Cairo took place at the level of politics. All of Bourdieu's definitions of the "political" 
and the political field revolved around the process of communication, mainly because, as 
mentioned before, he based his observations on the case of the political system in 
Europe, and mostly France. He understood politics as a communicative process through 
which the politician seeks to control the non-politician through representation. In this 
case, the political process was a completely different one, for the control over the non-
politician, absolute rule, was enshrined in the culture and laws of the empire. 
Furthermore, unlike the modern European experience of politics, the question of what to 
do with this control over the layman in the field of politics was necessary to address. The 
findings of this study were that this control only imbued its owner with legitimacy, a 
legitimacy that was to a large extent useless, since it translated into neither authority nor 
power in the political field. It was therefore necessary to understand the political field in 
different terms. Still, even though Bourdieu's understanding of what the political field 
entailed was not valid to this case, his broader theory still applied and allowed me to 
reconstruct how different political actors behaved in relation to one another and how 
they perceived their struggles for dominance over the field. 
c. The historical narrative and the sociological approach 
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The final note is about the approach to the presentation of the study which I 
have adopted in this thesis. At many points, the historical narrative took precedence over 
the sociological interpretation, most notably in Chapter IV, where I have presented the 
social space from a historical rather than a sociological perspective. This was the result of 
a personal choice emanating from a preference to simplify whatever analysis that did not 
need over-examination. This is in fact a criticism I have of some of Bourdieu's work, most 
notably some which were directly related to Chapter IV, and in which he described the 
economic field and cross-contextual understanding of intellectual production. In his 
article on the economic field, he analyzed the economy in a traditional Marxian way, 
except that he did so using the terminology of his own theory (Bourdieu, 1997). The same 
goes for his understanding of the circulation of ideas, in which he promoted a 
contextualized reading of intellectual production in the same way Skinner had done more 
than two decades before, except that, again, Bourdieu used his own terminology to do so 
(Bourdieu, 2002; Skinner 1978). Using historical narrative in such cases did not, as a 
result, present a theoretical inconsistency, but rather demonstrated a point in a clearer 








This research project started as a realization that the debate between the 
pluralist and the critical theorists of the role of media in politics presented two layers. 
The first layer could be observed when the literature is read at face value. It is a debate 
between those who believe that media play a positive role in promoting liberal values in 
society, and those who believe that it is a tool in the hands of elites who try to control 
the population by inculcating it with their own worldviews, ideologies, and opinions. The 
second layer, however, is not as easily discernible. It lies in the normative assumptions 
exhibited by the many scholars and academics who have examined the relation between 
media and politics, and which have largely dictated the direction of their findings. 
Pluralists do not need to hide these particular assumptions, since they claim that media 
is, in effect, playing a liberal and democratic role. It was, however, more interesting to 
notice that critical theorists all share a common argument that, even though media play a 
subversive propaganda role that serves elite interests, the role it should be playing is a 
liberal and democratic one. The second-tier analysis of the literature reveals, as a result, 
a common underlying assumption among all theorists, which is that the role of media in 
politics ought to be a pluralist liberal one. As I argued in Chapter II, the pluralist/critical 
debate hides a consistent and coherent acceptance of the liberal paradigm at the 
normative level; the dispute is simply on whether or not media actually fulfill this 
supposed function. 
The question that arose from this realization specifically addressed the value-
laden assumption. What if media is not supposed to play such a liberal role to begin 
with? If our understanding of media behavior has been distorted by a preconceived 
notion that set a path of expectations from what media did, is doing, and is supposed to 
do, how can we then really lay claim to a true and truthful knowledge of media and its 
role in society? What made this question even more pertinent is the fact that all of the 
theories on media were born from within and dealt with the Western European and 




To answer this question, I utilized, as explained in Chapter III, Bourdieu's theory 
of fields. Bourdieu constructed this theory based on a non-liberal and non-Western case 
study, that of the tribes in Kabyle, and tailored it to escape the "presuppositions inherent 
in the position of an outside observer" (Bourdieu, 1977a: 2). Not only that, but it also 
offers a unique approach to sociology in which some of the major dichotomies, like 
structure and agency, and material and ideational, are efficiently combined to produce a 
theory that allows its users to inspect the different levels and layers that could affect the 
object of their study. This was essential to this thesis because of the nature of the 
question it is trying to solve. It is a question about the socio-political order inasmuch as it 
is about the production and consumption of news. Bourdieu's theory presented an 
approach through which I could therefore observe broad social transformations as 
structuring structures, while at the same time look at the individual actors and see them 
as agents who behave according to predispositions generated by their social position and 
evolving experiences, while choosing from a spectrum of possible behaviors. Bourdieu 
also proposed a set of conceptual tools which knit together the different elements of the 
case-study at hand to provide a dynamic image of its contextualized evolution. 
The choice of the case-study fell on the rise and evolution of the Arabic private 
press in Beirut and Cairo. First, it was because this presented a case where a local group 
of people embarked on an original and innovative endeavor, the publication of 
newspapers. Since the journalistic press was a foreign invention, the field of journalism 
had to be constructed from scratch, with producers, consumers, and observers slowly 
coming to grips with what exactly a newspaper was, what it contained, and what was its 
social function. The study was therefore a reconstruction of the formation of a field of 
journalism in a non-Western part of the world, where non-Western values and socio-
political norms prevailed. Also, this case remains till the present undeservingly 
understudied, with only one book written about it in the English language, Ami Ayalon's 
the Press in the Arab Middle East (1995), in addition to a few and very specialized 
historical accounts that disregard the social function that the Arabic press played before 
World War I. There was therefore a complete absence of a sociological reading of the 
role that the Arabic press played in the political sphere during those early years of its 
formation. 
In Chapter IV, I have examined how private journalism came to be in Beirut, as a 
result of major social, economic, and political changes that affected the region ever since 
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it became integrated into the global capitalist economy in which the Ottoman Empire 
could not efficiently compete. This gave rise to the ideology of modernism. The Ottoman 
sultan and the governor of Egypt embarked on separate but simultaneous attempts at 
modernizing their armies and their bureaucracies, which required a new breed of state 
employees. This meant that the old educational system had to be replaced with a new 
one that promoted modern sciences and the skills relevant to the modern age. The new 
educational institutions, both governmental and missionary ones, began to produce a 
new type of knowledge which served a very particular social function. Graduates enrolled 
in the army and the state bureaucracy, they worked as translators for European 
diplomats and merchants, and as school teachers in rural areas. 
For this new rising educated class, social prospects were bleak. Employment, 
even though almost guaranteed at this point in time, held very little promise in 
comparison with the wealth of knowledge that these individuals have come to acquire. 
The problem was that this knowledge had no social value outside of the modern 
institutions of the state. It could not be invested anywhere else in society. Modern 
sciences were still useless in a predominantly rural and traditional society. This was the 
context in which some individuals decided to use this knowledge of theirs in an attempt 
to find an elevated status that would have otherwise been denied to them. In 1858, Khalil 
al-Khuri began to publish the first private newspaper in Beirut, Hadiqat al-Akhbar. While 
it featured headlines concerning official declarations, its main interest lay in the realms of 
modern sciences, literature, and the promotion of social development. It was, as its 
owner-editor-writer professed on the first page of its first issue, a platform on which 
journalists were to exhibit their cultural capital, the knowledge they had acquired in the 
modern educational system, for their peers to judge and recognize. This was, from the 
beginning of the foundation of private journalism, the main aim of its producers: 
recognition as first among equals. 
This trend became more pronounced with the second generation of journalists, 
whose political newspapers began to appear in the early years of the 1870s. They claimed 
that their readers demanded political news and these journalists dedicated their papers 
to that. The only limitation they faced was that they had no clear picture as to what 
constituted the "political". Prior to that, politics had been the exclusive realm of the ruler, 
and people, especially in the provinces, had no say in government. Not having the 
legitimate right to speak of political matters meant that people in the provincial cities of 
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Beirut and Cairo did not know what "politics" exactly meant. It was a period of trial and 
error, as a definition of politics was being formulated on the pages of these newspapers. 
Editorials containing political analysis began to appear on the front pages. 
But, as I have argued in Chapter V, the social seclusion of the class to which the 
journalists belonged remained unbroken. The social elites rejected these social 
newcomers and the profession of journalism was looked down on. The journalists looked 
in the same way at the common man, whom they perceived to be inferior and unworthy 
of the knowledge they were propagating. The cultural capital they were exhibiting was 
only to be digested and judged by men of great taste, those same men who were 
supposed to contribute to the newspaper. This social seclusion gave the producers of the 
journalistic product the opportunity to develop the field internally, to consolidate the 
practices and develop the ethos of the journalist. The second generation continued on 
the footsteps of their predecessors on both accounts. Exhibiting cultural capital remained 
the cornerstone of the symbolic recognition within the field. This was done by continually 
showcasing the abilities of the journalists as translators and men of letters. As for the 
ethos of the journalist, it mainly revolved around socio-political conservative values, 
promoting conformity and obedience to authority. The journalist had evolved from being 
an educator to being a spectator. 
Then came the 'Urabi Revolution. This military coup, unlike the two coups in 
Istanbul which replaced two sultans in one year in 1876 and which were to a large extent 
palace coups, had the backing of many different social groups and classes. It was 
supported by the army, the notables, the peasants, professionals, and artisans. What 
'Urabi did was not only to dethrone khedive Isma'il, but he also shattered the legitimacy 
of the absolute ruler in the eyes of both the ruler's competitors in the political field and 
the broad public, the laymen. Journalists played an important role in these events, 
transposing this revolution onto their field as well. Influenced by the teachings of the 
revolutionary cleric, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, journalists in Cairo, who were still in 
their great majority Syrians, began to conceive of the political field and their role in it 
differently. 
First, their role was no longer restricted to spectating. They actively participated 
in the revolution, inciting the public and supporting the 'Urabists. Their product was no 
longer political analysis, but political opinion (Hourani, 1983: 195). Second, and more 
importantly, the journalist discovered the "people". The aversion to the common man 
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disappeared from the lexicon and the behavior of the third generation of journalists. 
They began to address the broad audience with a language that the less educated could 
understand. Some journalists even adopted the vernacular as their writing style, which 
proved to be a major success in terms of circulation. Others began to speak in the name 
of the sha'b, the people. The mere use of this idiom, instead of other previously used 
terminology that denoted the aimlessness and subservience of the masses, reflected this 
change in attitude on the part of the journalists. They had discovered and consciously 
adopted the "mystery of ministry", the power of representation that came with speaking 
in the name of the group. The journalist of that period was a revolutionary both on the 
streets and in the field of journalism. 
The third generation met a sad end with its exile and the failure of the 'Urabi 
revolution that came to an end when the British invaded and occupied Egypt. The British 
adopted a patient yet firm policy toward the press, an attitude which was paralleled by 
that of the Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II. This attitude was dictated by the realization 
that the old methods of political competition in an imperial context, i.e. military power 
and physical violence, could no longer change the political status quo. This competition 
had to be moved to a different arena, one where the stakes were different but 
competition possible. All the dominant political actors recognized that the press could 
play the role of the platform where such a competition could take place, as 
demonstrated in Chapter VII. 
The press resisted this encroachment from political actors for a while, and this 
resistance took two forms. Public acts of resistance focused on the journalist himself as 
the victim of political infringement on the press and the hero who sacrificed his position 
and career to counter it. This approach qualified the second generation of journalists who 
were still enshrined in their own practices that revolved around the symbolic recognition 
of the journalist. Acts of public resistance relegated the act of resistance onto the 
readers. It was the approach that the fourth generation of journalists adopted. They were 
influenced by the third generation and had adopted much of their innovations, most 
notably their identification with the broader public. 
Eventually, political actors capitalized on this division, and used the nascent 
differences within the field of journalism to create camps within it. Second generation 
journalists like Faris Nimr and Ya'qub as-Sarruf were sponsored by British authorities in 
Egypt and they established their newspaper, al-Muqattam, to counter the resistance that 
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the press was showing toward the occupying authorities. The fourth generation 
retaliated by becoming more aggressive in its rhetoric. This struggle took many forms, 
and the competition was pitting not only journalists among each other, but also political 
actors as well. The politicians, needing to shift political competition to the realm of the 
public, supported the different camps based on their position-taking in the field of 
politics. They supplied them with social capital that took the form of access to 
information, protection, and sometimes also prestige. In return, journalists, who had 
acquired a legitimacy to create political opinions ever since the image of the absolute 
ruler was shattered in the late 1870s, would delegate the ministry that came to be 
through  their speaking in the name of the group to the respective politician they 
conglomerated around. 
For journalists, this constituted the epitome of their desired accomplishments. 
Their role had achieved them symbolic recognition across all of society. In addition to 
their peers, they were now recognized by the broader public through the "mystery of 
ministry", and by the political elites who now associated with them. They had by then 
become political actors, shapers of political opinions. Their ministry, however, hid an 
important fact. It was an assumed representativeness. The question of whether or not 
they truly represented the people, as discussed throughout this thesis, is of great 
importance when the role of the press in politics needs to be assessed. All evidence tends 
to indicate that, by the turn of the century, even though the press enjoyed a relatively 
larger public resonance than it did when the second generation dominated the field, it 
remained a marginal social endeavor. By the closing years before World War I, not many 
people in and around Beirut and Cairo knew how to read, and even fewer cared about 
journalism and politics, a field which was still till then exclusionary. 
Journalists, however, did not recognize this fact, nor did they really understand 
how the political field, in which they were investing the symbolic capital they generated 
in the field of journalism, operated. They tried to play an increasing role in politics. They 
formed political parties and secret societies, ran for parliament, and challenged the 
legitimacy of the authorities. The journalist had become a politician. But he was faced 
with a major limitation. While politicians had understood that power in the field of 
politics came from the military capabilities of the political actor, his ability to effectively 
use physical violence, journalists believed that they could gain power through 
representation. The result of this mistaken view of the field of politics, the relevant 
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capitals within it, the rules of the political game, and the difference between legitimacy, 
authority, and power in an imperial context, cost the journalists very steeply. In Beirut, 
they were summarily executed. In Egypt, the printing presses were closed down, paper 
supply was cut, and newspapers were censored. Physical violence remained the most 
important tool in the hands of the dominant political class. 
The results of this historical examination of the rise of the press and its evolution 
over a period of six decades from 1858 till 1916 indicate that the Arabic press presents us 
with a model of media that does not fit neither the pluralist argument, nor the critical 
argument. Also, the second-tier aspect of the pluralist-critical debate, the overarching 
liberal paradigm which presents a normative liberal function to the media, does not apply 
in this case. As seen in Chapter VIII, the press in Beirut and Cairo never played the roles of 
a watchdog or a representative of public opinion, nor did it even want to play this role. 
Informing the public was impossible in form and in function since the press produced 
political opinion rather than political news and analyses, and the public also had no 
function in the political field, which renders the rationale of media as a watchdog 
irrelevant. Also, the representativeness of the journalist, which was at the basis of his 
apparent role in the political field, was largely assumed with no actual basis. Talking in 
the name of a "people" did not mean that this "people" was reading newspapers. In fact, 
all the way up to World War I, the newspapers audience remained to a large extent the 
same class that the journalist belonged to: people who were educated enough to be able 
to read and who had enough material wealth to afford the cost of a paper and the luxury 
of leisure time to read it. These are the same prerequisites that Bourdieu (1981, 4) 
argued the professional politician, the one seeking to represent others, needed to 
possess. In relation to the people of their own class, who constituted the great majority 
of their readers, the journalist had no relative advantage that would allow him to 
represent. His readers, who were of the same social status and who shared the same 
social position, would not have accepted that their persona be reduced to that of a 
simple anonymous individual in the crowd. This, incidentally, was the same reason some 
among them decided to pursue their careers in journalism to begin with. It was a one-
sided claim to representativeness. 
The critical arguments equally do not apply. Money was never a major motivator 
and it did not come to define much of the journalists' behavior prior to the war. The 
image of the vagrant and poor journalist even remained ingrained in people's minds till 
197 
 
after the war. Economic capital, as previously discussed, was never a capital which 
defined the field of journalism. As for the propaganda argument, elites never had a role 
in the production of opinions, as they had very little sway over journalists' thoughts. As 
for the relationship between the producer and the consumer of news, evidence showed 
that journalism had relatively very little impact on society and that people did not react 
strongly to the journalistic message. If any sort of public opinion was forming, it was 
unrelated to the press, or at least not generated by it. Finally, journalists did not 
constitute an elite, at least not in the political sense. They remained on the fringes of the 
political field, and there was no possibility of them ever becoming a dominant actor in 
that field. 
More importantly, the findings of this thesis show that the normative values 
underlying the liberal paradigm, which, as previously explained, overshadows the whole 
literature on the role of media, completely distort our understanding of this role. The 
liberal paradigm imposes a decontextualized and anachronistic analysis of the behavior of 
media and of the practice of journalism, which even gets to the point of misrepresenting 
facts to fit its dogmatic rhetoric. In this case, this can be easily observed in the writings of 
Ami Ayalon and how he imposed a particular interpretation on the evidence, even 
though it completely contradicted it. A genuine historical approach revealed that the 
concept of "politics" was completely different in the eyes and minds of the journalists, 
politicians, and the general public in Beirut and Cairo prior to World War I, and that this 
generated a particular mode of behavior which ran contrary to liberal values at the 
normative level. Journalism was mainly a tool of conservative politics, and the only 
change it brought was to provide enough political capital for journalists to integrate the 
field of politics as marginal players. 
On this note, it is important to point out several of the shortcomings of Ami 
Ayalon’s account of the history of the Arabic press if only because, twenty years after its 
publication, it remains the only English book so far to focus on the topic. These points, 
which I address in this thesis, are threefold. First, their root cause lies squarely within the 
same phenomenon I sought to address in this project, the pervading liberal paradigm 
that I critique and criticize. Ayalon’s the Press in the Arab Middle East could be read as a 
prime example of the liberal paradigm at play. Indeed, Ayalon went out of his way to try 
and find liberal trends in the work of the press, distorting evidence and imposing 
anachronistic and erroneous interpretations. He could not conceive of a different 
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function of the press, not because there was no other function, which this thesis clearly 
proves existed, but rather because he was still restricted by the Eurocentric expectations 
of how media ought to behave. 
In his account, the liberal paradigm clearly materializes in the second 
shortcoming – the one I address when using Quentin Skinner’s method of study of 
intellectual production -, his misinterpretation based on the imposition of intent that is 
alien to the historical subject, and reflective of the mindset of the historian himself. This 
anachronism stems from methodological pitfalls as much as from the ontological 
assumptions that drive his work. Methodologically, the imposing of intent generates 
many cases of misinterpretation that does not stand in the face of careful and critical 
assessment. One case that illustrates this claim is how Ayalon consistently claims that 
Khalil al-Khuri wanted to write one thing in his paper but did not, either because of fear 
from the authorities or to preserve his financial interests. The fact that there is no 
evidence to support his claim puts in question his explanatory narrative. Assuming intent 
in the stead of the historical actor is, in this case, a methodological flaw that distorts the 
whole interpretation, especially that it is repeated throughout the book. Ayalon often 
saw intent where there was none. 
But that is not all of the methodological problems that Ayalon’s history suffers 
from. The third issue with his account is that he often disregards evidence that does not 
comply with his version of events, a version which often emanates from his ahistorical 
interpretation of history. Sometimes, he even contradicts evidence he himself presents. 
For example, he provides his reader with ample evidence that the producers of 
newspapers in Beirut and Cairo were financially well off, or at least received sizeable 
subsidies, but goes on to argue that competition between newspapers was the main 
reason some of them went bankrupt and were forced to shut down. This is equally 
despite the fact that there were alternative explanations in the literature Ayalon was 
familiar with and cited extensively (like Filib di Tarrazi), but which he chose to disregard. 
Another more flagrant example targets his argument that newspapers in the Arab world 
were a force of liberal change and political liberation from oppressive authorities, except 
that many of the largest newspapers were either supporters of the governments in Egypt 
and the Ottoman Empire, or were neutral in the political struggles of the times. This is 
not to mention some of the logical lapses that plague his account, like claiming that 
effects precede causes (Ayalon, 1995: 34). 
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Having gone through the different limitations of Ayalon’s history, it becomes 
clear that this thesis offers a major reinterpretation or the rise and development of the 
Arabic press in Beirut and Cairo. It addresses each of the different methodological, 
conceptual, and normative problems Ayalon faces to produce a completely different 
understanding of the different roles that this press played at different times prior to 
World War I. 
From an empirical perspective, this study showed that the experience of Arab 
journalism, a non-Western media, could not be explained by the traditional theories of 
the media. Mass communication in a social, political, and cultural context that was 
different from Europe developed to perform different functions, and operated according 
to a different ethos than its European counterpart. This tells us that there is a true need 
for an alternative media theory that accounts for these contextual differences. Such 
theory specifically needs to reject wholesale the liberal paradigm, since it has so far been 
the major impediment in the face of a proper understanding of non-Western media and 
their social role. It is not enough to simply call for a "de-Westernizing" of media theory, 
like Curran and Park (2000) did, but still look at non-Western media and pass judgment 
according to Western values (Sreberny, 2000). Alternative and radical approaches to 
media seem to present an excellent starting point toward the formulation of such a 
theory, and I must repeat here a point I made in Chapter II. This research project must be 
read as part of the radical and alternative trends because of both the initial criticism to 
the applicability of a Eurocentric view to non-Western media, and also because of the 
conclusion reached that media behavior, ethos, and function cannot be properly assessed 
outside their proper context, or more precisely the context proper to their socio-
historical experience. 
This is not to say that any such alternative theory should be formulated from a 
cultural-relativist perspective, as it might seem to the reader that the proposed solution 
to oppose Eurocentrism would be to rely on quasi-disciplines such as area studies. The 
whole aim of critiquing the liberal paradigm was to show that the behavior of media is 
not restricted in scope to a single scope of assessment and, therefore, not restricted to 
the pluralist-critical duality. I have shown throughout this thesis that media can in fact 
play multiple roles, all of which do not perform a liberal or propaganda function. This 
raises a major question that the current literature needs to answer. By restricting the 
debate to the dichotomy generated by the liberal paradigm, how many functions of 
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media and practices of journalists have theorists missed? I do not claim to possess an 
answer to this question, but I do, however, stress that they definitely could have only 
produced partial knowledge about media, even in Western societies, because they were 
unwilling to look at a broader spectrum of possibilities. In the case of the first few 
decades of the evolution of the Arab press in two Arab cities, I have identified four 
different roles that journalists played at different times. They were educators, spectators, 
revolutionaries, and then low-impact politicians. The press, more broadly speaking, was a 
tool used by these journalists to rise in the social ranks and be recognized. It also served 
to define a new type of politics in the Empire, one which was by no means more inclusive 
than previous imperial politics. I could only imagine what a similar analysis of the 
evolution of Western media could yield in this regard. This takes me back to the point 
that the development of a new theory of media cannot be limited by a culturalist 
perspective. It needs to address media in all societies, but take into account the 
particular social context of each, a context which would have arisen from a particular 
historical evolution and experience. 
As shown in this dissertation, Bourdieu's theory of fields is an excellent starting 
point for such a theory. It allows for a reconstruction of the social space within which a 
particular field, in this case the field of media, operates. This approach properly situates 
the particular media under study within its proper contexts. I use the plural here because 
it is not just one context that affects the evolution of media. By virtue of it being a 
platform of social communication, media is logically affected by different factors. Culture, 
the economy, the intellectual sphere, politics, technology, etc., can all affect media in one 
way or another. More importantly, each can affect media separately. Bourdieu's 
conceptualization of the social space as the space where different social fields exist 
facilitates the examination of such factors and how they can each affect media; each of 
these factors can be studied as a separate field affecting the field of media in their own 
way. I have shown the importance of this approach in this study, when I have focused on 
the different fields which have each affected the development of media, be it the field of 
education, the field of politics, or the field of the state. I will not go through all the useful 
aspects of the theory of fields which I have already explained in Chapter III. It was enough 
to point out here the value of a theory that does not focus exclusively on the production 




In addition to that, I must stress the need to adopt a historical analysis of the 
evolution of media to properly understand its role in a particular society at a certain 
point. As seen in this thesis, the role of the journalist and of the press more broadly 
speaking developed across time, as an internal evolutionary process and also as a 
reaction to outside influences from other social fields. What is more relevant here is not 
that these roles changed, but the way in which they changed. Here, the concept of 
habitus is primordial in understanding this evolution because it shows, and rightly so, 
that past experiences within a field accumulate and present the actor within that field 
with an array of action choices and possibilities that emanate from these particular 
experiences. The habitus of an actor within the field of media, whether the journalist or 
the audience, the politician or the owner, is therefore not simply the perceived or 
conscious available choices at his disposal, which we can observe from a momentary 
observation, a still, or a snapshot of practice and action within a field, but the sum of past 
experiences of himself and his class which we, as observers, can only come to grasp when 
we look at the historical evolution of this actor. Furthermore, and also as shown 
throughout this thesis, the field of media evolves in reaction to outside forces and 
changes. This means that the evolution of other fields which affect the field of media 
must be examined from a historical perspective so see where particular changes might 
induce parallel transformation in media behavior and function. Just consider the 
enduring impact of the 'Urabi Revolution on the field of journalism. It presented the 
journalist with an opportunity to produce political opinions, and to connect with an 
audience he had previously shunned, an equal revolution in the field of journalism and 
the habitus of the journalist. 
By combining historical depth with sociological understanding, I have in fact tried 
to unite two separate disciplines which I believe would work much better together than 
apart, a point which James Curran (2002: 3) shared when he lamented: "despite this 
auspicious beginning, media history has since become marginalized. It is now the 
neglected grandparent of media studies: isolated, ignored, rarely visited by her 
offspring". In fact, arguments from the discipline of critical media history have repeatedly 
supported some of the assumptions of this thesis. Conboy (2004: 2-3) writes that his 
account: "seeks to recapture something of the overall chronology of journalism's 
development while rejecting any naive celebration of a triumph of the political freedom 
of our news media. [...] There is not and never has been a single unifying activity to be 
thought of as journalism". Historical insight is therefore not simply a question of luxury 
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which the sociologist of media might want to choose to indulge in or disregard if it proves 
too taxing. This is especially the case when this sociologist wants to impose a particular 
worldview on media, its behavior, and its social function. 
It is therefore through a combination of Bourdieu's theory of fields and critical 
historical analysis that a proper sociological theory of media could take shape. Not only 
would such a theory, or at the very least such an approach, answer the call of radical and 
alternative media scholars to escape Eurocentrism within media studies, but it would also 
allow Western perceptions of Western media to remove the veil of the liberal paradigm 
from their eyes and look at media with no particular expectations and preconceived 
notions that dictate the course of their often teleological analyses. Such a theory will 
have to resolve a very specific question that requires an immense answer: what are the 
roles of what media in what context? Only then would we be able to achieve true 
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